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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE YEAR 2003
By
Martin J. McMahon, Jr.
Ira B. Shepard
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand
the significance of, the most important judicial decisions and administrative
rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service and
Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months - and sometimes a
little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or
outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they
cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read
them all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles are
highlighted. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not
discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they
have led to administrative rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected
previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline, or
(4) they provide Many the opportunity mock our elected representatives. The
outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general interest [to the two of us,
at least] - income tax accounting rules, determination of gross income,
allowable deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate and
partnership taxation, exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties. It
deals summarily with qualified pension and profit sharing plans, and generally
does not deal with international taxation or specialized industries, such as
banking, insurance, and financial services. Please read this outline at your own
risk; we take no responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned
by our advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any
particular item right.
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I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Really kind taxpayer-favorable § 481 adjustments. Rev.
Proc. 2002-19, 2002-13 I.R.B. 696 (4/1/02). This revenue procedure modifies
Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1 C.B. 680, and Rev. Proc. 2002-9, 2002-3 I.R.B. 327
(1/22/02). It revises the revised rules for obtaining the IRS's consent to changes
in accounting methods. The most significant changes to Rev. Proc. 97-27 and
Rev. Proc. 2002-9 are: (1) allowing a taxpayer to change its method of
accounting prospectively, without audit protection, when the method to be
changed is an issue pending for a taxable year under examination or an issue
under consideration by either an appeals office or a federal court; and (2) taking
negative, i.e., taxpayer-favorable, § 481 (a) adjustments into account entirely in
the year of change. This revenue procedure was amplified and clarified by Rev.
Proc. 2002-54, 2002-35 I.R.B. 432 (8/14/02).
a. And just a little more for taxpayers in the name of
simplicity. REG-142605-02, Administration Simplification of Section 481(a)
Adjustment Periods in Various Regulations, 68 F.R. 25310 (5/12/03). Proposed
amendments to regulations under §§ 263A and 448 would allow taxpayers
changing a method of accounting to take any § 481(a) adjustments over the
same number of taxable years that is provided in the general guidance provided
under Rev. Proc. 92-27, 1997-1 C.B. 680 (as modified and amplified by Rev.
Proc. 2002-19, 2002-13 I.R.B. 696, and modified by Rev. Proc. 2002-54, 2002-
35 I.R.B. 432) for accounting method changes (four years for positive
adjustments and one year for negative adjustments].
2. Is it an accounting method or is it not?
a. Taxpayer's change in its cost recovery period is not
a change of accounting method. Brookshire Brothers Holding, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 320 F.3d 507, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-629, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,214 (5th Cir. 1/29/03), affig T.C. Memo. 2001-150 (6/22/01). The taxpayer
filed amended returns changing its cost recovery period for convenience stores
from 31.5 and 39 years to 15 years, as permitted by a Specialized Program
Coordinated Issue Paper. The IRS asserted that the change required consent
under § 446(e). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's (Judge Nims)
holding that Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (e)(2)(ii)(b) [providing that a change of useful
life is not an accounting method change] applied to changing the § 168 ACRS
cost recovery period. Although it did not need to do so to decide the case, the
Court of Appeals went a step further and reasoned that even if the switch in cost
recovery periods was a change in accounting methods, for the Commissioner to
have challenged the switch in cost recovery periods, he would have had to do
so for the first year in which the switch had been made, before the statute of
limitations had expired on that year.
b. Another case holding that a reclassification of
MACRS property is not a change of accounting method. Green Forest
Manufacturing Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-75 (3/14/03). The Tax
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Court (Judge Nims) followed Brookshire Brothers Holding, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 320 F.3d 507, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-629, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,214 (5th Cir. 1/29/03), affg T.C. Memo. 2001-150 (6/22/01), in holding
that reclassification of MACRS property used outside the U.S., which resulted
in a changed recovery period and method, was not a change of accounting
method. The court declined to follow Rev. Proc. 96-31, §2.01, 1996-1 C.B. 714,
providing that a change from not allowing depreciation to allowing depreciation
is a change of accounting method, because the guidance did not contain any
reasoning and thus was not entitled to deference under United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
S Note that the relief provided by Rev.
Proc. 96-31, updated by Rev. Proc. 2002-9, Rev. Proc. 2002-19, and Rev. Proc.
2004-11, infra, permits a deduction for all prior allowable depreciation that was
erroneously not taken by the taxpayer with respect to an asset owned by the
taxpayer. This relief is available to taxpayers who file a Form 3115 for a change
of accounting method with their income tax return for the year of sale, or,
preferably, at an earlier date.
c. However, new regulations provide that a change in
depreciation will generally constitute a change in accounting method. T.D.
9105, Changes in Computing Depreciation, 69 F.R. 5 (1/2/04); REG-126459-
03, 69 F.R. 42 (1/2/04). These final, temporary and proposed regulations
provide that changes in depreciation or amortization generally are changes in
accounting method under Reg. § 1.446-1 (e). Additionally, these regulations (1)
amend Reg. § 1.167(e)-1 to provide that certain changes in depreciation method
for property for which depreciation is determined only under § 167 are not
changes in accounting method, and (2) amend Reg. § 1.1016-3 to provide that
§ 1016(a)(2) does not permanently affect a taxpayer's lifetime income for
purposes of determining whether a change in depreciation or amortization is a
change in method of accounting.
* The useful life exception to the general
rule [that a change in depreciation method is a change in accounting] applies
only to property for which depreciation is determined under § 167. However,
a change to or from a useful life (or recovery period or amortization period) that
is specifically assigned by the Code, the regulations, or other guidance
published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin is a change in method of accounting.
* Other exceptions include (1) a change
in computing depreciation allowances made in the year in which the use of
property changes in the hands of the same taxpayer, (2) the making of a late
depreciation election or the revocation of a timely valid depreciation election,
and (3) a change in the placed-in-service date of an asset.
(1) Automatic consent procedure to
make a change in method of accounting for depreciable or amortizable
property after its disposition. Rev. Proc. 2004-11, 2004-3 I.R.B. 311
(12/31/03). This revenue procedure provides an automatic consent procedure
allowing a taxpayer to make a change in method of accounting under § 446(e)
for depreciable or amortizable property disposed of in the year of change. This
revenue procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2002-9 (as modified by Rev. Proc. 2002-
54, Rev. Proc. 2002-19, Rev. Proc. 2002-33, and as modified and clarified by
[Vol6:Sl
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Announcement 2002-17), and other revenue procedures to conform to Temp.
Reg. § 1.446-1 T(e)(2)(ii)(d), and waives the application of the two-year rule set
forth in Rev. Rul. 90-38, 1990-1 C.B. 57, for certain changes in depreciation or
amortization.
0 Extensive portions of the Appendix of
Rev. Proc. 2002-9 are deleted and replaced with new language in the Appendix
to Rev. Proc. 2004-11.
B. Inventories
1. Rev. Proc. 2003-51, 2003-29 I.R.B. 121 (6/25/03). This
revenue procedure provides three basic methods for valuing inventory items
acquired when a taxpayer purchases the assets of a business for a lump sum or
a corporation acquires the stock of another corporation and makes a § 338
election: (1) the Replacement Cost Method, (2) the Comparative Sales Method,
and (3) the Income Method. However,"[v]aluing inventory is an inherently
factual determination... [and] the three valuation methods outlined above serve
only as guidelines for determining the fair market value of inventories."
C. Installment Method
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during
2003.
D. Year of Receipt or Deduction
1. Another taxpayer friendly accounting method ruling. Rev.
Rul. 2003-3, 2003-2 I.R.B. 252 (1/13/03). A state or local income or franchise
tax refund resulting from NOL carrybacks is includible by an accrual method
taxpayer in the earlier of the year in which the taxpayer receives payment or
notice that the refund claim has been approved. Rev. Ruls. 65-190, 1965-2 C.B.
150, and 69-372, 1969-2 C.B. 104, which held that the refund is accrued in the
year of the loss, are revoked. The IRS reasoned that review and approval of the
refund claims by state authorities is not merely ministerial, but substantive.
[This follows the holding in Doyle, Dane, Bernbach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 101 (1982), nonacq., 1988-2 C.B. 1, acq., 2003-2 I.R.B. 251 (1/12/03).]
Automatic change of accounting method is available.
2. This year or next year? Only the IRS knew, and now they
are telling us. Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-3 I.R.B. 288 (1/21/03). This ruling
addresses the accrual under the all events test of § 451 of income from goods
sold when an accrual method taxpayer's customer disputes its liability under
certain circumstances: (1) If the taxpayer overbills a customer due to a clerical
mistake in an invoice and the customer discovers the error and, in the following
taxable year, disputes its liability for the overbilled amount, then the taxpayer
accrues gross income in the taxable year of sale for the correct amount; (2) A
taxpayer does not accrue gross income in the taxable year of sale if, during the
taxable year of sale, the customer disputes its liability to the taxpayer because
the taxpayer shipped incorrect goods; (3) A taxpayer accrues gross income in
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the taxable year of sale if the taxpayer ships excess quantities of goods and in
the next year the customer agrees to pay for the excess quantities of goods.
0 The IRS has requested comments on
the application of § 451 to a situation in which a taxpayer ships defective
products to a customer that discovers the defect in the next taxable year and
disputes its liability: (1) Does the taxpayer have a fixed right to income under
§ 451 in the taxable year of sale? (Compare Hallmark Cards, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 26 (1988), with Celluloid Co. v. Commissioner, 9
B.T.A. 989 (1927), acq. VII-1 C.B. 6); (2) Does the taxable year concept
require the taxpayer to accrue income in the taxable year of sale because the
dispute did not arise until the next taxable year?
3. Taxpayer got the deduction, but not § 1341 relief. Cinergy
Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1229, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 150,302 (3/10/03). The Court of Claims held that § 1341 did not apply
to repayments to customers of utility charges [additional charges to cover
deferred taxes] that were determined by regulatory authorities in subsequent
years to have been excessive. The court accepted the IRS's view [see Rev. Rul.
58-226, 1958-1 C.B. 318; Rev. Rul. 67-48, 1967-1 C.B. 50] that when the
taxpayer's right to an income item was absolute in the year of inclusion but was
undermined by subsequently arising facts, § 1341 does not apply. Section 1341
applies only when the taxpayer had merely an "apparent" right to the income
item. Thus, although the repayments were deductible, no rate arbitrage relief
was available.
4. Even if the economic performance rules don't get ya, the
nonqualified deferred compensation rules might. Weaver v. Commissioner,
121 T.C. No. 14 (10/8/03). The taxpayer controlled two corporations, an accrual
method calendar year S Corporation (CL) and a cash method July 31 fiscal year
C corporation (J). J rendered services to CL and CL deducted the amounts owed
to J even though it had not paid the amounts until more than two and one-half
months after the close of its taxable year (i.e., by March 15) The Tax Court
(Judge Laro) held that the amounts were not deductible in the year the services
were rendered because the economic performance requirement of § 461 (h) had
not been met. Reg. § 1.461 -1 (a)(2)(iii)(D) and § 404(d) required deferral of the
deduction amounts owed to a cash method taxpayer for services until its taxable
year the last day of which is within two and one-half months of the day on
which the amount is includable in the service provider's gross income if there
was a plan or arrangement for the deferral of the payment. Judge Laro
emphasized the holding rested on the conclusion that there was such a plan or
arrangement between the two entities.
5. Regulations on nonaccrual-experience method applied.
Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 92 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-6705, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,702 (6th Cir. 10/30/03), affg 107 T.C. 116
(9/17/96). The taxpayer-hospitals were entitled to elect the § 448 nonaccrual-
experience method for years 1987 and 1988 for calculating their uncollectible
amounts because they do not "sell" medical supplies to their patients, but they
are furnished to patients as part of the hospitals furnishing medical services. The
Sixth Circuit upheld the Tax Court's (Judge Wells) decision that the taxpayers
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were required to use the amended Temp. Reg. § 1.448-2T(e)(2) to compute the
excluded amount, as opposed to the original temporary regulation; under the
amended temporary regulation, the "uncollectible amount" is equal to the year-
end receivables multiplied by a fraction equal to (1) total bad debts sustained
during the current and 5 preceding years divided by (2) total accounts receivable
earned throughout the same 6-year period, not merely (1) total bad debts divided
by (2) total year-end accounts receivable (which would have been the result
under the traditional former § 166(c) bad debt reserve computed under the Black
Motorv. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940), af'd on another issue, 125 F.2d
977 (6th Cir. 1942) formula). Like the Tax Court, the court of appeals
concluded that § 448(d)(5) was an ambiguous statute and legislative history left
a gap that was properly filled by the amended temporary regulation, following
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
We must ... not substitute our own construction of the tax law
where the regulation at issue is reasonable. . . . Several
permissible constructions may be reasonable, and where
Congress has left gaps, agencies may fill the gaps with
necessary rules that are reasonable. . . . [W]e 'should not
interfere with this process,' .. ., which is what would happen
were we to decide whether a method is the better of two
possibilities. We need only determine if the one chosen by the
Treasury is reasonable. In reviewing the legislative history of
the statute and the Treasury Decisions promulgating the
regulation, we conclude that the Treasury did not act arbitrarily
but selected a reasonable method to measure accounts that
should not be accrued from experience.
0 The taxpayer also argued that under
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Temporary Regulation
was not entitled to Chevron deference because it was issued without following
the notice and comment process that was involved in Chevron, but the court of
appeals rejected this application of Mead:
The Court made clear, however, that while most of the
Supreme Court cases applying Chevron involved notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, "the want of such
procedure.., does not decide the case, for we have sometimes
found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such
administrative formality was required and none was afforded."
533 U.S. at 231.... The temporary regulations involved in this
case were arrived at centrally by the Treasury Department,
after careful consideration. They were issued pursuant to
statutory authority to "prescribe" needful rules and regulations.
See I.R.C. § 7805(a). The regulation was "interpretive" in the
same sense that the regulation in Chevron was interpretive - it
gave content to ambiguous statutory terms. Congress clearly
intended that the Treasury Department do so, and Chevron
deference is therefore appropriate.
20041
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6. Section 461(1) deductions for transfers related to contested
liabilities. T.D. 9095, Transfers to Provide for Satisfaction of Contested
Liabilities, 68 F.R. 65634 (11/21/03); REG-136890-02, 68 F.R. 65645
(11/21/03). The Treasury has promulgated temporary regulations and published
identical proposed regulations clarifying issues under § 461(f) and coordinating
§ 461(f) and § 461(h) [the economic performance requirement]. Temp. Reg. §
1.461-2T(c)(1) and Prop. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) provide that the transfer to a trust
of the transferor's debt instrument or stock, or the stock or indebtedness of a
related person or corporation, does not give rise to a deduction under § 461(f)
with respect to a contested liability. Temp. Reg. § 1.461-2T(e) and Prop. Reg.
§ 1.461-2(e) provide that a payment to a trust to provide for satisfaction of a
contested claim with respect to which the economic performance rules of §
461(h) require payment to the claimant - e.g., tort and workers compensation
claims, rebates, prizes and jackpots, warranty claims, etc. - will not result in a
deduction under § 46 1(f).
a. Fudging around with § 461(f), especially when
combined with economic performance requirements, makes for a "listed
transaction." Notice 2003-77, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1182 (11/19/03). Certain
contested liability trusts used improperly to attempt to accelerate deductions
under § 461(f) are identified as "listed transactions." These transactions include
those involving: (1) retention of powers over the trust assets by the taxpayer; (2)
transfers of promissory notes to a trust under circumstances indicating the
underlying liability is not genuine; (3 and 4) transfers to trusts for contested tort,
workers compensation and similar, liabilities for which economic performance
requires payment to the claimant, except where the trust is the person to which
the liability is owed or payment to the trust discharges the taxpayer's liability
to the claimant; and (5) transfers of stock of the taxpayer, or indebtedness or
stock issued by a party related to the taxpayer, that are made on or after
11/19/03 to a trust purported to be established under § 461(f).
7. Prepayments for funerals are deposits because they are
refundable, albeit rarely refunded. Perry Funeral Home, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-340 (12/16/03). Applying the principles of
Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 493 U.S. 203 (1990), Judge
Wherry held that refundable prepayments for funerals were excludable deposits
even though refunds were rarely requested. The customers, rather than the
taxpayer, controlled whether funds would be retained by taxpayer or refunded.
H. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. Maybe the Raiders would have won the Super Bowl if it had
been played in the Ninth Circuit's courtroom. Milenbach v. Commissioner,
318 F.3d 924, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-818, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,229 (9th Cir.
2/6/03), rev'g in part and aff'g in part 106 T.C. 184 (1996). The taxpayer was
a partner in the Oakland/Los Angeles/ Oakland Raiders. The partnership
received a $6.7 million nonrecourse loan from the Los Angeles Coliseum
Commission as part of a package of inducements to move the Raiders from
[VoL6:SI
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Oakland to Los Angeles. The loan was repayable only out of net rents received
by the Raiders from leases by the Raiders of luxury skyboxes in the Los
Angeles Coliseum during the years 1982 through 1986 and was secured only by
the suites to be constructed. At the time the loan was made, there were no such
skyboxes in the Coliseum. The Raiders partnership was required by the
agreement to construct the skyboxes "as soon as practicable as determined by
the partnership in its reasonable discretion, having in mind considerations
deemed important or significant to the partnership." In fact, the skyboxes were
never constructed, and the Tax Court found that there was no evidence that the
Coliseum Commission intended to enforce the requirement that they be
constructed. Reasoning that this standard for determining when the skyboxes
were to be constructed "gave the Raiders great latitude in timing the
construction," which amounted to "unlimited discretion," the Tax Court found
that the obligation to construct the skyboxes to be illusory. Thus, because the
Raiders' obligation to repay the loan was conditional, the Raiders were required
to include the funds in gross income upon receipt. On another related issue, the
Tax Court held that $10 million received by the partnership as the first
disbursement on a $115 million nonrecourse loan from the City of Irwindale,
made as a part of a package to lure the Raiders to move from the Los Angeles
Coliseum, was a true loan even though the loan agreement relieved the Raiders
from any obligation to repay the $10 million if the City of Irwindale failed to
advance the remaining funds or to perform certain other acts toward
construction of a stadium as required by the loan agreement. At the time the
funds were received, they were not under the Raiders' complete dominion and
control. The Raiders' obligation to repay was not conditional on their own
actions, but could be cancelled by a condition subsequent that was within the
lender's control. When the obligation was cancelled in the following year,
however, the Raiders realized $10 million of discharge of indebtedness income.
* With respect to the L.A. Coliseum
Commission loan, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Tashima) reversed, finding that "the
Raider's broad discretion in the timing of the construction of the suites did not
make the contract illusory. Under California law, an obligation under a contract
is not illusory if the obligated party's discretion must be exercised with
reasonableness or good faith .... Here the Raiders were required to exercise
their discretion reasonably and nothing in the [agreement] indicates that
construction of the suites was optional."
* The taxpayer's victory mightjust be one
of timing. The Ninth Circuit's opinion points out that when the Los Angles
Coliseum obligation was extinguished [in 1990] the partnership realized COD
income. [We wonder, did the Commissioner ask for a waiver of the statute of
limitations on that year?]
* As far as the Irwindale loan was
concerned, the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding that COD income was realized
by the Raiders in 1988 as "clearly erroneous," because the Tax Court had relied
solely on the grounds that a state statute passed in 1988 prevented performance by
the City under the plan as proposed. The court of appeals reasoned that under
California law the debt might not have been discharged until a subsequent year and
remanded the case for a "practical assessment of the facts and circumstances
relating to the likelihood of payment." According to the Ninth Circuit, the debt was
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not discharged until "when, as a practical matter, it became clear that Irwindale
would not be able to fund the entire loan and that the stadium would not be built."
0 The Commissioner did receive a
consolation prize from the Ninth Circuit when the court of appeals affirmed the
Tax Court's decision that damages received by the partnership in a suit against the
City of Oakland for inverse condemnation of the Raiders team were taxable as
damages in lieu of lost profits; although settlement agreement stated that its
purpose was to resolve a claim involving "restoration of lost franchise value," the
taxpayer's damages study indicated that claim was based on lost profits.
2. Fuel cost over-recoveries are not includible in income. Cinergv
Corp. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 489, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1229, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,302 (3/10/03). Fuel cost over-recoveries (and interest earned
thereon) received by a public utility company under a fixed fuel factor scheme
instituted by state regulatory authorities [for the benefit of customers, by avoiding
large fluctuations in monthly bills] were not includible in gross income under the
claim of right doctrine because taxpayer did not have complete dominion, but was
obligated to repay or credit the customers accounts. The court followed Houston
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which also
involved fuel surcharges, and distinguished Iowa Southern Utilities Co. v. United
States, 841 F.2d 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1988), involving a construction surcharge, on the
grounds that in that case - as opposed to this case - there was no "unequivocal
contractual, statutory, or regulatory duty to repay."
3. Tax-free subsidies for environmentalist landowners. Rev. Rul.
2003-59, 2003-24 I.R.B. 1014 (6/16/03). All or a portion of cost sharing payments
received under the Conservation Reserve Program- a USDA program under which
landowners receive 50 percent of the cost of establishing certain practices for soil
and water conservation, wetland establishment and restoration, and reforestation
- are eligible for exclusion under § 126.
4. Congress might have changed one of the holdings of Gitlitz,'
but the Treasury put another one in the regulations. T.D. 9080, Reduction of
Tax Attributes Due to Discharge of Indebtedness, 68 F.R. 42590 (7/18/03). The
Treasury has promulgated Temp. Reg. §§ 1.108-7T and 1.1017-IT(b)(4), dealing
with reduction in tax attributes under §§ 108(b) and 1017 when COD income is
excluded from income under § 108(a)(1)(A)-(C). Examples (and the preamble)
indicate that the tax liability for the year of discharge first must be determined
without any reduction in attributes in order to identify the amounts, if any, of the
tax attributes that will be reduced. "This ordering rule affords the taxpayer the use
of certain of its tax attributes described in section 108(b)(2), including any losses
carried forward to the taxable year of discharge, for purposes of determining its tax
for the taxable year of discharge, before subjecting those attributes to reduction."
Basis reductions under § 1017 occur at the beginning of the taxable year following
the year in which the discharge occurred. If a § 381 transaction ends a taxable year
1. Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001). See, Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act of 2002, which reverses the result of Gitlitz by providing that excluded
cancellation of indebtedness income of S corporations does not result a § 1366
adjustment to the basis of stock owned by the shareholders.
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in which the distributing or transferor corporation excluded COD income under §
108(a), the basis of the property acquired by the acquiring corporation reflects the
reduction under § 1017.
5. United States v. Brown, 348 F.3d 1200,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6826
(10th Cir. 11/4/03). The Court of Appeals upheld the regulations under § 468B. A
receiver's estate may be a qualified settlement fund under § 468B(g) and Reg. §
1.468B-1 if it is established to "resolve" claims -even if the establishment of the
fund and the transfer of assets to it does not extinguish claims against the alleged
tortfeasor. The creation of a qualified settlement fund is not dependent on the
deductibility of amounts transferred to it. As a QSF, the receiver's estate was liable
for income taxes.
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
INDOPCO aftermath: "... deductions are exceptions to the norm
of capitalization .... " INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)
(Blackmun, J.)
1. Kudos from taxpayers; pans from professors. Treasury
abandons the future benefits test of INDOPCO - Long live the separate and
distinct asset test. Or, do the final regulations go beyond the separate and
distinct asset test and interpret INDOPCO in a more efficient way? T.D. 9107,
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 69 F.R. 436
(1/5/04), proposed in REG-125638-01, 67 F.R. 77701 (12/19/02). The Treasury
Department has promulgated Regs. § 1.263(a)-4 and § 1.263(a)-5, which deal
comprehensively with the capitalization of expenditures that relate to intangible
assets and "future benefits." These regulations are commonly referred to as the
INDOPCO regulations, because they are intended to provide bright-line rules to
make the standards based approach to capitalization articulated by the Supreme
Court in INDOPCO more administrable, However, the regulations more aptly
might be called the anti-INDOPCO regulations, because they reverse the principle,
if not the specific holding of INDOPCO.
0 The Supreme Court in INDOPCO v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), unequivocally rejected the view that
capitalization was not required unless the expenditure resulted in the creation or
improvement of a "separate and distinct asset," but also clearly announced that "the
notion that deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization" is embodied in
various aspects of the Code and is supported by a long line of Supreme Court
precedents. The regulations turn on their head these interpretations of §§ 162, 261,
and 263 by the Supreme Court.
a. Capitalization is an exception to the norm of
deductibility. Under Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1), the only expenditures that must be
capitalized are those incurred (1) to acquire, create, or enhance an intangible, (2)
to facilitate in the acquisition, creation, or enhancement of an intangible or (3) that
are otherwise identified by the IRS in prospectively effective published guidance.
The term "separate and distinct intangible" is limited by Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3) to
"a property interest of ascertainable and measurable value in money's worth that
is subject to protection under applicable state or federal law and the possession and
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control of which is intrinsically capable of being sold, transferred, or pledged
(ignoring any restrictions imposed on assignability) separate and apart from a trade
or business." The last phrase of this definition presumably excludes business
goodwill for the definition of intangible.2 The regulations provide extensive lists
of the intangibles to which they apply, including, for example, ownership interests
in corporations or partnerships, debt instruments, financial interests, options,
patents, copyrights, trademarks, franchises, customer lists, covenants not to
compete, certain contract rights, government licenses, assembled workforce, and
goodwill. See Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(c)(1) and (d). In addition, the regulations
specifically provide that any fund or account that may revert to the taxpayer is a
separate and distinct intangible. Reg. § 1.263(a)4(b)(3)(i). On the other hand,
expenditures to induce another person to enter into a contract are not required to
be capitalized unless the expenditures are listed as expenditures that give rise to a
separate and distinct intangible. Reg. § 1.263(a)4(b)(3)(i). Thus, for example, a
signing bonus to induce an employee enter into an employment relationship is not
required to be capitalized if the employee is free to leave and go to work for a
competitor at any time. Reg. § 1.263(a)4(d)(6)(vii), Ex. 8.
9 In the preamble to the proposed
regulations, the Treasury Department explained that "the separate and distinct asset
standard has not historically yielded the same level of controversy as the
significant future benefit standard," and that "the separate and distinct asset test is
a workable principle in practice." The preambles to both the proposed and final
regulations also explained that the IRS and Treasury Department might in the
future identify expenditures that are not listed in the regulations, but for which
capitalization is nonetheless appropriate. Capitalization of non-listed expenditures
will be required, however, only if (and after) they have been identified in published
guidance. Unless an expenditure relating to an intangible asset is listed in the
regulations or in such subsequently published guidance, however, capitalization
will not be required and a current deduction will be allowed. Thus, under the
regulations, capitalization become an exception to the norm of deducting business
expenditures
0 The only expenses not related to a
separate and distinct asset that must be capitalized under the proposed regulations
are costs to "facilitate... a restructuring or reorganization of a business entity or
a transaction involving the acquisition of capital, including a stock issuance,
borrowing, or recapitalization." Reg. § 1.263(a)-5 separately requires capitalization
of any these expenditures, as well as any expenditures to facilitate acquisition of
controlling ownership of another trade or business, regardless of whether the
acquisition is an acquisition of the assets constituting the business or of the stock
of the corporation conducting the business. This category includes only fact
patterns analogous to the narrow fact pattern in INDOPCO and a number of cases
involving similar issues that followed INDOPCO. Thus, the future benefits test of
INDOPCO has been largely abandoned. See, e.g., Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(4)
(expenses for certification of products, services or business processes are not
subject to capitalization).
* The regulations provide two very
important exceptions to the rule requiring capitalization of transaction costs. First,
2. See Baker v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2003) (business goodwill cannot
exist and be sold separately from business assets to which it could attach).
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under a "simplifying convention" that is in fact a major substantive rule, Reg. §
1.263(a)-4(e)(4)(ii) provides that compensation paid to employees (including
certain independent contractors who perform employee-like work) and the
employer's associated overhead are never capitalized. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5(d)(2)
provides a similar rule with respect to transaction costs involving business
acquisitions and restructurings. These provisions reject case law to the contrary and
go far beyond the principle of those cases that in certain circumstances have
allowed a current deduction for employee compensation that facilitates the
acquisition of an intangible asset.3 Moreover, they adopt a rule for dealing with
intangible assets that is diametrically opposed to the treatment of transaction costs
with respect to tangible assets, which always must be capitalized under either or
both of §§ 263(a) or 263A.
0 Second, Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4)(iii)
provides an exception that permits de minimis transaction costs - defined as costs
that do not exceed $5,000 per transaction (not payee) - to be deducted currently.4
In applying this de minimis rule, the taxpayer may use an elective pooling method
in which the transaction costs of all similar transactions are averaged and all for the
costs are deductible as long as the average does not exceed $5,000. Thus for
example, the taxpayer could average fifty $4,750 expenditures with fifty $5,250
expenditures and deduct them all because the average of the one hundred
expenditures was only $5,000. To prevent substantial manipulation that would
result in current deductions for very significant transaction costs, this pooling
method must be elected prospectively, must include all similar transactions, and is
available only if the taxpayer reasonably expects to include at least twenty-five
transactions. Furthermore, expenditures that are reasonably expected to differ
significantly from the average cannot be included. See Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(h). For
example, a single $401,000 expenditure could not be averaged with 99 different
$1,000 expenditures to permit a deduction of the $401,000 expenditure even
though the average of the 100 expenditures is only $5,000 (([99 x $1,000] +
$401,000) + 100).
b. The"whether and which" test shall too pass. Reg. §
1.263(a)-5 significantly changes the scope of § 195 with respect to transaction
costs involving business investigation and expansion expenditures (but not start-up
costs). The regulations replaced Rev. Rul. 99-23's "whether and which" standard
for determining the point at which expenditures are inherently capital costs of the
acquisition of the business with a bright-line rule. Under the regulations, expenses
incurred in the process of pursuing an acquisition of a trade or business - whether
the acquisition is structured as an acquisition of stock or of assets (and whether the
taxpayer is the acquirer in the acquisition or the target of the acquisition) - must be
capitalized only if (1) they are "inherently facilitative" of the acquisition or (2) they
relate to activities performed on or after the earlier of (a) the date on which a letter
3. See Norwest Corp. v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 89 (1999) (disallowing deduction),
rev'd sub nom., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000);
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 349 (1998) (disallowing deduction),
rev'd, 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000); Lychuk v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 374 (2001)
(disallowing deduction).
4. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5(d)(3) provides a similar rule with respect to transaction costs
involving business acquisitions and restructurings.
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of intent, exclusivity agreement, or similar written communication (other than a
confidentiality agreement) is executed by representatives of the acquirer and the
target, or (b) the date on which the material terms of the transaction are authorized
or approved by the taxpayer's board of directors (or committee of the board of
directors) or, if taxpayer is not a corporation, the date on which the material terms
of the transaction are authorized or approved by the taxpayer's appropriate
governing officials. Expenditures that are "inherently facilitative" include amounts
expended to determine the value of the target, drafting transactional documents, or
conveying property between the parties. However, a taxpayer is not required to
capitalize any portion of its own employee compensation attributable to these
activities, and the regulations also provide a de minimis rule similar to that
applicable to intangibles generally. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5(d)(2) and (3). The preamble
indicates that expenses which escape capitalization under Reg § 1.263(a)-5
nevertheless are not deductible if they are start-up expenses subject to § 195.
C. Depreciation on intangibles with unascertainable
useful lives. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(b) provides a fifteen-year "safe-harbor"
amortization period for any capitalized expenses relating to a self-created
intangible for which another amortization period is not prescribed by the Code or
regulations and for which amortization is not proscribed.
d. The 12-month rule for prepaid expenses. Reg. §
1.263(a)-4(d)(3) requires that prepaid expenses generally be capitalized. However,
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f) adopts the holding of the Court of Appeals in U.S.
Freightways v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001), and provides that an
expenditure to create or enhance intangible rights or benefits that do not extend for
more than twelve months after the expenditure is incurred is not required to be
capitalized.' Furthermore, the deduction will not be deferred under the "clear
reflection of income" standard of § 446(b). Amounts paid to create rights or
benefits that extend beyond twelve months must be capitalized in full and deducted
ratably over the period benefited. This arbitrary line produces some strange results.
Suppose that in March 2004, Taxpayer A pays an insurance premium of $130,000
for the period from April 1, 2004 through April 30,2005. Taxpayer B, on the other
hand, in December 2004, pays an insurance premium of $120,000 for the period
from December 1, 2004 through November 30, 2005. For 2004, Taxpayer A's
deduction is $90,000. Taxpayer B's deduction for 2004, however, is $120,000,
even though Taxpayer B's prepayment extends further into 2005 than does
Taxpayer A's prepayment.
2. IRS identifies issues to be addressed in forthcoming proposed
regulations on tangible property costs. Notice 2004-6, 2004-3 I.R.B. 308
(12/23/03). These issues include [using the numbering from the Notice]: (1) What
general principles of capitalization should be applied? (2) What is the appropriate
"unit of property"? (3) What is the starting point for determining whether property
value is increased or useful life is prolonged? (11) Should the regulations provide
"repair allowance" type rules? (12) Should the regulations provide a de minimis
rule? (13) When should the "plan of rehabilitation" doctrine be applied? (15) Are
5. A taxpayer may elect to capitalize and amortize prepaid expenses that cover a period
of twelve months or less. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(f)(7).
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there circumstances where tax treatment should follow financial or regulatory
accounting treatment?
3. Go ahead and deduct the cost of asbestos removal - at least
as long as you don't change the building's use. Cinergv Corp. v. United States,
55 Fed. Cl. 489, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1229, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,302 (3/10/03).
The Court of Federal Claims allowed a § 162 deduction for the cost of removing
and encapsulating deteriorating fireproofing material that contained asbestos fibers.
The fireproofing material did not create a problem for years, but as it deteriorated
the danger of the asbestos circulating in the offices increased. The work prevented
the asbestos from crumbling or circulating. In allowing the deduction, the court
applied the test applied by the Sixth Circuit in United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v.
United States, 267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir.2001), and found all of the elements to be
met.
[T]hree elements must be satisfied for a valid deduction under §
162 for environmental cleanup costs: first, the taxpayer
contaminated the property in its ordinary course of business;
second, the taxpayer cleaned up the contamination to restore the
property to its pre-contamination state; third, the cleanup did not
allow the taxpayer to put the property to a new use.
The court distinguished United Dairy Farmers, Inc., in which the taxpayer
acquired the property after it had been contaminated, and Dominion Resources,
Inc. v. Unites States, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000), in which the environmental
remediation adapted the property for a different use.
0 Note, however, the possibility of
deductibility of cleanup costs under § 198 if the site is certified by the state and the
expiration date of § 198 is extended beyond the end of 2003.
4. Would you like to fly on a jet without its engines? FedEx
Corporation v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1940,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,405
(W.D. Tenn. 4/7/03). The district court denied the taxpayer's motion for summary
judgment that expenditures for its off-wing engine maintenance program were
deductible repairs under Reg. § 1.162-4. The court found that there was a genuine
issue of fact regarding whether the appropriate unit of property for measuring
whether the expenditures added value or materially prolonged life was (1) the
entire aircraft, as argued by FedEx, or (2) the jet engines and auxiliary power units,
as argued by the government. The court concluded that there is no 'entire vehicle'
rule of law requiring that repairs be measured against the entire vehicle rather than
against components.
a. You don't have to, at least in Memphis. FedEx Corp.
v. United States, 291 F.Supp.2d 699,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5986,2003-2 U.S.T.C.
50, 697 (W.D. Tenn. 8/27/03). Taxpayer was permitted to deduct the costs of
engine shop visits for jet aircraft engine inspection, heavy maintenance and repair
because the relevant unit of property was held to be the entire aircraft, not the
engine.
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5. Judge Laro draws the line between deductible expenses and
capital expenditures. D'Angelo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-295
(10/23/03). In this otherwise unremarkable case, in the context of determining
whether certain legal fees were currently deductible or were capital expenditures,
Judge Laro articulated the following standards for drawing the line between
deductible expenses and capital expenditures:6
Just because a particular expense fits within the literal language
of section 162, it does not automatically become deductible. This
is because other sections, such as section 261, except certain
payments from the current deductibility provisions. INDOPCO,
Inc. v. Commissioner, [503 U.S. 79 (1992)]. Section 261 states
that "no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of the
items specified in this part", e.g., Part IX, Items Not Deductible.
Section 263(a)(1), which is contained in Part IX, generally
provides that a deduction is not allowed for "Any amount paid
out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate."
As we recently noted in Lychuk v. Commissioner, [116 T.C. 374
(201)], the Supreme Court's mandate as to capitalization requires
that an expenditure be capitalized when it (1) creates a separate
and distinct asset, (2) produces a significant future benefit, or (3)
is incurred "in connection with" the acquisition of a capital asset.
See also Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13
(1974); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575-576
(1970). If any of the three conditions is met, an expense may not
be deducted and must be capitalized
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. The Commissioner at least has to give it the "good old college
try" if he expects to win. Devine Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2003-15 (1/16/03). Judge Cohen upheld the taxpayer corporation's compensation
deduction in full. The taxpayer made a prima facia case for reasonableness. The
salary was within the range paid to similarly situated executives. The
Commissioner provided no evidence to the contrary and failed to explain how he
calculated the disallowed portion. Under either a traditional multi-factor test or the
Exacto Spring [196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999)] hypothetical investor test, the result
was the same.
2. Haffner's Service Stations Inc. v. Commissioner, 326 F.3d 1, 91
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1461, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,333 (1st Cir. 3/31/03). A
corporation's payments to two officers [treasurer and assistant treasurer, who were
also wife and husband] were not reasonable compensation. The corporation was
founded by the treasurer's parents and was run by one of their five children. Judge
Boudin selected a multifactor test over the Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner,
6. Compare T.D. 9108, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures, 69 F.R. 436 (1/5/04).
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196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999), single factor independent investor test based on the
facts and circumstances of this case: Return on equity, while high, was declining
in recent years, and the roles played by the two officers was relatively modest.
3. An old-fashioned multi-factor reasonable comp analysis.
Brewer Quality Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-200 (7/10/03).
In an case appealable to the Fifth Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge Chabot) applied a
traditional multi-factor analysis, based on the factors enumerated in Ownesby &
Kritikos, Inc. v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987), to determine the
portion of bonus payments to the president of a corporation, all of the stock of
which was owned by the president and his wife, that was reasonable compensation.
Judge Chabot observed that the "independent investor test" is a "lens through
which the entire analysis should be viewed," citing Dexsil Corp. v. Commissioner,
147 F.3d 96, 100-101 (2d Cir. 1998), and that "[d]iscerning the intent behind the
payments also presents a factual question to be resolved within the bounds of the
individual case."
4. T.D. 9083, Golden Parachute Payments, 68 F.R. 45745 (8/14/03).
The Treasury Department has promulgated final regulations under § 280G, relating
to payments contingent on ownership changes. The effective date is 8/4/03 for
payments contingent on ownership changes occurring after 12/31/03. See also,
Rev. Proc. 2003-68, 2003-34 I.R.B. 856 (8/1/03) for modified stock option
valuation guidance for golden parachute rules.
D. Miscellaneous Expenses
1. Without a debt, there's no interest. Indeck Energy Services,
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-101 (4/11/03). Indeck Energy Services,
Inc. ("Indeck") fired Polsky in 1990 and in January 1991 an arbitrator ordered
Indeck to pay Polsky $15,030,000 to repurchase his shares of Indeck stock. Indeck
appealed, and the case was settled in 1994 pursuant to the following agreement
Indeck... agrees to purchase.., the thirty (30) shares of...
stock.., for a price computed as follows ("Purchase Price"): (i)
... $501,000 per share, for a total of... $15,030,000; plus (ii) an
amount determined by Ten Percent (10%) per annum on the
amount in (i) from January 31, 1991 through April 13, 1994 for
a total of... $4,809,600; plus (iii) an amount determined by
interest on the amount in (i) at ... [the Federal funds rate]
between April 14, 1994 and May 9, 1994, for a total of...
$47,321.85. The total Purchase Price of... $19,886,921.85 shall
be paid... at the Closing.
Polsky treated the full $19,886,921.85 as the amount realized on the stock. Indeck
treated $15,030,000 as the price of the stock and deducted the remaining
$4,856,922 as interest. The Tax Court (Judge Gale) held that no portion of the
$19,886,921 constituted interest on two alternative grounds: First, the evidence,
including Indeck's failure to issue Polsky a Form 1099 for interest, indicated that
the parties intended the entire amount to be the stock purchase price. Second, until
the settlement agreement was signed, there was no indebtedness within the
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meaning of § 163(a) on which interest could accrue -" it was not paid with respect
to an existing, legally enforceable obligation for the payment of a principal sum,
nor was the amount of the obligation fixed as of the date the purported interest
began to accrue." The court distinguished Halle v. Commissioner, 83 F.3d 649 (4th
Cir. 1996), rev'g on other grounds Kingstowne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-
630, and Dunlap v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1377 (1980), rev'd on other grounds,
670 F.2d 785 (8th Cir.1982), on the ground that in both of those cases, "there was
agreement between the purported debtor and creditor as to the amount of the
obligation and its due date, as of the time the purported interest began to accrue."
In contrast, "Indeck's obligation and its due date were disputed during the period
that the bulk of the claimed interest purportedly accrued."
2. Every buck counts - even if not spent on a Springmaid sheet.'
T.D. 9064, Substantiation of Incidental Expenses, 68 F.R. 39011 (7/1/03). Reg. §
1.274-5 0)(3) authorizes the Commissioner to permit taxpayers traveling away from
home to use a specified amount for incidental expenses in lieu of substantiating
(under § 274(d)) the actual cost of incidental expenses. Applicable to expenses paid
or incurred after 9/30/02.
3. Issuers of so-called "feline PRIDES" investment units may
deduct interest on the debt component. Rev. Rul. 2003-97,2003-34 I.R.B. 380
(8/25/03). This ruling deals with whether, under very detailed facts, a corporation
that issues units, each consisting of instruments in the form of a 5-year note and a
3-year forward contract to purchase a quantity of the corporation's common stock,
may deduct the "interest" accruing on the note under § 163(a), or whether the
deduction is disallowed by 163(). The ruling held that the instrument was a debt
instrument, even though the components were severable when issued. The
instrument was not a disqualified debt instrument under § 163(l)(2) [indebtedness
of a corporation that is payable in equity of the issuer or a related party], because
absent specific evidence of bad faith with respect to the debtor's performance of
its obligations the transaction was not reasonably expected to give the debtor an
option to pay the notes in, or convert them into, its stock. Accordingly, the interest
was deductible. The ruling will not be applied adversely to any unit issued on or
before 8/22/03 if certain circumstances are met.
4. Fishing trip costs deductible because taxpayer had a business
purpose for them, as well as an expectation of future benefits from them.
Townsend Industries Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
6096, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,666 (8th Cir. 9/15/03). The taxpayer manufactured 'T-
51 printing press attachments," consisting of approximately 800 parts that give
users the ability to print multiple color documents in a single pass through a
printing press. Annually for 40 years, it gathered its in-house sales personnel, its
outside independent contractor sales people and its engineers and factory workers
7. This refers to one of the most famous advertisements of the last century. Its author
was Elliott White Springs, who, after assuming control of his family textile firm, wrote
a series of risqu6 magazine advertisements, including one showing a smiling young
Native American woman departing from a hammock [made, of course, from a
Springmaid sheet] that was occupied by an exhausted Native American man, captioned
"A Buck Well Spent on a Springmaid Sheet."
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for an annual two-day meeting at corporate headquarters, followed by a four-day
expense-paid fishing trip. The two-day meeting was often used to introduce new
products. Judge Bowman held that the costs of the fishing trip were deductible
based upon taxpayer's "realistic expectation to gain concrete future benefits from
the trip based on its knowledge of its own small company, its knowledge of the
utility of interpersonal interactions that probably would not occur but for the trip,
and its knowledge of its own past experience," and the trip qualified as a § 132(d)
working condition fringe benefit for the employees who attended.
5. The IRS never seems able to catch up with the movements in
the price of gasoline, and more tinkering is in store for 2004. Rev. Proc. 2003-
76, 2003-43 I.R.B. 924 (10/27/03), superseding Rev. Proc. 2002-61, 2 C.B. 616.
The optional standard mileage rate for business use of automobiles will increase on
1/1/04 from 36 cents per mile to 37.5 cents per mile; the mileage rate for medical
and moving will increase from 12 cents per mile to 14 cents per mile; and the
mileage rate for giving services to a charitable organization will remain at 14 cents
per mile. The procedure also revises the limitation on simultaneous use of multiple
automobiles to allow a taxpayer using up to four vehicles simultaneously to use the
standard mileage rate.
6. Change your globes - Antigua and Barbuda are now part of
North America! Rev. Rul. 2003-109, 2003-42 I.R.B. 839 (10/20/23). This
revenue ruling supersedes Rev. Rul. 94-56, 1994-2 C.B. 37, and lists all of the
geographical areas included in the North American area for purposes of § 274(h),
which generally denies any deduction for the cost of attending a "convention,
seminar, or similar meeting held outside the 'North American area."'
7. Florida Progress Corp. v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 954, 92
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6583 (11th Cir. 10/21/03) (per curiam), affig 114 T.C. 587
(2000). Section 1341 does not apply to rate reductions by a public utility to
indirectly compensate customers for prior charges that retrospectively were
determined to have over-recovered costs and, therefore, to have been excessive.
Section 1341 does not independently authorize a deduction, but operates only
when a deduction is allowed under some other Code section. The Tax Court's
finding that rate reductions were income reductions, not deductible expenses, was
not erroneous.
8. Electronic employee expense reimbursement arrangement is
OK, except for non-itemized hotel bills. Rev. Rul. 2003-106,2003-44 I.R.B. 936
(11/03/03). This revenue ruling explains when an employer's expense
reimbursement arrangement for deductible travel and entertainment expenses that
uses electronic receipts and expense reports is an accountable plan under §
62(a)(2)(A) and (C) and the regulations thereunder. Under the plan, the credit card
company provides the employer with an electronic receipt for all expenses billed
to an employee's business credit card. The electronic receipt contains the date of
the charge, the amount of the charge, the merchant's name, the merchant's
location, and, if available, an itemization from the merchant of each expense
included in the charge. Employees access the database to create an electronic
expense report to accompany the electronic receipts associated with their travel and
entertainment expenses, and the employees must provide all relevant information
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to substantiate the deduction under § 274(d) and the regulations. Employees must
be required to submit paper expense reports and receipts for: (1) any expense over
$75 where the nature of the expense is not clear on the face of the electronic
receipt; (2) all lodging invoices for which the credit card company does not provide
the merchant's electronic itemization of each expense; and (3) any expenses paid
for by the employee without using the business credit card; paper receipts and
expense reports must contain all required information.
9. Schedule C deficiency interest is nondeductible in the Fifth
Circuit. Alfaro v. Commissioner, 349 F.3d 225,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6914, 2003-
2 U.S.T.C. 50,715 (5th Cir. 11/6/03). The Fifth Circuit held that interest on
taxpayers' individual income tax liability that arose from a sole proprietorship
belonging to husband is nondeductible personal interest under § 163(h), joining
five other circuits in this result. Judge Weiner followed Robinson v. Commissioner,
119 T.C. 44 (2002), and all of the other courts that have decided the issue, and
upheld the validity of Temp. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i)(A), disallowing a deduction
for interest on an individual income tax deficiency, as applied to interest on a
deficiency arising from income attributable to a trade or business. He decided that
the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute, that it is consistent with
the Blue Book, and that Congress has not acted to overturn it in the intervening
years since it was promulgated.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L.
107-47, 115 Stat. 260, provides for additional first-year depreciation of 30 percent
for certain property that was acquired after 9/10/01 (and before 9/11/04) and placed
in service before 1/1/05. Qualifying property consists of (1) § 168 property with a
recovery period of 20 years or less, (2) computer software other than computer
software covered by § 197, (3) water utility property, and (4) leasehold
improvement property. For passenger automobiles, the § 280F(a)(1)(A)(i)
limitation is to be increased by $4,600. This provision also applies to
improvements to used property.
0 Depreciation claimed pursuant to this
provision may be used for alternative minimum tax purposes even though the 200
percent declining balance depreciation tables are used for the basis remaining after
the additional first-year depreciation is taken.
a. Rev. Proc. 2002-33,2002-20 I.R.B. 963 (5/20/02). This
revenue procedure provides procedures for claiming the additional 30 percent first-
year depreciation provided by § 168(k) [and § 1400L(b)]. It also explains how a
taxpayer may elect not to deduct the additional first-year depreciation for qualified
property.
b. Fifty-percent bonus depreciation. Section 168(k)(4),
added by the 2003 Act, allows a deduction of fifty percent of the adjusted basis of
qualified property (in lieu of the prior 30 percent) placed in service after 5/5/03 and
before 1/1/05.
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* Section 168(k)(2)(F) provides that the
50 percent (and 30 percent) first year allowance is also allowable as a deduction for
purposes of the alternative minimum tax.
0 Bonus depreciation is extended to
passenger automobiles by increasing the § 280F(a)(1)(A)(i) limit by $4,600 for
passenger automobiles that are qualified property placed that are in service after
9/10/01 and before 5/6/03, and by $7,650 for passenger automobiles that are
qualified property placed that are in service after 5/5/03 and before 1/1/05.
c. Regulations on bonus depreciation. T.D. 9091, Special
Depreciation Allowance, 68 F.R. 52986 (9/8/03); REG-157164, Special
Depreciation Allowance, 68 F.R. 53008 (9/8/03). The Treasury has promulgated
Temporary Regulations [Temp. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14T (dealing with qualified
intangible property); Temp. Reg. § 1.168(k)-IT (dealing with tangible property)]
and published identical proposed regulations (Prop. Reg. § 1.167(a)- 14; Prop. Reg.
§ 1.168(k)-iT] dealing with first year bonus depreciation under § 168(k).
2. Increased § 179 expensing for small business - with an
increased phase-out amount. The 2003 Act increased the amountdeductible
under § 179 to $100,000 for property placed in service in taxable years beginning
in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In addition, for those years, the dollar-for-dollar phase-
out of the amount begins when the cost of property placed in service exceeds
$400,000 (adjusted for inflation in 2004 and 2005). The 2003 Act also amended
§ 179(d) to treat off-the-shelf computer software placed in service in taxable years
beginning in 2003 through 2005 as qualifying property.
0 The 2003 Act amended § 179(c)(2) to
allow elections to expense assets under § 179 with respect to taxable years
beginning in 2003 through 2005 to be revoked (by an amended return) without the
consent of the Commissioner.
3. The Service agrees that the rotable spare parts pool used in
a maintenance service business is depreciable property, not inventory. Rev.
Rul. 2003-37, 2003-15 I.R.B. 717 (4/14/03). The Service will follow Hewlett
Packard, Inc. v. United States, 71 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 1995), and Honeywell, Inc.
v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo. 1992-453, afffd, 27 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1994), and
will treat rotable spare parts as depreciable assets provided they are used in the
taxpayer's maintenance service business and are not held for sale. The ruling seeks
comments on the maximum amount of rotable spare parts sales that should be
permitted from a rotable spare parts pool that is treated as a depreciable asset.
4. The "exhaustion, wear and tear" prerequisite for depredation
is an undemanding standard. And, cost recovery periods are not accounting
methods. O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner, 332 F.3d 1125,91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
2559,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,522 (8th Cir. 6/13/03), affg 89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-658,
2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,235 (D. Minn. 9/29/2001). The S corporation in which the
taxpayer was a shareholder manufactured glass using a "float process" that
involved the use of a molten tin "bath " that lost volume and purity in the
manufacturing process, requiring periodic replenishment. The amount of tin added
each year equaled the amount of tin consumed in glass production during the year.
The corporation deducted the cost of adding tin to the bath and depreciated the cost
20041
Florida Tax Review
of the original volume of tin. Applying Rev. Rul. 75-491, 1975-2 C.B. 19, which
was directly on point, the IRS disallowed the depreciation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's refusal to apply the revenue ruling, because it was not
binding and because it predated the ACRS depreciation system, and held that the
original volume of tin was depreciable because over time it would have been
completely exhausted by volume and purity losses. On another issue, the Court of
Appeals reversed the district court and held that reallocation of certain plant assets
from one asset category to another for the purposes of MACRS depreciation did
not constitute a change in accounting method, following Brookshire Brothers
Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner, 320 F.3d 507, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-629, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,214 (5th Cir. 1/29/03). But see, T.D. 9105, at I.A. 2.c.
5. More tangible personal property that the local zoning board
and building inspector think is real estate. Cost segregation studies to take
advantage of this phenomenon. Rev. Rul 2003-54,2003-23 I.R.B. 982 (6/9/03).
This ruling provides guidance on how the common gasoline pump canopies and
their supporting concrete footings - used by 90 percent of gasoline stations - are
to be classified for depreciation purposes. Gasoline pump canopies are not
inherently permanent structures; for depreciation purposes they are classified as
tangible personal property includible in asset class 57.0 of Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-
2 C.B. 674. The supporting concrete footings are inherently permanent structures
classified as land improvements includible in asset class 57.1 of Rev. Proc. 87-56.
0 No Fooling! Note the recent trend of
obtaining a "cost segregation study" to determine the amount and nature of
tangible personal property in either an existing or a newly-constructed building.
These studies are based on the holding in Hospital Corporation of America v.
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 21 (1997), affd on another issue, 348 F.3d 136, 92
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6705, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,702 (6th Cir. 10/30/03). See also,
ILM 199921045 (4/1/99) [sic], which held that this determination must be based
on facts and circumstances. This is different from component depreciation, which
involved separate useful lives for different parts of the real estate. These studies
determine whether there is tangible personal property that is part of the building,
for purposes of depreciating this tangible personal property separately from the real
estate.
6. Section 197 amortization applies to noncompete agreements
ancillary to stock redemptions. Frontier Chevrolet Co. v. Commissioner, 116
T.C. 289 (5/14/01), affd, 329 F.3d 1131, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2338, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,490 (9th Cir. 5/28/03).
* The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that
§ 197 applied to a covenant not to compete entered into when a corporation
redeemed the stock of its 75-percent owner. The covenant not to compete had to
be amortized over 15 years under § 197, even through it was for only a 5-year term
because the redemption constituted the acquisition of an interest in a trade or
business. [The holding is consistent with Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(9), which was not
applicable because the case arose prior to its effective date.]
0 The Ninth Circuit (Judge Trott) agreed
with the Tax Court that taxpayer's redemption was an indirect acquisition of an
interest in a trade or business because "the substance of the transaction was to
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effect a change of controlling corporate stock ownership," so taxpayer had to
amortize the covenant under § 197.
0 Query whether the redemption of less
than a controlling amount of stock would result in the acquisition of an interest in
a trade or business?
7. Notice 2003-45, 2003-29 I.R.B. 86 (7/21/03). This notice
provides for an automatic extension of time until 12/31/03 to amend returns to use
the mid-year convention - as opposed to the mid-quarter convention - for property
placed in service during 2001 for entities whose third and fourth quarters included
9/11/01 (as permitted by Notice 2001-70, 2001-2 C.B. 437, and Notice 2001-74,
2001-2 C.B. 551). The Treasury and IRS intend to amend the regulations under §
168 to incorporate the guidance provided in this notice, which may be relied upon
meanwhile.
a. Similarly, Rev. Proc. 2003-50, 2003-29 I:R.B. 119
(7/21/03), provides an extension until 12/31/03 for taxpayers to claim (or not
claim) the additional 30-percent first-year depreciation under § 168(k) or change
their selection of § 179 property for the taxable year that included 9/11/01.
8. Changes in use change MACRS depreciation. REG-138499-02,
Changes in Use Under Section 168(i)(5), 68 F.R. 43047 (7/21/03). The Treasury
has published comprehensive proposed regulations to provide rules for
determining MACRS depreciation under § 168 when the taxpayer changes the use
of the property. Changes in use include: (1) a conversion of personal use property
to a business or income-producing use, (2) conversion from business or income-
producing to personal use, or (3) a change in use that results in a different recovery
period, depreciation method, or both. The regulations will be effective when
finalized. Any reasonable method will be acceptable for changes after 12/31/86 and
before final regulations are published. However, current Reg. § 1.167(g)-I limits
the depreciable basis of property converted from personal to business use to its fair
market value at the time of the conversion.
9. IA 80 Group, Inc. v. United States, 347 F.3d 1067,92 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-6714, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,703 (8th Cir. 10/30/03). Section 168(e)(3)(E)
provides a 15-year class life to "retail motor fuels outlets," whether or not food or
other items are sold there. A building of more than 1,400 square feet qualifies only
if: (1) 50 percent or more of the gross revenues from the property are generated
from petroleum sales, or (2) 50 percent or more of the floor space in the property
is devoted to petroleum marketing sales. The court of appeals (Judge Smith) held
that § 168(e)(3)(E)(iii) applies on a building-by-building basis with respect to a
multi-building truck stop that consisted of fuel center buildings, and separate
restaurants, stores, and other facilities. Some of the buildings, such as the
restaurants, were not 15-year property, even though the gross revenue test was
meet with respect to the aggregate gross receipts for all the buildings, because
neither the gross receipts test nor the floor space test was met with respect to those
buildings.
10. The cost of removing and replacing roof-covering material is
deductible. Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2002-117
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(9/6/02) (nonprecedential pursuant to § 7463(b)). Special Trial Judge Pajak held
the $8,000 expenditure for roofing work done on taxpayer's rent house was a
deductible repair, and need not be capitalized. As set forth in the opinion, "The
contractors removed the existing top layers of the roof and recovered it with
fiberglass sheets and hot asphalt. They made no structural changes to the roof...
.There was no replacement or substitution of the roof. Petitioner's only purpose
in having the work done to the roof was to prevent the leakage and keep her rental
house in operating condition and not to prolong the life of the property, increase its
value, or make it adaptable to another use."
a. Same result for costs of spraying roof with foam to
prevent future leaks because there was "no replacement or substitution of the
roof." Northen v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2003-113 (8/13/03)
(nonprecedential pursuant to § 7463(b)). Special Trial Judge Pajak held that, with
respect to. the roof of a commercial building, the replacement of 28 sheets of
plywood, the removal of all tar and gravel and the spraying of a primer topped with
a spray polyurethane foam coating constituted a deductible repair expense. The
court followed Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 471 (1967), in finding
that roof work done to prevent leakage - and not to prolong the life of the property,
increase its value, or make it adaptable to another use - was deductible because
there was no replacement or substitution of the roof.
F. Credits
1. Leveraging the New Markets Credit. Rev. Rul. 2003-20, 2003-
7 I.R.B. 465 (2/18/03). For purposes of determining the § 45D new markets tax
credit (39% of the investment over seven years), the amount of the qualified equity
investment made by a partnership [LLC] includes cash from a nonrecourse loan to
the partnership that the partnership invests as equity in a qualified community
development entity.
2. Big brother may be watching your mouth, but he won't give
your dentist a tax credit for it. Fan v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 32 (7/24/01). Dr.
Fan, who had some hearing-impaired patients, purchased an intraoral camera
system [consisting of a camera and monitor, video presentations and educational
materials] for use in his dental practice [which was an eligible small business as
defined in § 44(b)]. The system was useful with respect to all of his patients, but
because Dr. Fan considered the system to be a more effective and efficient way to
communicate with hearing-impaired patients, he claimed the § 44 disabled access
credit for the cost of the system. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
disallowance of the credit on the grounds that the system was not an "eligible
access expenditure" as defined in § 44(c). Dr Fan was already ADA compliant; and
the system was not marketed, acquired, or used specifically as an auxiliary aid or
service to ensure effective communication to comply with the applicable
requirements of the ADA.
a. But he will give your optometrist a tax credit if he
purchases an automatic refractor to accommodate disabled patients. Hubbard
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-245 (8/14/03). The Tax Court allowed
taxpayer a $5,000 tax credit under § 44 because his optometry practice is an
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eligible small business that falls within the definition of a public accommodation,
and he must make reasonable modifications to provide services to disabled
individuals. The court noted that in the year before taxpayer purchased the
automatic refractor, he had to refer about 30 disabled patients to other optometrists.
Judge Swift distinguished Fan on the ground that in that case taxpayer was already
in compliance with ADA. He also noted that it was irrelevant that taxpayer used
the refractor to treat nondisabled patients.
3. Nothing in the statutory structure of the AMT warrants a de
novo calculation of taxable income. Ventas. Inc. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl.
411, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5711, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,513 (Fed. Cl. 7/30/03).
Section 280C requires that § 162 deductions be reduced by the amount of the § 51
targeted jobs credit [now Work Opportunity Credit] claimed in computing regular
income tax. For the year in question, the taxpayer was subject to the AMT and did
not reduce the wage deduction in computing AMTI, because the credit is not
allowed against the AMT. The court (Judge Wiese) held that in computing AMTI
and tentative AMT for purposes of § 38(c), any reduction in the amount of
deductions required by § 280C by virtue of a credit having been claimed with
respect to the otherwise deductible expenditure must be taken into account. Judge
Wiese rejected the taxpayer's argument that the AMT was a separate tax system,
and that since the targeted jobs credit was not allowable under the AMT, the
expense deduction should not be disallowed. "Taxable income," which is the
starting point for computing AMTI under § 55, is taxable income under the regular
income tax. Nothing in the statutory structure provided the adjustment sought by
the taxpayer or warranted a de novo calculation of taxable income.
0 The Tax Court reached the same
decision regarding the statutory structure in Allen v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 1
(2002), although in that case the taxpayer was not subject to the AMT and the issue
was the application of the limitation of the general business credit in § 38(c).
• This case has implications beyond the
Work Opportunity Credit because the same statutory structures apply to Welfare
to Work Credit, Orphan Drug Credit, and Increased Research Activities Credit.
4. A little assistance in identifying new employees that qualify for
the work opportunity credit. Rev. Rul. 2003-112, 2003-45 I.R.B. 1007
(11/10/03). An individual whose family receives TANF8 assistance for the
requisite period meets the requirements to be certified as a qualified IV-A recipient
under § 51(d)(2)(A) if the individual is included on the grant and receives
assistance for some portion of the specified period.
5. The final research credit regulations that weren't. In T.D.
8930, Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 66 F.R. 280 (1/3/01), the IRS
promulgated final regulations relating to the computation of the credit under §
41(c) and the definition of qualified research under § 41 (d). The final regulations
immediately came under withering criticism from the business sector, and, in an
unusual move, in Notice 2001-19, 2001-10 I.R.B. 784, the Treasury (Secretary
O'Neill, himself, actually) announced that it will review the "final" regulations by
8. Temporaty Assistance for Neady Families (TANF), replaced Aid for Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
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reconsidering the comments submitted and requesting additional comments on the
regulations to be received by 4/2/01. Any additional changes to the regulations will
be made in proposed form. The regulations, including any future changes, will not
be effective until the review is complete, except for the retroactive effective date
[12/31/85] of the taxpayer-friendly changes to internal-use computer software
rules. Taxpayers may rely on the final rules pending new regulations.
0 What the suspended final regulations
said. The final regulations cover the requirements to qualify for the credit, rules for
computing the credit, and rules for electing and revoking the election of the
alternative incremental credit, and take into account the legislative history of the
Tax Relief and Extension Act of 1999.
0 The final regulations do not change the
definition of gross receipts from that in the Proposed Regulations. REG-105170-
97, 63 F.R. 66503 (12/2/98).
* The final regulations retain the
requirement in the proposed regulations that a taxpayer seek to discover
information that exceeds, expands, or refines the common knowledge of skilled
professionals in the particular field of science or engineering.9 But, in response to
comments regarding the discovery requirement, the final regulations make a
number of changes.
* In order to satisfy the discovery
requirement, research must be undertaken for the purpose of discovering
information that is beyond the knowledge that should be known to skilled
professionals had they performed a reasonable investigation of the existing level
of knowledge in the particular field of science or engineering [instead of
technology or science], but there is no requirement that a taxpayer actually conduct
such an investigation in order to claim the credit. The regulations also state, by
example, that trade secrets generally are not within the common knowledge of
skilled professionals (because they are not reasonably available to skilled
professionals not employed, hired, or licensed by the owner of such trade secrets).
Underlying principles of science or engineering used in the research need not be
novel. Obtaining a patent [other than a design patent] raises a conclusive taxpayer
favorable presumption.
* The prescribed four-step process in the
definition of experimentation in Prop. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(5) has been eliminated.
0 The requirement of experimental record
keeping in Prop. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(5) has been eliminated.
0 The shrinking-back rule has been
modified in response to comments. Reg. § 1.41-4(b).
* The exclusion of most activities after
commercial production has commenced has been retained. Theperse exclusion list
retains debugging, but not correction of flaws.
* Research with respect to internal-use
software that satisfies both the general conditions for credit eligibility and the
three-part test is eligible for the credit. The final regulations retain the definition of
9. A discovery requirement was applied in United Stationers, Inc. v. United States, 163
F.3d 440 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1023 (1999), Norwest Corp. v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 454 (1998), and WICO-OR, Inc. v. United States, 116 F. Supp.
2d 1028 (E.D. Wis. 2000), aff'd, 263 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2001).
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internal-use software and the additional qualifying test in the proposed regulations,
but provide a new exception (pursuant to § 41(d)(4)(E)) under which certain
internal-use software used to deliver noncomputer services to customers with
features that are not yet offered by a taxpayer's competitors is not subject to the
additional tests. Following the Conference Report to the 1999 Act, the final
regulations clarify that software that is intended to be used to provide noncomputer
services to customers is internal-use software, while software that is to be used to
provide computer services is not developed primarily for internal use.
0 The final regulations clarify (1) that the
three-part test in the proposed regulations is the high threshold of innovation test,
and not a separate requirement, and (2) how the three-part part high threshold of
innovation test supplements the discovery requirement. Research with respect to
internal-use software is credit eligible only if it is intended to exceed, expand, or
refine the common knowledge of skilled professionals (as defined in Reg. § 1.41-
4(a)(3)(ii)) to a degree that is substantial and economically significant.
a. The new research credit proposed regulations that
are. REG- 112991-01, 66 F.R. 66362 (12/26/01). New proposed regulations under
§ 41 expand the definition of qualified research by eliminating the "discovery test"
included in the 1/3/01 regulations.
0 Treasury and IRS have eliminated in
these proposed regulations the requirement that qualified research must be
undertaken to obtain knowledge that exceeds, expands, or refines the common
knowledge of skilled professionals in a particular field of science or engineering.
Rather, Treasury and the IRS believe that the requirement that qualified research
be "undertaken for the purpose of discovering information which is technological
in nature" is intended to distinguish technological research, which may qualify for
the research credit, from non-technological research, which does not.
0 The proposed regulations repeat the
requirement from Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) by stating that research is undertaken for the
purpose of discovering information if it is intended to eliminate uncertainty
concerning the development or improvement of a business component.
Uncertainty, for purposes of this requirement, exists if the information available to
the taxpayer does not establish the capability or method of developing or
improving the business component, or the appropriate design of the business
component.
0 The proposed regulations revise the
shrinking-back rule to conform it to the rule in the legislative history to the 1986
Act. These proposed regulations also reiterate that the shrinking-back rule may not
itself be applied as a reason to exclude research activities from credit eligibility.
* No separate research credit-specific
documentation requirement is included in these proposed regulations.
* The preamble notes that the Service will
not generally challenge return positions that are consistent with the proposed
regulations.
b. New final research credit regulations retain the
requirement that experimentation "must be an evaluative process ... capable
of evaluating more than one alternative." They validate the old joke: 'How's
your wife?' "Compared with whom?"' T.D. 9104, Credit for Increasing
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Research Activities, 69 F.R. 22 (1/2/04). The final research credit regulations
generally retain the provisions of the December 2001 proposed regulations. The
rules for internal-use software are not included in these regulations, but are the
subject of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.
0 They require a process of
experimentation directed at resolving uncertainty regarding the taxpayer's
development or improvement of a business component that fundamentally relies
on the principles of the physical or biological sciences, engineering, or computer
science. One or more alternatives intended to eliminate that uncertainty must be
identified, and a process of evaluating the alternatives must also be identified. The
process may involve, e.g., modeling, simulation, or a systematic trial-and-error
methodology.
c. ANPRM on internal-use software. REG-153656-03,
Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 69 F.R. 43 (1/2/04). The Treasury
Department has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking under §
41(d)(4)(E), seeking comments on the definition of intemal-use software for
research credit purposes.
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. To "produce" or to "transport" gas, that is the question.
Saginaw Bay Pipeline Co. v. United States, 338 F.3d 600, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
5613,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,592 (6th Cir. 7/30/03), rev'g 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-6019,
2001-2 U.S.T.C 50,642 (E.D.Mich. 8/23/01)
0 The District Court (Judge O'Meara) held
that the natural gas gathering systems were used to transport gas [Class 46.0] - not
in production [Asset Class 13.2] - and thus are depreciable over 15 years rather
than seven years because the taxpayer was engaged in the transportation of natural
gas, not in the production or processing of natural gas. The District Court described
Duke Energy Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 172 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999),
as "wrongly decided."
0 The Sixth Circuit (Judge Krupansky)
found the Duke Energy reasoning persuasive and reversed the District Court. The
court held that the period of depreciation of natural gas gathering systems should
depend upon the use to which they were being put, and not upon the producer or
nonproducer status of the owner of the pipeline. Inasmuch as the pipelines in
question were used to transport impure "raw" or "wet' natural gas from the field
wellheads to a cleansing and processing facility, they qualify as "gathering
pipelines" under Asset Class 13.2 or Rev Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674. Natural
gas gathering systems are depreciable over seven years rather than the 15 years for
pipelines used to transport gas under Asset Class 46.0.
a. Non-producer must use 15-year recovery period.
Clajon Gas Co. L.P.v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 197 (10/25/02) (reviewed, 10-5).
The Tax Court in a decision by Judge Halpern upheld the government's notices of
final partnership administrative adjustment in determining that the recovery period
for gathering pipeline systems owned and operated by a non-producer were
transportation property with a 15-year recovery period, and not natural gas
production property with a 7-year recovery period. The court adhered to its
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decision in Duke Energy Natural Gas Corp. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 416
(1997), rev'd, 172 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), and refused to follow the Tenth
Circuit's reversal. The majority held that Clajon's use of the pipeline system was
relevant, and inasmuch as Clajon was not a producer, the pipeline system could not
have been part of the production system.
0 Judge Wells' dissent was based upon the
Tenth Circuit's plain language analysis in Duke Energy of Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-
2 C.B. 674, which only requires that the assets be "used" by natural gas producers
to qualify for 7-year depreciation. The Tax Court majority requires that the asset
be both owned and used by a natural gas producer. Judge Wells notes that the Tax
Court held in Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157 (10/7/02), that "the
Commissioner may not choose to litigate against an official position the
Commissioner has published without first revising or revoking that position."
* Judge Foley's dissent was based upon
similar grounds, that the asset meets the regulatory requirement even though Claj on
was not a producer.
b. Tax Court holding reversed by the Eighth Circuit: 7-
year recovery period for gathering pipelines. Clajon Gas. Co., LP v.
Commissioner, 354 F.3d 786,93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-396,2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,123
(8th Cir. 1/12/04). The court followed the Eighth Circuit's Duke Energy case and
the Sixth Circuit's Saganaw Bay Pipeline case.
2. The Exxon Saga: After an initial setback in the Tax Court, Exxon
has been meeting with success in the Federal Circuit on the issue of taking
percentage depletion on fixed contract natural gas on representative market or field
prices that are greatly in excess of the actual sale price for the gas.
a. Tax Court: Taxpayer not permitted to follow the
literal language of the regulations. Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 721
(6/6/94). Taxpayer was not permitted to follow the literal language of Reg. § 1.613-
3(a) and use "representative market or field prices" (RMFP) in determining "gross
income from the property" for purposes of computing percentage depletion under
§613A(b)(1)(B) ["fixed contract" exception]. Even though the regulation states that
"the gross income from the property shall be assumed to be equivalent to RMFP"
with respect to natural gas transported from the premises prior to sale, the purpose
of that provision was to prevent integrated producers from taking depletion
deductions on transportation, refiing, etc. - and not to permit a taxpayer to take
depletion based upon a RMFP price five times the actual sales price of the natural
gas to an Exxon affiliate. The actual contract sales price was therefore reduced by
royalties and transportation expenses to determine "gross income from the
property."
b. Same issue in Court of Federal Claims. Exxon Corp.
v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 250, 75 A.F.T.R.2d 95-1733, 95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,245
(Fed. Cl. 4/11/95). On the same issue, the court held, that while the amount upon
which depletion can be taken is not necessarily limited by actual gross income [21
cents], the RMFP calculated by Exxon [41 cents] was not a reasonable basis upon
which depletion may be taken and [based upon the burden of proof] the complaint
was dismissed. But reversed ....
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c. Federal Circuit holds that RMIFP which exceeds
actual gross receipts is not precluded, nor is it per se "unreasonable." Exxon
Cor. v. United States, 88 F.3d 968, 77 A.F.T.R.2d 96-2521, 96-2 U.S.T.C.
50,324 (Fed. Cir. 6/20/96), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1119 (3/17/97), rev'g and
remanding 33 Fed. Cl. 250,95-1 U.S.T.C. 50,245 (Fed. Cl. 1995). The court held
that the taxpayer was entitled to calculate its depletion deduction based upon an
RMFP of 39 cents based upon the wellhead price that would be realized by
nonintegrated producers. The court further held that the Court of Federal Claims
should not have limited the price by making an independent assessment of the
reasonableness of the price because the §611 (a) language "reasonable allowance
.. . in each case" refers to the different types of depletable resource, not to
individual taxpayers.
d. And you thought you couldn't deplete more than your
gross income. Of course you can, silly boy. Exxon Corp. v. United States, 45
Fed. Cl. 581, 84 A.F.T.R.2d 7235, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,116 (Fed. Cl. 12/2/99).
Exxon sought a $172.6 million refund based on percentage depletion for 1975,
under §613A(b)(1)(B), allowing §613 percentage depletion for natural gas sold
under a fixed contract. The long-term contracts in issue were with Houston
Lighting & Power Co. (HL&P) and with Southwestern Electric and Power Co.
(SWEPCO), The IRS assessed a deficiency for 1975 on the grounds that Exxon
was not entitled to use the RMFP under Reg. §1.613- 3(a) to compute percentage
depletion because the fixed-contract exception in §613A(b)(1)(B) did not permit
use of the RMFP. Exxon filed suit, and the Court of Claims initially denied the
government's motion for summary judgment, in which the government argued that
Reg. §1.613-3(a) did not apply to post-1974 depletion allowed under the fixed
contract exception.
0 On the government's motion for
summary judgment, the court (Senior Judge Gibson) held that: (1) Reg. § 1.613-
3(a), absent evidence that the regulation systematically causes a material distortion
of the "gross income from the property," was not facially invalid as applied to
percentage depletion deduction pursuant to the post-1974 fixed contract exception
[even if the RMFP exceeded the actual sales price, which it can under Exxon,
Corp. v. United States, 88 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1996)], and (2) evidence raised
genuine issues of material fact that the regulation produced a result that was
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the post-1974 statutory percentage
depletion scheme. 40 Fed. Cl. 73 (1998).
After trial, the court held:
* First: Not all of the natural gas was
eligible under Reg. § 1.613A-7(c)(5) and (d). Exxon failed to prove that its contract
with HL&P qualified as a "fixed contract." The HL&P excess royalty
reimbursement and additional gas contract terms permitted Exxon, in part, to raise
prices after Feb. 1, 1975, by amounts tied to the market price for natural gas [which
would allow it to recover through price increases increased tax liabilities arising
from the repeal of percentage depletion], and the sales prices did in fact increase.
Exxon did not prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the price increase did
not "to any extent" permit it to recoup tax increases attributable to the repeal of
percentage depletion. The contract with SWEPCO, however, was qualified.
Although the contract had a price adjustment clause under which Exxon "could
potentially have recovered a portion of its increased income tax liabilities," the
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contract qualified as a "fixed contract" because the contract price did not in factincrease after February 1, 1975. 0 Second: For calculating Exxon's 1975
percentage depletion allowance, the RMFP is $0.6831 per thousand cubic feet
(Mcf) of natural gas that is eligible for percentage depletion. (1) The Texas Gulf
Coast/East Texas region, rather than the entire state, constituted a "market area that
was geographically 'representative"' of Exxon's 1975 production from the
properties at issue. (2) In determining whether that region was the relevant market
area, Judge Gibson found that Exxon's 1975 "gas well gas production" -
comprising 90.24 percent of the gas in issue - was comparable or superior to gas
produced and sold generally through the region; only 9.74 percent [casinghead gas]
was not comparable and must be excluded from the computation of Exxon's
allowance. (3) After determining the appropriate RMFP transaction sample and
adjusting for the pre-sale costs of compression and dehydration, the court held that
the RMFP for purposes of Reg. §1.613-3(a) was $0.6831 per Mcf.
0 Exxon had argued that every sale of raw
gas at a delivery point anywhere on the producer's leased property was a
transaction in which the sale price was untainted by transportation before the sale.
The court held that Exxon failed to support that position, and that it was not
feasible to cure tainted transactions by subtracting the transportation cost from the
gas sale price.
e. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. Literalism
triumphs in the Federal Circuit. Taxpayer celebrates a little bit more. Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1341, 87 A.F.T.R.2d 1508, 2001-1
U.S.T.C. 50,348 (Fed. Cir. 4/3/01). The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of
Federal Claims holding that percentage depletion should be calculated with respect
to a RMFP that exceed the taxpayer's actual sale price. Judge Michel rejected the
government's argument that Reg. § 1.613-3(a) here would lead to "absurd results,"
and would "thwart the obvious purpose" of the 1975 Act by noting that Treasury
considered, but declined to fix, the "perceived anomaly." He so held because "it is
not the province of this court to remedy anomalies in the tax laws that Congress
and the [Treasury] have refrained from correcting." The 1975 addition of §613A
"may have changed pre-1975 law by redefining what kinds of gas are eligible for
percentage depletion, nothing in the regulation changes ...the method of
computing the AMOUNT of percentage depletion or eligible gas." (emphasis in
original)
* He also affirmed the trial court's holding
that casinghead gas [gas that was dissolved in oil at reservoir conditions but
becomes gaseous at atmospheric pressure at the top - or "casinghead - of an oil
well] should be excluded from the computation of the RMFP because it was not
comparable to its gas well gas. Finally, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's holding that the HL&P contract was not a "fixed price contract," holding
as a matter of law that it was a fixed price contract, thereby entitling Exxon to
percentage depletion on the gas sold pursuant to that contract. Under the contract,
Exxon could not raise the price of gas unless HL&P exercised its rights under the
additional gas clause. That did not alter the fact that the price for the original
quantity of gas was fixed from Exxon's perspective. HL&P controlled whether the
additional gas clause, and thus the price increase, would be invoked.
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f. The District Court for the Northern District of Texas
permits percentage depletion based on the RMFP, but not for the HL&P and
SWEPCO contracts. Exxon Mobil Conp. v. United States, 253 F.Supp.2d 915,
2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,260 (N.D.Tex. 3/10/03). In this refund action for the 1976
year, the court found that natural gas sold under 18 fixed price, long-term contracts
was eligible for percentage depletion based upon the representative market or field
price ("RMFP"). The court, however, found that two additional contracts [with
HL&P and SWEPCO] were not "fixed contracts" because taxpayer failed to meet
its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the prices thereunder
were not subject to adjustment to reflect the increase in liabilities of Exxon for
federal income tax after 1974 by reason of the [1975 Act] repeal of percentage
depletion.
3. A § 29 credit no-ruling issue. Rev. Proc. 2000-47, 200046
I.R.B. 482 (11/13/00). Rev. Proc. 2000-3, §5, 2000-1 I.R.B. 103, was amplified by
adding to the list of issues on which the IRS will not issue advance rulings the
question of whether a solid fuel other than coke or a fuel produced from waste coal
is a qualified fuel under §29(c)(1)(C). Waste coal for this purpose is limited to
waste coal fines from normal mining and crushing operations and does not include
fines produced (for example, by crushing run-of-mine coal) for the purpose of
claiming the credit.
a. Rulings will again be available. But Treasury didn't
revert to pre-suspension ruling standards. Rev. Proc. 2001-30, 2001-19 I.R.B.
1163 (4/23/0 1), modified by Rev. Proc. 2001-34. 2001-22 I.R.B. 1293 (5/8/01).
The ruling provides the circumstances under which the Service will issue private
letter rulings regarding whether a solid fuel produced from coal is a qualified fuel
under § 29(c)(1)(C). The circumstances necessary for the Service to issue a private
letter ruling include the presence of coal feedstock particles no larger than a
specific size, and the performance of specific activities in processing the feedstock
in order to effectuate a significant chemical change. The chief requirement is that
the fuel be "synthetic." To be synthetic "a fuel must differ significantly in chemical
composition, as opposed to physical composition, from the substance used to
produce it." Examples of "favorable processes" set forth in the revenue procedure
include "gasification [sic] and liquefaction [sic] and production of solvent refined
coal that result[s] in substantial chemical changes to the entire coal feedstock rather
than changes that affect only the surface of the coal."
b. Eleven days later, the Treasury reverted to pre-
suspension ruling standards. Rev. Proc. 2001-34 modifies Rev. Proc. 2001-30
to expand the range of sizes of coal feedstock and to eliminate one particular
activity as a necessary part of a process that results in a qualified fuel.
c. IRS looks again at coal-based synfuels - or, is it sin-
fuels? Announcement 2003-46, 2003-30 I.R.B. 222 (7/28/03). IRS suspends
issuance of letter rulings related to the § 29 tax credit for the production of solid
synthetic fuels produced from coal pending review of tests that purportedly show
that the processes resulted in significant chemical change.
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d. Someone holds the "kies" to IRS continuation of
rulings in this area - at least for the time being. Announcement 2003-70, 2003-
46 I.R.B. 1090 (10/29/03). In so doing, the Announcement states:
The Service has finished the review started with Announcement
2003-46. As a result of this review, the Service has determined
that the test procedures and results used by taxpayers are
scientifically valid if the procedures are applied in a consistent
and unbiased manner. The Service believes, however, that the
processes approved under its long standing ruling practice and as
set forth in Rev. Proc. 2001-30 do not produce the level of
chemical change required by § 29(c)(1)(C) and Rev. Rul. 86-100.
Nevertheless, the Service continues to recognize that many
taxpayers and their investors have relied on its longstanding
ruling practice to make investments. Therefore, the Service will
continue to issue rulings on significant chemical change but only
under the guidelines set forth in Rev. Proc. 2001-30 as modified
by Rev. Proc. 2001-34.
Although the Service will resume its ruling practice, the Service
has continuing concerns regarding the sampling and data/record
retention practices prevalent in the synthetic fuels industry.
Accordingly, in order to receive future rulings, taxpayers will be
required to (i) maintain sampling and quality control procedures
that conform to ASTM or other appropriate industry guidelines
at their synthetic fuel production facilities, (ii) obtain regular
reports from independent laboratories that have analyzed the
synthetic fuel produced in such facilities to verify that the coal
used to produce the fuel undergoes a significant chemical change,
consistent with prior ruling practice, and (iii) maintain records
and data underlying the reports that taxpayers obtain from
independent laboratories including raw FTIR data, and processed
FTIR data sufficient to document the selection of absorption
peaks and integration points. The Service also plans to issue
guidance extending these requirements to taxpayers already
holding rulings on the issue of significant chemical change. In
addition to these requirements, the Service is considering whether
to impose certain requirements on laboratories used by taxpayers
to demonstrate significant chemical change, consistent with prior
ruling practice, such as requiring that the laboratories be
accredited by the NIST National Voluntary Laboratory
Accreditation Program.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts and NOLs
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during 2003.
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I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1. Whose "participation" counts if the taxpayer isn't a natural
person? The Mattie K. Carter Trust v. United States, 256 F.Supp.2d 536, 91
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1946,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,418 (N.D. Tex. 4/11/03). The district
court (Judge McBryde) held that in determining whether a trust "materially
participated" in an activity [in this case a ranching operation] the activities of all of
the trust's fiduciaries, employees, and agents should be considered, as urged by the
taxpayer, and not just the activities of the trustee, as argued by the government.
2. Soon (or eventually), no amounts borrowed from your
partner will increase your at-risk amount. REG-209377-89, At-Risk
Limitations; Interest Other Than That of a Creditor, 68 F.R. 40583 (7/8/03).
Section 465(b)(3) provides that amounts borrowed for use in an activity do not
increase the borrower's amount at risk in an activity listed in § 465(c)(1) [(1)
motion-picture films or videotapes; (2) farming; (3) leasing § 1245 property; (4)
oil and gas resources and geothermal deposits] if the lender has an interest other
than that of a creditor in the activity or if the lender is related to a person (other
than the borrower) who has a disqualifying interest in the activity. Section
465(c)(3)(D) provides that § 465(b)(3) applies to activities to which § 465 is
extended by § 453(c)(3)(A) - all other business and profit seeking activities - only
to the extent provided in regulations; Alexander v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 467
(1990), affd by order sub nom. Stell v. Commissioner, 999 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.
1993), held that until regulations were issued, §465(b)(3) does not apply to
activities other than those described in § 465(c)(1). The revisions to Prop. Reg. §
1.465-8 and 1.465-20 would apply § 465(b)(3) to the activities described in §
465(c)(3)(A). The regulation will be effective when finalized.
Il. INVESTMENT GAIN
A. Capital Gain and Loss
1. This collar just plain clean works. Rev. Rul. 2003-7, 2003-5
I.R.B. 363 (1/16/03). The IRS ruled that a shareholder has neither sold stock
currently nor caused a constructive sale of stock under § 1259 where he (1)
receives a fixed amount of cash, (2) simultaneously enters into an agreement to
deliver on a future date a number of shares of common stock that varies
significantly depending on the value of the shares on the delivery date [but which
does provide a "collar" on the number of shares of stock to be delivered, in effect
providing a "collar" on the ultimate sale price], (3) pledges the maximum number
of shares for which delivery could be required, (4) has the unrestricted right to
deliver the pledged shares or to substitute cash or other shares on the delivery date,
and (5) is not economically compelled to deliver the pledged shares.
0 There was not a sale of the pledged
shares because the shareholder was not required to relinquish the pledged shares
but had an unrestricted right to reacquire them by delivering cash or other shares.
There was not a constructive sale under § 1259(c)(1)(C) because due to the
variation in the number of shares that might be delivered, the agreement was not
a contract to deliver a substantially fixed amount of property for purposes of §
1259(d)(1).
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2. A little help for bears. Rev. Rul. 2003-31, 2003-13 I.R.B. 643
(3/31/03). This revenue ruling dealt with two issues regarding short sales in margin
accounts. First, changes to the terms of a margin account through which a short
sale was effectuated do not result in the short sale being consummated for purposes
of Reg. § 1.1233-1 (a)(4). Second, if a taxpayer's pre-6/9/97 appreciated financial
position and short-against-the-box transactions are not taken into account for
purposes of applying § 1259 of the Internal Revenue Code to post-6/8/97
transactions, as provided by the transition rule in § 1001(d)(2) of the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, changes to the terms of the margin account through which the
short sale was effectuated will not result in transition rule ceasing to apply.
3. Capital gains rates reduced to 15 percent. Generally speaking,
under the 2003 Act, gains from the sale of capital assets held for more than one
year realized by taxpayers otherwise subject to income tax rates of greater than 15
percent (formerly taxed at a 20-percent rate) are taxed at a rate of 15 percent. For
taxpayers otherwise subject to income tax rates of 10 or 15 percent, capital gains
(formerly taxed at an 8- or 10-percent rate) are taxed at 5 percent (with a special
zero percent rate capital gains rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in
2008).
* The 25- and 28-percent capital gains
rates remain. Some or all of any capital gains realized on the sale of depreciable
real estate, however, may be taxed at a maximum rate of 25 percent if realized by
a taxpayer (otherwise in a tax bracket greater than 15 percent), and gains on the
sale of collectibles, e.g., art work, precious gems, gold bullion, antiques, etc., are
subject to a maximum rate of 28 percent.
0 For taxable years that include 5/6/03, the
rate on net long-term capital gains is bifurcated pursuant to § 301(c) of the 2003
Act. For gains taken into account prior to 5/6/03, net long-term capital gains are
taxed under former law. Gains taken into account after 5/5/03 will be taxed at the
new rates.
4. You have to transfer some other business asset before you can
sell goodwill. Baker v. Commissioner, 338 F.3d 789, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5640,
2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,604 (7th Cir. 8/4/03), affg 118 T.C. 452 (5/29/02). The
taxpayer was a State Farm insurance agent, who sold policies exclusively for State
Farm as an independent contractor, operating his own agency, developing clients,
hiring employees, and paying expenses. Upon retirement, the taxpayer returned all
of State Farm's property to it, but transferred no identifiable assets of his own, and
he received a "termination payment" - the insurance policies he had written were
assigned to a successor agent. The Seventh Circuit (Judge Bauer) affirmed the Tax
Court (Judge Panuthos) decision denying the taxpayer capital gain treatment with
respect to the termination payment. He transferred no assets that owned; the
telephone number and at-will employment relationships were not assets. He could
not transfer goodwill, because he transferred nothing to which goodwill could
attach because (contractually) the customer list belonged to the insurance company.
The entire termination payment was ordinary income without regard to the potion
of it allocable to a covenant not to compete. As the court stated:
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Fundamentally, in order to have the ability to sell something, one
must own it. Because Warren Baker did not own any property
related to the policies, he could not sell anything.
5. Welter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-299 (10/29/03). Grain
commodity trading by the shareholder of a corporation engaged in the grain
farming business were not hedging transactions under the predecessor of Reg. §
1.1221-2 because they were effected through the shareholder's personal brokerage
account. The gains and losses (net losses) were capital.
0 The same result would occur under
current Reg. § 1.1221-2.
B. Section 121
1. Peripatetic taxpayers sold the wrong house. Guinan v. United
States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2174,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,475 (D. Ariz. 4/9/03). Reg.
§ 1.121-1 (b)(2) provides that the property used by the taxpayer for a majority of
the time during the year will be treated as the taxpayer's principal residence. The
taxpayers in Guinan owned three residences - a residence in Wisconsin, which
they sold, a residence in Georgia, and a residence in Arizona. During the five year
period prior to selling the Wisconsin residence, the taxpayers spent more time in
the aggregate in the Wisconsin residence (847 days) than in either of the other two
residences (563 days in the Georgia residence and 375 days in the Arizona
residence), but their combined use of the Georgia and Arizona residences exceeded
their use of the Wisconsin residence. The taxpayers spent the majority of their time
in the Wisconsin residence only in the first year of the five-year period. The other
factors listed in Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1 (b)(2) did not support treating the Wisconsin
residence as the taxpayers' principal residence - at various times the taxpayers had
registered to vote in Wisconsin, Georgia, and Arizona, they had Arizona and
Georgia driver's licenses, but not Wisconsin licenses, and they filed Arizona and
Georgia state income tax returns, but not Wisconsin returns. Thus, the Wisconsin
residence was not the taxpayers' principal residence, and the § 121 exclusion was
not available.
C. Section 1031
1. Safe-harbor deferred like in-kind exchanges for car rental
companies. Rev. Proc. 2003-39, 2003-22 I.R.B. 971 (6/2/03). This revenue
procedure provides safe harbor rules allowing under § 1031 with respect to
programs involving ongoing exchanges of tangible personal property using a single
intermediary ("LKE Programs"). [For background information on this revenue
procedure, see Attorneys Request Guidance for Like-kind Exchange Programs,
2002 TNT 78-22 (4/1/02).]
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D. Section 1035
1. Rev. Rul. 2003-76, 2003-33 I.R.B. 355 (8/18/03). An exchange
of a portion of an annuity contract into a new annuity contract effected by the
owner assigning a portion of the cash surrender value (60 percent) to a different
insurance company was a tax-free exchange under § 1035. The investment in the
contract and basis are allocated according to the cash value immediately prior to
the exchange using the rules of § § 72 and 1031. Thus, the basis in the new contract
equals 60 percent of the basis in the contract immediately before the exchange.
After the transaction, the basis in the old contract equals 40 percent its original
basis.
E. Section 1041
1. A welcome regulation is made final! Subchapter C principles
govern which spouse will be taxed on stock redemptions incident to a divorce
- at least unless the spouses mutually elect otherwise. T.D. 9035, Constructive
Transfers and Transfers of Property to a Third Party on Behalf of a Spouse, 68 F.R.
1534 (1/13/03). Because of the inconsistent standards applied by the courts in
dealing with redemptions of stock incident to a divorce, in REG-107151-00,
Constructive Transfers and Transfers of Property to a Third Party on Behalf of a
Spouse, 66 F.R. 40659 (8/3/01), the Treasury proposed regulations [Prop. Reg. §
1.1041-2] to provide greater certainty in determining which spouse will be taxed
on stock redemptions occurring during marriage or incident to divorce. Reg. §
1.1041-2 has been finalized and Reg. § 1.1041 -IT(c) Q&A-9 no longer controls
redemptions of stock incident to a divorce. Reg. § 1.1041-2 applies only where the
nonredeemed spouse owns stock of the redeeming corporation either immediately
before or immediately after the stock redemption. If a corporation redeems stock
of one spouse, and that redemption is treated as a constructive distribution to the
other spouse under Subchapter C principles - the primary and unconditional
obligation standard [Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947); Sullivan
v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966)] - the redemption is treated as a
distribution to the spouse who continues as a shareholder. Section 1041 applies to
the deemed transfer of the stock by the redeemed spouse to the continuing
shareholder spouse. Section 1041 does not apply to the deemed transfer of stock
from the nontransferor spouse to the redeeming corporation. Any property actually
received by the redeemed spouse from corporation is treated as flowing through the
continuing shareholder-spouse, and § 1041 applies to that transfer. In all other
cases, the form of the stock redemption will be respected; the redeemed spouse will
be taxed on the redemption and the continuing spouse has not tax consequences.
The preamble to the proposed regulations specifically state:
[I]f the rules of the proposed regulations had applied in the Ames
case,"l0 because the husband did not have a primary and
unconditional obligation to purchase the wife's stock, the
redemption would have been taxed in accordance with its form
10. Ames v. United States, 981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992), not applied by Tax
Court, Ames v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 522 (1994) (reviewed, 7 judges
dissenting).
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with the result that the wife would have incurred the tax
consequences of the redemption.
a A special rule applies if an effective
divorce or separation instrument, or a written agreement between the spouses
[executed before the due dates of their returns], requires the spouses to file their
federal income tax returns in a consistent manner that treats the stock as being
redeemed from the continuing shareholder spouse rather than from the spouse from
whom it was actually redeemed. In such a case spouses and former spouses will
treat a redemption that otherwise would be taxed according to its form as a
redemption from the continuing shareholder spouse involving (1) a deemed § 1041
transfer of the stock by the redeemed spouse to the continuing shareholder spouse,
and (2) a deemed § 1041 transfer by the continuing shareholder spouse to the
redeemed spouse of the redemption proceeds.
* The final regulations add a provision
dealing with situations in which the redemption results in a constructive dividend
distribution to the nontransferor spouse under Subchapter C principles, but the
spouses nevertheless would like to agree that the redemption will be treated as a
redemption distribution to the transferor spouse. Reg. § 1.1041-2(c) allows' the
spouses to agree in the divorce or separation instrument, or other valid written
agreement, that the redemption will be taxable to the transferor spouse
notwithstanding that the redemption might otherwise result in a constructive
dividend distribution to the nontransferor spouse. Example 2 in § 1.1041-2(d)
illustrates the application of this special rule.
* Under the final regulations, the spouses
can elect the special rule by expressly providing, in a divorce or separation
instrument or other valid written agreement, that expressly supersedes any other
instrument or agreement concerning the purchase, sale, redemption, or other
disposition of the stock that is the subject of the redemption, their mutual intent
concerning [which spouse should receive redemption treatment].
* These regulations are applicable to
redemptions of stock on or after January 13, 2003 that are pursuant to instruments
in effect after January 13, 2003. These regulations are also applicable to
redemptions before January 13, 2003 or that are pursuant to instruments in effect
before January 13, 2003 if the spouses or former spouses execute a written
agreement on or after August 3, 2001, that satisfies the requirements of § 1.1041 -
2(c)(1) or (2).
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. IRS revokes Notice 2001-10 and for future arrangements will
require taxation under one of two mutually exclusive regimes. Notice 2002-8,
2002-4 I.R.B. 398 (1/28/02), revoking Notice 2001-10, 2001-5 I.R.B. 459. When
the Treasury and Service publish proposed regulations providing comprehensive
guidance regarding the tax treatment of split-dollar life insurance arrangements, the
regulations will provide the following in employment-related arrangements:
* If the employer is formally designated
as owner of the life insurance contract, then the employer will be treated as
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providing current life insurance protection and other economic benefits to the
employee. A transfer of the life insurance contract to the employee would be taxed
under § 83, but an employer would not be treated as having made a transfer of the
cash surrender value for purposes of § 83 "solely because the interest or other
earnings credited to the cash surrender value of the contract cause the cash
surrender value to exceed the portion thereof payable to the employer." This has
the effect of leaving that issue unresolved, and would change the position in Notice
2001-10 that the employee would be taxed under § 83 on the transfer of a
beneficial interest in the cash surrender value.
0 If the employee is formally designated
as owner, the premiums paid by the employer would be treated as a series of loans
by the employer to the employee - if the employee is required to repay the
employer out of insurance proceeds or otherwise. The loans are subject to taxation
under the §§ 1271-1275 OD provisions and the § 7872 compensation-related
below-market loan provision. If the employee is not required to repay the
employer, then the premiums paid would be treated as compensation income to the
employee when paid.
0 The above rules will be effective for
arrangements entered into after the date of publication of final regulations. P.S. 58
rates may be used for provisions valuing current life insurance protection entered
into before 1/28/02 and for arrangements entered into before the date of
publication of final regulations.
a. Notice 2002-8 is carried into proposed regulations.
REG-164754-01, Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 67 F.R. 45414
(7/9/02). These proposed regulations provide guidance on the income, employment
and gift taxation of split-dollar life insurance arrangements and carry out the
concepts of Notice 2002-8. These proposed regulations will be effective for split-
dollar life insurance arrangements entered after the date of publication of final
regulations in the Federal Register.
b. Crackdown on split-dollar life insurance
arrangements that are designed to understate the value of benefits for income
or gift tax purposes. Notice 2002-59, 2002-36 I.R.B. 481 (9/9/02). The IRS held
that neither the premium rates in Table 2001 nor the insurer's lower published
premium rates may be relied on to value the insured's current life insurance
protection for the "purpose of establishing the value of policy benefits to which
another party may be entitled." Under reverse split-dollar arrangements, one party
with a right to current life insurance protection may use various techniques to
confer policy benefits other than current life insurance protection on another party,
but using such techniques to understate the value of other policy benefits "distorts
the income, employment, or gift tax consequences of the arrangement."
0 According to Tax Notes Today, 2002
TNT 161-4 (8/20/02), this notice was issued after Treasury officials read a 7/28/02
story in the New York Times, which stated that Jonathan Blattmachr had
developed this technique based upon a 1996 private letter ruling [identified as LTR
9636033].
c. Equity split-dollar proposed regulations. REG-164754-
01, Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 68 F.R. 24898 (5/8/03). Supplement
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the 2002 proposed regulations to provide guidance on the valuation of economic
benefits under an equity split-dollar life insurance arrangement. Under an equity
split-dollar arrangement, the payments by the owner of the policy establish a pool
of assets in which the non-owner has rights of withdrawal, borrowing, surrender,
assignment or the like; in addition, this pool of assets may be also placed beyond
the reach of the owner's creditors. The proposed regulations provide that the non-
owner "has current access to any portion of the policy cash that is directly or
indirectly accessible by the non-owner, inaccessible to the owner, or inaccessible
to the owner's general creditors." "Access" is thus to be broadly construed.
0 Thus, the non-owner is to be taxed on
the value of curr.ent term life insurance protection plus the amount of policy cash
value to which he has "current access." There is also a third component: "the value
of any economic benefits ... provided to the non-owner."
d. Final split-dollar regulations are effective on 9/17/03.
T.D. 9092, Split-Dollar Life Insurance Arrangements, 68 F.R. 54336 (9/17/03).
The Treasury Department has promulgated comprehensive final regulations [Reg.
§§ 1.61-22, 1.83-3(e), 1.83-6(a)(5), 1.301-1(q), and Reg. § 1.7872-15] regarding
the federal income, gift, and employment taxation of split-dollar life insurance
arrangements (as defined in § 1.61-22(b)(1) or (2)). They adopt the proposed
regulations with only minor changes. The effective date of the final regulations is
9/17/03, the date of publication in the Federal Register, i.e., the regulations apply
to any split-dollar life insurance arrangement that is entered into after 9/17/03 and
to any split-dollar life insurance arrangement entered into on or before that date that
is materially modified after that date.
(1) Rev. Rul. 2003-105, 2003-40 I.R.B. 696
(9/12/03). This revenue ruling renders prior guidance in this area obsolete. In the
case of any split-dollar life insurance arrangement entered into on or before
9/17/03, taxpayers may continue to rely on prior revenue rulings to the extent
described in Notice 2002-8, but only if the arrangement is not materially modified
after that date.
2. A Tax Court loss for an airline pilot on taxation of disability
benefits, the premiums on which were employer-paid. Tuka v. Commissioner,
120 T.C. 1 (1/06/03). The taxpayer claimed that disability payments, based on age,
years of service, and salary, received from an employer sponsored plan were tax
exempt under § 104(a)(3). Judge Ruwe held that the exclusion of disability benefits
under § 104(a)(3) is available only if the contributions to the accident and health
plan were includible in the employee's gross income. Even if the plan had been
funded by wage savings to the employer resulting from collective bargaining with
the union it would not have been an employee contribution plan.
3. Amounts received from employer may be excluded as § 139
qualified disaster relief; amounts received from a state agency are excluded
as gifts. Rev. Rul. 2003-12, 2003-3 I.R.B. 283 (1/21/03). Amounts received by an
individual from an employer to reimburse the individual for necessary medical,
temporary housing, or transportation expenses incurred as a result of a flood are not
excludable as a gift under § 102, but are excluded from gross income as qualified
disaster relief under § 139 if the flood was a Presidentially declared disaster.
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Similar amounts received from a state agency are excludable under the
administrative general welfare exclusion; and similar amounts received from a
charity are excluded under § 102.
4. Health FSAs and HRAs with point of service electronic
payment. Rev. Rul. 2003-43, 2003-21 I.R.B. 935 (5/27/03). An employer-
sponsored health FSA [§ 125] or HRA [Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93]
qualifies under § 105 where the plan provides electronic reimbursement of medical
expenses through the use of a debit card or stored-value card, or payment by a
credit card, issued to the employee and charged to the employer's account if: (1)
use of the card is limited to the maximum dollar amount of coverage available in
the cardholder's health FSA or HRA, (2) the card is effective only at authorized
physicians, pharmacies, dentists, vision care offices, hospitals, and other medical
care providers, (3) the employee certifies that any expense paid with the card has
not been reimbursed and that the employee will not seek reimbursement under any
other plan, (4) the employee agrees to acquire and retain sufficient documentation,
including invoices and receipts, for expenses paid with the card, and (5) the
employer maintains comprehensive procedures for substantiating claimed medical
expenses after the use of the card. But where the employer does not
comprehensively substantiate that the expenses paid with the card qualify as
medical expenses - for example, only statistically samples expenditures to verify
that the expenditure was not for cosmetic procedures - the plan does not qualify.
a. You don't need a prescription to be reimbursed by a
health FSA for over-the-counter drugs. Rev. Rul. 2003-102,2003-38 I.R.B. 559
(9/22/03). The test for reimbursement by a health FSA under § 105(b) for drugs
simply requires that they be obtained for .'medical care' as defined in section
213(d)," and does not require that they satisfy they requirement of § 213(b) which
permits an amount paid for a medicine or drug to be taken into account for
purposes of the § 213 deduction "only if the medicine or drug is a prescribed drug
or insulin."
b. Contrast reimbursement plans with deductibility
under § 213. Under § 213 a prescription is required for medicines and drugs to be
deductible. Rev. Rul. 2003-58, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (6/2/03). Amounts paid by an
individual for medicines that may be purchased without a prescription of a
physician, e.g., aspirin, are not deductible under § 213 of the Code, even when the
taxpayer's physician instructs the taxpayer to take the medication to alleviate a
medical problem. See V.E., below.
5. Guidance on Health Savings Accounts. Notice 2004-2,2004-2
I.R.B. 269 (1/12/04). The IRS has issued guidance in Q&A form on Health
Savings Accounts under new § 223 (added by § 1201 of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-
173, 117 Stat. 2066). This guidance provides basic information about HSAs. This
new provision offers health-spending accounts without the "use it or lose it"
requirement of health FSAs.
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B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1. EPCRS updated again. Rev. Proc. 2003-44, 2003-25 I.R.B.
1051 (6/23/03), updating and superseding Rev, Proc. 2002-47, 2002-29 I.R.B. 133.
This iteration of the Employee Plans Compliance Resolution System will be
generally effective 10/1/03.
2. Cash balance plan proposed regulations provide a green light
for adoptions of cash balance plans favoring younger employees, including
permission to require quasi-geriatrics to spin their [retirement accrual] wheels
during "wear-away" periods. REG-209500-86 and REG-164464-02, Reductions
of Accruals and Allocations Because of the Attainment of any Age; Application of
Nondiscrimination Cross-Testing Rules to Cash Balance Plans, 67 F.R. 76123
(12/11/02). These proposed regulations provide guidance on age discrimination
requirements under §§ 41 l(b)(1)(H) and 41 1(b)(2), including the allocation of
these requirements to cash balance pension plans.
* A cash balance plan is a defined benefit
plan under which an employee has a hypothetical individual account that provides
a benefit upon retirement based upon pay credits and interest credits - a concept
that closely resembles a defined contribution plan. Section 411 (b)(1)(H) provides
that a defined benefit plan fails to comply with the age discrimination rules of §
411 (b) if benefit accrual is ceased or reduced on the attainment of any age, and §
411 (b)(2) provides that a defined contribution plan similarly fails to comply unless
the rate at which amounts are allocated to an employee's account is not similarly
ceased or reduced because of age.
0 A cash balance qualifies, inter alia, only
if "the participant accrues the right to future interest credits (without regard to
future service) at a reasonable rate of interest that does not decrease because of the
attainment of any age."
0 The rules for conversion of traditional
defined benefit plans to cash balance plans require that either (1) the converted plan
defines the benefit as the sum of the benefits under the traditional defined benefit
plan and the cash balance account, or (2) the converted plan must establish each
participant's opening account balance as an amount not less than the actuarial
present value of the participant's prior accrued benefit. The second alternative
would permit a "wear-away" period during which the participant will not accrue
net benefits for some period after the conversion.
a. Treasury and IRS withdraw the proposed cash-
balance plan nondiscrimination regulations. Announcement 2003-22,2003-17
I.R.B. 846 (4/7/03). The proposed nondiscrimination regulations under § 401 (a)(4)
that would have required a modified form of cross-testing, which were proposed
at the same time as the proposed cash balance regulations, are withdrawn because
(as proposed) they would make it difficult "for plan sponsors converting long-
standing traditional pension plans to cash balance plans to provide different types
of transitional relief to plan participants." The withdrawn proposed regulations will
be re-proposed.
b. Courts find that Xerox and IBM cash balance plans
violate ERISA. Berger v. Xerox Corporation Retirement Income Guarantee Plan,
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338 F.3d 755, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,597 (7th Cir. 8/1/03) (plan violates ERISA
because method of determining an ex-employee's benefit if a lump sum under
$25,000 is chosen on leaving before retirement); Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension
Plan, 274 F.Supp.2d 1010, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,576 (S.D. 111. 8/1/03) (plan
violates ERISA § 240(b)(1)(G) [reduction of accrued benefit solely on increases
in age or service] and 240(b)(1)(H) [rate of benefit accrual decreases once a certain
age is attained]).
3. Here's how to deduct a redemption. Boise Cascade Corp. v.
United States, 329 F.3d 751,91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2280,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,472
(9th Cir. 4/10/03). Boise Cascade's ESOP held over 6.7 million shares of Boise
Cascade convertible preferred stock. To fund distributions to employees who had
terminated their employment when they had vested account balances, Boise
Cascade redeemed a relatively small number of shares of the convertible preferred
stock held by its ESOP. The Court of Appeals upheld Boise Cascade's claim that
the redemption failed all of the tests of § 302(b), and thus was a dividend under §
301, and, as such, was deductible pursuant to § 404(k). Furthermore, § 162(k) did
not apply to bar the deduction. Responding to what appears to have been a
groundless argument by the government, the court held that § 318 did not treat the
plan beneficiaries as owners [because the ESOP was a § 401(a) trust]. The court
held that the ESOP was not a grantor trust of which the beneficiaries were the
owners.
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options
1. Just exactly what does "included" mean? Robinson v. United
States, 52 Fed. Cl. 725, 90 A.F.T.R.2d. 2002-5003, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,524
(6/24/02). The Court of Federal Claims followed Venture Funding, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 236 (1998), affd per curiam, 198 F.3d 248 (6th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1205 (2000), to hold that §83(h) allows a deduction
for the value of a compensatory transfer of restricted stock to an employee only
when the amount of the discount is actually "included" by the employee, not when
the amount is "includable" but not reported as income by the employee. Since the
employee was appealing from an unfavorable audit with respect to the income item
attributable to the year of the transfer [in which the employee-COO had made a §
83(b) election and reported the bargain element as zero, giving notice to himself
as a representative of the corporation, even though the taxpayers owned all of the
remaining stock of the S corporation- 90 percent], the fact of inclusion was not yet
established and the refund claim was not ripe. Taxpayers claimed that employee
received restricted stock worth $28 million for $2 million and made the § 83(b)
zero election without advising them or anyone else at the corporation at the time;
taxpayers did not find out about the § 83(b) election until negotiating the COO's
termination three years later (when they sent the COO an amended Form W-2).
a. Reversed and Reg. § 1.83-6(a) invalidated. "Included"
means included under law, not included in fact. Robinson v. United States, 335
F.3d 1365, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5349, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,590 (Fed. Cir.
7/15/03). The Federal Circuit (Judge Bryson) reversed. The court reasoned that
since a deduction under § 162 for compensation paid is allowed whether or not the
employee actually includes the amount in income, the word "included" in § 83(h)
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refers only to whether the amount was properly includable by the employee under
§ 61. In support of this proposition, the court quoted the legislative history of §
83(h): "The allowable deduction is the amount which the employee is required to
recognize as income. The deduction is to be allowed in the employer's accounting
period which includes the close of the taxable year in which the employee
recognizes the income." S. Rep. No. 91-522, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1969)
[emphasis added], focusing on the italicized language. The court also cited the
Bluebook for support.
0 Furthermore, the court refused to apply
Reg. § 1.83-6(a), as revised in 1995, which was the controlling regulation and
which supported the Commissioner's position, because, the court reasoned, the
regulation was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute [even though that plain
meaning was not apparent to the Tax Court or the Sixth Circuit in Venture
Funding, Ltd. v. Commissioner, with which the Federal Circuit noted it disagreed]
and flunked the first half of the Chevron analysis.
2. Rev. Rul. 2003-98, 2003-34 I.R.B. 378 (8/25/03). This revenue
ruling deals with the corporation entitled to claim the deduction under § 83(h)
when a nonstatutory stock option with no ascertainable value granted to an
employee of T is exercised or settled after T has been acquired by P. In three
situations, after the acquisition of the T stock, T survives as a subsidiary [for which
there was no § 338 election made]. In all three cases, T was entitled to the
deduction without regard to whether the employee received cash from T to settle
the option or the employee exchanged the T option for a P option that was later
exercised. In the fourth situation, T merged into P and the employee exchanged the
T option for a P option that was later exercised; in that case P was entitled to the
deduction.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. Guidance for waivers of the 60-day rollover period. Rev. Proc.
2003-16,2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (1/27/03). The IRS has provided guidance in applying
for a waiver of the 60-day rollover period for IRAs and pension plan distributions,
including when automatic waivers will be granted.
2. T.D. 9056, Earnings Calculation for Returned or Recharacterized
IRA Contributions, 68 F.R. 23586 (5/5/03). Final regulations provide a new
method to be used for calculating the net income attributable to IRA contributions
that are distributed as a returned contribution under § 408(d)(4) or recharacterized
under § 408A(d)(6). The regulations are applicable to IRA contributions made on
or after 1/1/04.
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
1. Dividends received are to be taxed at capital gains rates. The
2003 Act added § 1 (h)( 11), which provides that dividends received by taxpayers
other than corporations generally will be taxed at the same rate as long-term capital
gains, i.e., 15 percent for taxpayers otherwise taxable at a rate greater than 15
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percent; and five percent for taxpayers otherwise at 10 or 15 percent (with a special
zero percent rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in 2008). This rate
applies to dividends received from domestic and qualified foreign corporations for
purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative minimum tax. A dividend is
treated as investment income for purposes of determining the amount of deductible
investment interest under § 163(d) only if the taxpayer elects to treat the dividend
as not eligible for the reduced rates. The provision is effective for taxable years
beginning after 12/31/02, and beginning before 1/1/09.
0 Note that § 1 (h)( 11) treats dividends as
"adjusted net capital gain" under § 1(h)(3), even though the dividend itself (in
contrast to the stock) is not a capital asset as defined in § 1221, and dividends are
not taken into account in the calculation of "net capital gain" under § 1222. The
principal effect of this statutory construction is to extend the 5-percent and 15-
percent maximum rates under § 1 (h) to dividends received by taxpayers, without
permitting capital losses to be deducted against dividend income (except to the
extent allowed by §§ 1211 and 1212).
a. Which dividends are taxed at capital gains rates? The
2003 Act added § 1(h)(1 1), which provides that dividends received by taxpayers
other than corporations generally will be taxed at the same rate as long-term capital
gains, i.e., 15 percent for taxpayers otherwise taxable at a rate greater than 15
percent; and five percent for taxpayers otherwise at 10 or 15 percent (with a special
zero percent rate for 10- and 15-percent bracket taxpayers in 2008). The
Conference Report states:
Under [§ 1(h)(11)], dividends received by an individual
shareholder from domestic [and qualified foreign" ] corporations
are taxed at the same rates that apply to net capital gain. This
treatment applies for purposes of both the regular tax and the
alternative minimum tax. Thus, under the provision, dividends
will be taxed at rates of five and 15 percent.
If a shareholder does not hold a share of stock for more than [60]
days during the [120]-day period beginning [60] days before the
ex-dividend date (as measured under section 246(c)), dividends
received on the stock are not eligible for the reduced rates. Also,
the reduced rates are not available for dividends to the extent that
the taxpayer is obligated to make related payments with respect
to positions in substantially similar or related property.
If an individual receives an extraordinary dividend (within the
meaning of section 1059(c)) eligible for the reduced rates with
respect to any share of stock, any loss on the sale of the stock is
treated as a long-term capital loss to the extent of the dividend.
11. Qualified foreign corporations include those "eligible for the benefits of a
comprehensive income tax treaty [other than the Barbados treaty]" and those paid "with
respect to stock that is readily tradable on an established securities market in the United
States [including those whose stock is traded in the form of American Depository
Receipts]."
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* The 15- and 25-percent rates under § 11
on corporate taxable income of $75,000 or less make it advantageous to pay
dividends out of corporate earnings, as opposed to paying "zeroing out" the
corporation with shareholder/employee compensation. This strategy does not work
for professional services corporations, the income of which is taxed at a flat rate of
35 percent.
* Note that the 60-day holding period
cannot be satisfied by stock that is acquired one day before the ex-dividend date.
This anomaly is to be retroactively corrected in the Tax Technical Corrections Bill
(H.R. 3654), which was introduced by Ways & Means Committee Chair Thomas
and ranking minority member Rangel. 2003 TNT 236-1.
b. Investment income § 163(d) limitations may lead to
a taxpayer election to have dividends taxed at regular rates. The existence of
a preferential rate for dividends gives rise to tax arbitrage possibilities similar to
those that arise when an interest deduction is allowed with respect investments that
produce only tax-favored capital gains, for which § 163(d) historically has limited
interest deductions. Accordingly, the 2003 Act amended § 163(d)(4) to exclude
from the definition of net investment income any dividends that are taxed at
preferential rates under § 1(h). However, §§ 1(h)(1 1)(D)(i) and 163(d)(4)(B) allow
taxpayers to elect to forgo the preferential rates for dividends and to treat the
dividends as investment income for purposes of § 163(d). If a taxpayer does not
have other investment income against which investment interest may be deducted
under § 163(d), it may be to the taxpayer's advantage to elect not to have the
preferential rates under § 1(h) apply to an amount of dividend income equal to the
amount of investment interest that otherwise would be nondeductible by virtue of
§ 163(d).
c. Payments in lieu of dividends are not eligible for the
exclusion. See § 6042(a) and 6045(d), relating to statements required to be
furnished by brokers regarding these payments. Notice 2003-67, 2003-40
I.R.B. 752 (9/16/03). This notice provides guidance for brokers and individuals
regarding payments in lieu of dividends (sometimes called "substitute payments").
Brokers are essentially given a pass for 2003 reporting as to whether a payment is
a dividend [on Form 1099-DIV] or a payment in lieu of a dividend [in Box 8 of
Form 1099-MISC], but must adopt proper procedures by 2004, Brokers will be
permitted to treat shares as loaned first by tax-indifferent customers, then by other
customers using the random lottery method provided in existing Reg. § 1.6045-
2(f)(2)(ii)(B).
d. Qualified foreign corporations include those "eligible
for the benefits of a comprehensive income tax treaty [other than the
Barbados treaty]." Notice 2003-69, 200342 I.R.B. 851 (10/20/23). This notice
provides a list of U.S. income tax treaties meeting the requirements of
§ 1 (h)( 1)(C)(i)(ll), which results in treating foreign corporations as a "qualified
foreign corporation" dividends from which are eligible for the 5 / 15 percent
maximum rates.
e. Stock that is readily tradable on an established
securities market in the United States [including stock that is traded in the
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form of American Depository Receipts]. Notice 2003-71, 2003-43 I.R.B. 922
(10/27/03). This notice defines what it means 'to be readily tradable on an
established securities market in the United States for purposes of determining
whether dividends on stock of a foreign corporation are eligible for the 5 / 15
percent preferential rates.
f. Simplified 2003 reporting procedures for QFCs.
Notice 2003-79, 2003-50 I.R.B. 1206 (12/15/03). This notice provides guidance
regarding simplified 2003 reporting procedures for dividends paid by "qualified
foreign corporations" and corporations whose stock is readily tradable on an
established U.S. securities market.
g. T.D. 9103, Information Statements for Certain Substitute
Payments, 68 F.R. 74847 (12/29/03). The Treasury Department has promulgated
final regulations on information reporting under § 6045(d) for payments in lieu of
dividends made to individuals on or after 1/1/03. These regulations provide that,
pending issuance of further amendments to Reg. § 1.6045-2, brokers may rely on
Notice 2003-67 to comply with information reporting requirements under §
6045(d).
2. Income tax rate reductions accelerated. In the 2003 Act,
Congress accelerated the rate reduction by putting the 25 percent, 28 percent, 33
percent, and 35 percent brackets previously scheduled to take effect in 2006 into
effect for all years after 2002.
3. Marriage penalty relief for the upper limit of the 15-percent
bracket accelerated. The 15-percent bracket rate was not reduced, but the 2003
Act increased the size of the upper limit of the 15-percent regular income tax rate
bracket for married taxpayers filing joint returns to twice the width of the 15-
percent regular income tax rate bracket for single returns for taxable years
beginning in 2003 and 2004.
* For taxable years beginning after 2004,
the upper limit of the 15 percent rate bracket for married taxpayers filing joint
returns reverts to the amount provided in § 1 (a) and (f).
4. Increased width of the 10-percent rate bracket. The 2003 Act
also temporarily accelerated an increase in the taxable income ceiling of the 10-
percent rate bracket from $6,000 to $7,000, and for married taxpayers filing joint
returns from $12,000 to $14,000 (indexed for inflation in 2004), previously
scheduled to take effect in 2008, to be effective in 2003 and 2004.
0 Starting in 2005, the taxable income
ceiling for the 10-percent rate bracket reverts to the levels provided under the 2001
Act (which are not adjusted for inflation). See § l(i).
5. Increased AMT exemption amount. The 2001 Act and the 2003
Act combined to increase the alternative minimum tax exemption amount for 2001
and 2002 to $35,750 for single taxpayers and $49,000 for married taxpayers filing
joint returns, and for 2003 and 2004 to $40,250 for unmarried taxpayers and to
$58,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns.
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6. A fraudulently obtained annulment leaves you married for
filing status purposes. Rinehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-109
(4/18/03). Judge Vasquez held that the taxpayers proper filing status was as
married, as asserted by the Commissioner, notwithstanding that they had their
marriage judicially annulled, because, on the unusual facts, the Tax Court found
that annulment had been obtained by a fraud on the Texas court.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. You have to prove that the damages were received for a
physical personal injury. Prasil v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-100
(4/9/03). The taxpayer received $7,650 to settle a sex discrimination claim against
her employer. The court held that § 104(a)(2) did not exclude the payment. The
record was devoid of any evidence to corroborate the taxpayer's "own self-serving
testimony... that [the employer's] sex discrimination caused a physical injury to
or the physical sickness of Mrs. Prasil." Furthermore, the settlement agreement
referred only to the sex discrimination claim and "did not specifically carve out any
portion of the settlement payment as a settlement on account of personal physical
injury or physical sickness, let alone make reference to a physical injury or a
physical sickness ....
2. Forste v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-103 (4/16/03). When
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells informed the taxpayer that he was being terminated
because of his refusal to fly to meetings, he negotiated a settlement for retirement
payments and "other amounts." In negotiating the settlement, the taxpayer asserted
numerous tort and contract causes of action. The settlement agreement described
$25,130 of the payments as "[i]n settlement of all claims for Workmen's
Compensation arising from my employment or termination with DH & S, and
without DH & S admitting any liability, and expressly denying any liability for any
and all claims which may be or are claimed to result from my employment or
termination with DH & S . . . ." Additional amounts, equal to the difference
between $25,130 and the taxpayer's salary, were described as paid to settle other
claims. Nevertheless, the taxpayer excluded the full payments [which DH&S
reported on W-2s], claiming that § 104(a)(2) [as in effect before 11/13/95] applied.
The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the taxpayer produced credible evidence
that $25,130 of the $45,615 received by the taxpayer was paid and received on
account of tort or tort type personal injuries, that under § 7491 the burden of proof
shifted to the Commissioner with respect to that amount of $25,130, and that the
Commissioner had failed to satisfy the burden. The court concluded that the
workers' compensation language was based on advice from the taxpayer's
accountant and was intended to indicate that the payment was to settle tort-type
claims, for which workers' compensation is a substitute. Thus, $25,130 was
excludable. The taxpayer, who bore the burden of proof regarding the amount in
excess of $25,130, failed to prove that the excess was excludable; as it was paid to
settle the contract claims.
12. See TAM 200041022 (7/17/00) for some indication as to what the IRS might
consider a physical injury.
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3. How not to behave when dealing with an issue for which there
is no precedent. Roco v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 160 (9/11/03). Qui tam
payments are includable in gross income, and taxpayer is penalized for not doing
so - despite the absence of any precedent - in large part because the taxpayer
sought a private letter ruling and withdrew his request after being advised that the
Service would rule adversely.
4. Dennis Rodman is a supporting actor in what might be a far-
reaching Tax Court case; only Walter Matthau and Jack Lemmon can do
justice to this script. Rodman's nickname might change from "the worm" to
"the squirrel." Amos v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-329 (12/1/03). The
taxpayer was a television cameraman who was kicked in the groin and injured by
Dennis Rodman after Rodman ran out of bounds and tripped, landing on the
taxpayer - i.e., the kick took extra effort by Rodman. The taxpayer settled any
claims he had against Rodman for $200,000. The settlement agreement expressly
provided that Rodman paid the taxpayer a portion of the settlement amount at issue
in return for his agreement not to: (1) defame Rodman, (2) disclose the existence
or the terms of the settlement agreement, (3) publicize facts relating to the incident,
or (4) assist in any criminal prosecution against Rodman with respect to the
incident. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) characterized these provisions collectively
as "the nonphysical injury provisions," and found that $80,000 of the settlement
was attributable to these provisions and that only $120,000 of the settlement was
"on account of" personal physical injury and therefore excludable.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1. The alternative minimum tax ("AMT") trap for attorneys'
fees on large recoveries.
a. Cases decided in past years by the First, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuits sprang the AMT trap.
Attorney's fees incurred by an individual in a nonbusiness profit-seeking
transaction are [§ 212] miscellaneous itemized deductions [§67] and may not be
deducted for AMT purposes. To avoid this result, taxpayers in a number of cases
in recent years have argued the portion of a taxable damage award retained by the
taxpayer-plaintiff's attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from the taxpayer-
plaintiff s income and treated as income earned directly by the attorney. The Tax
Court and most Courts of Appeals have reached conflicting results on this question.
Generally, the Tax Court holds that attorney's fee awards paid directly to a
plaintiffs attorney [or the portion of a damage award that is the attorney's
contingent fee that is so paid] are nevertheless includable in the litigant's gross
income, and that the taxpayer then may claim a deduction, subject to any applicable
limitations, including disallowance of the deduction for AMT purposes if it is a §
212 deduction. Bagley v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 396 (1995), affd 121 F.3d 393
(8th Cir. 1997). Accord Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
affig 30 Fed. Cl. 248 (1993);Alexanderv. IRS, 72 F.3d 938,96-1 U.S.T.C. 50,011
(1st Cir. 1995), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1995-51; Coady v. Commissioner, 213 F.3d
1187, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,528 (9th Cir. 2000), affg T.C. Memo. 1998-291;
Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, 2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,595 (9th
Cir. 2000), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1998-395, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001);
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Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-5378, 2001-2
U.S.T.C. 50,570 (7th Cir. 8/l/01), affg 114 T.C. 399 (5/24/00) (reviewed, 8-5);
Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369,87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-889,2001-1 U.S.T.C.
50,244 (4th Cir. 2/16/01), affig, 113 T.C. 152 (8/20/99); Hukkanen-Campbell v.
Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-7983, 2002-1 U.S.T.C.
50,351 (10th Cir. 12/19/01), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2000-180 (6/12/01), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1056 (5/13/02).
b. But the Fifth and Sixth Circuits see things differently.
(1) In Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1959), however, the Fifth Circuit held that attorney's fees so paid directly to
a plaintiff's attorney are not includable by the litigant. The court of appeals
reasoned that under the Alabama attorney's lien law, the ownership of the portion
of the award representing attorney's fees vested in the attorney ab initio.
Subsequently, in Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353,86 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-
5410,2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,597 (5th Cir. 2000) (2-1), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1998-362,
a majority decision of a Fifth Circuit panel held that Cotnam applied to attorneys'
fees under Texas law because there is no difference in the "economic reality facing
the taxpayer-plaintiff' between Alabama and Texas attorney's liens and any
distinction between them does not affect the analysis required by the anticipatory
assignment of income doctrine. A dissent by Judge Dennis distinguished Cotnam
on the ground that Alabama law gives the holders of attorney's liens greater power
than does Texas law.
(2) Estate of Clarks v. United States, 202 F.3d 854,
85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-405, 2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,158 (6th Cir. 1/13/00). The Sixth
Circuit held that the taxpayer was not required to include the portion of the taxable
interest attached to a damage award excluded under §104(a)(2) that was paid
directly to the taxpayer's attorney. The court discussed the particularities of the
attorney's fee statutory lien law in Cotnam, found the Michigan attorney's fees
common law lien law to be similar to the Alabama law involved in Cotnam, and
stated that it was following Cotnam. But the court also provided a broader
explanation for its decision, concluding that the opinions representing the weight
of authority, e.g., Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
inappropriately relied on the assignment of income doctrine cases, e.g., Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), which,
while relevant in family transactions, were not relevant in a arm's length
transaction.
c. In the Eleventh Circuit (as derived from pre-split
Fifth Circuit precedents1 3), under the Golsen rule, attorney's fees are not
included in the income of an Alabama taxpayer who received a large punitive
damages award. Davis v. Commissioner, 210 F.3d 1346, 85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-
1567,2000-1 U.S.T.C. 150,431 (4/27/00) (per curiam), affg T.C. Memo. 1998-248
13. Under Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1981), Fifth
Circuit decisions rendered before the Eleventh Circuit was created are binding precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit.
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(7/7/98). The Eleventh Circuit panel held that, with respect to Alabama taxpayers,
it was bound by Cotnam.
(1) In Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1278,
87 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-2011,2001-1 U.S.T.C. 50,392 (1 lth Cir.2001), the Eleventh
Circuit followed Davis in a subsequent case involving another Alabama taxpayer.
d. There is no AMT trap in Vermont! Will the Second
Circuit get a chance to opine? Raymond v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 2d 548,
91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-535,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,196 (D. Vt. 12/17/02). The district
court (Chief Judge Sessions) followed Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1959), to exclude contingent attorney's fees in a wrongful discharge cases
attorney's fees because under state law the plaintiff taxpayer never personally owed
the contingent fee and attorney's lien gave him an equitable interest in the
plaintiff s claim. He concluded that the taxpayer transferred an interest in income
producing property before the income was realized, rejecting the reasoning of all
of the cases to the contrary, e.g., Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir.
2001), affg 114 T.C. 399 (2000), that refused to treat state law as controlling and
applying the assignment of income doctrine of Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. 716
(1929). Notably, Judge Sessions also chose not to rely on Srivastava v.
Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000), in which the Fifth Circuit abandoned
reliance on state law in holding that successful plaintiffs are not required to include
and deduct contingent attorney's fees but may simply exclude them.
(1) Yes, it is now up to the Second Circuit because
in Connecticut the client must include contingent attorney's fee in gross
income. Parmanand v. Capewell Components, LLC, 289 F.Supp.2d 35, 92
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6594 (D. Conn. 9/10/03). In a-suit for taxable damages in which
the plaintiff prevailed, in the context of ruling the on motions regarding
information return reporting requirements, the District Court (Judge Dorsey) held
that the portion of the award paid to the plaintiffs attorney was includable in the
plaintiffs gross income because under Connecticut law the attorney had no
equitable ownership in the judgment.
(2) Raymond reversed by the Second Circuit,
which follows the majority rule. Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107, 93
A.F.T.R.2d 2004-416, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,124 (2d Cir. 1/13/04). Taxpayer-
plaintiff was required to include the gross recovery in gross income because he
received "money's worth" for the fee diverted to attorney. State attorney's fee lien
law was analyzed but was not solely determinative. The taxpayer had sufficient
control of the source of funds to require full inclusion in gross income.
e. Now we discover that in the Ninth Circuit it all
depends on which state's attorney's lien law controls. Banaitis v. Commissioner,
340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 8/27/03), rev'g T.C. Memo. 2002-5, cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 1713 (3/29/04). In a case involving attorney's fees subject to Oregon attorney's
fee lien law, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Thomas) held the portion of a taxable damage
award (for wrongful discharge from employment) retained by the attorney as a
contingent fee was not includable in the taxpayer-plaintiff s gross income. Judge
Thomas found that the nature of the attorney's fee lien was determinative.
Examining relevant state law, he concluded that under Oregon law, the attorney's
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claim to the fee was even stronger than under Alabama law. Therefore he applied
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1959), holding that contingent attorney's fees paid directly to an attorney were
not includable in the client's gross income because Alabama attorney's fee lien law
vested title in the attorney ab initio. Judge Thomas declined to apply the Ninth
Circuit's precedents in Benci-Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941, (9th
Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1112 (2001), and Coady v. Commissioner, 213
F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2000), on the grounds that Oregon attorney's fee lien law was
significantly different than that of California and Alaska, which were relevant in
those cases.
* In his opinion, Judge Thomas described
the Fifth Circuit as having "reached a similar conclusion about the operation of
Texas law" in Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir.2000), and the
Eleventh Circuit as "extending Cotnam's Alabama-law- based holding into the law
of the entire Eleventh Circuit" in Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1278
(11 th Cir. 2001), notwithstanding that in Srivastava the Fifth Circuit actually
reached its conclusion wholly apart from the niceties of Texas attorney's lien law
and in Foster the Eleventh Circuit was dealing with a case that arose in Alabama,
for which there was no doubt that Cotnam was the controlling precedent. [The
Eleventh Circuit has not yet decided an attorney's fees AMT trap case arising in
Florida or Georgia.].
f. Now we know how to exclude California contingent
attorney's fees - move to the Sixth Circuit in before petitioning the Tax Court!
Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6298, 2003-3
U.S.T.C. [50,675 (6th Cir. 9/30/03), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1712 (3/29/04). The
Sixth Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in Srivastava v. Commissioner,
220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000), and reaffirmed that the Sixth Circuit's holding in
Estate of Clarks v. Commissioner, 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000), was based on a
broader principle than the ground that state attorney's fee lien law determines
whether the taxpayer-plaintiff can exclude attorney's fees. The taxpayer, who lived
in Michigan when he filed his Tax Court petition, but who had previously been
employed in California and had settled a wrongful termination suit brought in
California for taxable tort damages under California law, was allowed to exclude
the contingent attorney's fees, even though they were governed by California law
and the Ninth Circuit would have reached a contrary conclusion under Benci-
Woodward v. Commissioner, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000).
g. The expense of suing your former employer might be
"attributable" to the trade or business of being an employee, but it's not
"incurred by the employee in connection with the performance of services as
an employee of the employer." Biehl v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 467 (5/30/02).
The taxpayer successfully sued his former employer for wrongful termination and,
in addition to damages, pursuant to his employment contract, the employer was
required to pay his attorney's fees. The taxpayer [who lived in the Ninth Circuit,
which has already ruled that successful plaintiffs cannot exclude attorney's fees,
see, e.g., Sinyard v. Commissioner, 268 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 2001)] attempted to
avoid the AMT trap on miscellaneous itemized deductions by arguing that the
attorney's fees were employer reimbursement of a § 162 employee business plan
excludable under an accountable plan pursuant to § 62(c) and Reg. § 1.62-2(c) and
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(d). Judge Beghe held that that even though the expenses were § 162 employee
business expenses because they were "attributable" to his trade or business of being
an employee, the expenses did not meet the requirement of Reg. § 1.62-2(d) that
the expenses be "paid or incurred by the employee in connection with the
performance of services as an employee of the employer." This latter requirement
is met only if the expenses were incurred on the employer's behalf, which clearly
was not true in this case. Furthermore, it cannot be met if the expenses are incurred
after the employment relationship has been terminated, which was true in this case.
(1) And the Ninth Circuit agrees. Biehl
v. Commissioner, 351 F.3d 982, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-7280, 2004-1 U.S.T.C.
50,109 (9th Cir. 12/12/03). The Ninth Circuit (Judge Trott) affirmed following
essentially the same reasoning as Judge Beghe in the Tax Court. In contrast to §
62(a)(1), which requires only that an expense be "attributable to a trade or
business," § 62(a)(2)(A) applies only to reimbursement of expenses incurred in
performing duties for or on behalf of the taxpayer's employer. The legislative
history supports Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(d).
2. A nondeductible estate administration expense. Schwan v.
United States, 264 F.Supp.2d 887, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1658, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,362 (D. S.D. 3/16/03). Interest, required by a state statute, on a specific legacy
payable from an estate to the legatee when the legacy is not paid within a
statutorily specified period, is not deductible under either § 163 or § 212.
D. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes
1. Section 183 sent the claimed loss deduction to Davy Jones's
locker. Magassy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-4 (1/5/04). Judge Foley
applied § 183 to disallowing a claimed § 1231 loss on the sale of a yacht.
E. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. Another court imposes second-class citizen status on a trust's
§ 212 deductions for investment advisory fees. The Fourth Circuit follows the
Federal Circuit's Mellon case, but not the Sixth Circuit's O'Neill Trust case,
in deciding that a trust's investment advisor fees are subject to the § 67(a)
two-percent floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions. Scott v. United States,
328 F.3d 132, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2100, 2003-1 U.S.T.C 50,428 (4th Cir.
5/1/03), affg 186 F. Supp. 2d 664,89 A.F.T.R.2d 1314,2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,364
(E.D. Va. 2/28/02). The court used dictionary definitions to affirm the District
Court's grant of summary judgment to the government, and rejected the taxpayers'
contention that the fees were fully deductible under § 67(e) (which allows full
deduction if the fees "would not have been incurred if the property were not held
in trust"). The court concluded that the requirement of the second clause of §
67(e)(1), excepting from the floor costs that would not have been incurred if the
property were not held by a trust or estate did not apply because "investment-
advice fees are commonly incurred outside the context of trust administration."
That "'the investment advisory fees were necessary to the continued growth of the
Trust and were caused by the fiduciary duties of the co-trustees"' was irrelevant.
"[T]he second requirement of § 67(e)(1) does not ask whether costs are commonly
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incurred in the administration of trusts. Instead, it asks whether costs are commonly
incurred outside the administration of trusts." The Fourth Circuit followed Mellon
Bank, N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and declined to follow
William J. O'Neill Revocable Trust v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993),
rev'g 98 T.C. 227 (1992). Judge King noted that "investment advice fees are
commonly incurred outside the administration of trusts."
0 The Fourth Circuit did not reach the
Virginia state law issue on which the District Court decided the case.
2. Boltinghouse v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-134 (5/13/03).
A declaration that the custodial spouse will not claim the child as a dependent is
valid pursuant to § 152(e)(2) even though it was executed prior to the divorce
decree and was not incorporated into the divorce decree.
3. Grandma's big teeth may not be whitened with tax-deductible
dollars, but the costs of breast reconstruction surgery and vision correction
surgery are deductible. Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (6/2/03). Costs for
breast reconstruction surgery following a mastectomy for cancer and for vision
correction surgery are deductible medical care expenses under § 213. Costs to
whiten teeth discolored as a result of age are not medical care expenses under §
213(d) and are not deductible.
a. Sometimes you need a prescription, sometime you
don't. Rev. Rul. 2003-58, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (6/2/03). Amounts paid by an
individual for medicines that may be purchased without a prescription of a
physician, e.g., aspirin, are not deductible under § 213 of the Code, even when the
taxpayer's physician instructs the taxpayer to take the medication to alleviate a
medical problem. Amounts paid by an individual for equipment, supplies [e.g.,
crutches for a taxpayer with a broken leg] or diagnostic devices [e.g., a blood sugar
monitoring kit for a taxpayer with diabetes] that may be purchased without a
physician's prescription may be deductible under § 213.
4. Marriage penalty relief for the standard deduction amount.
The combined effect of the 2001 Act and the 2003 Act has been to set the basic
standard deduction amount for married taxpayers filing a joint return at twice the
basic standard deduction amount for single individuals on a temporary basis for
2003 and 2004.
* For 2005 the basic standard deduction
amount for married taxpayers filing a joint return is 174 percent of the basic
standard deduction for single individuals, increasing in steps over the following
four years, with the result that in 2009 and thereafter the amount of the basic
standard deduction for married taxpayers filing a joint return again will be twice
the basic standard deduction for single individuals. However, these changes sunset
on 12/31/10.
5. Acceleration of increase in the § 24 child credit. In the 2001
Act, the amount of the § 24 child credit was increased to $600 for taxable years
2001 and 2002. The 2003 Act increases the amount to $1,000 for 2003 and 2004.
* In 2005, the credit is reduced to $700,
but then increases in steps to $1,000 for 2010. See § 24 (a)(2). However, these
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changes sunset on 12/31/10. Thus, absent further congressional action the amount
of the credit reverts to $500 in 2011.
6. Advance refund of the increased amount of 2003 child credit.
The 2003 Act adds new § 6429, which provides an advance cash refund of $400
per child who was allowed a § 24 credit for the 2002 year and who has not attained
the age 17 (as of 12/31/03). The cash refund is to be made before 10/1/03. The
amount of the cash refund will reduce the 2003 child credit, but not below zero.
0 This provision may be expanded to
include more children of lower-income (non)taxpayers.
7. "Happy birthday to you, happy birthday to you .... How old
are you now?" Under what circumstances will the IRS will use the birthday
rule, as opposed to the common law rule. Rev. Rul. 2003-72,2003-33 I.R.B. 346
(8/18/03). A child attains an age on his or her birthday for purposes of § § 21 (child
and dependent care credit), 23 (adoption credit), 24 (child tax credit), 32 (earned
income credit), 129 (excludable dependent care benefits), 131 (excludable foster
care benefits), 137 (excludable adoption assistance benefits), and 151 (dependency
exemptions).
* Under the common law rule, a person
attains an age on the day before his or her birthday. In her 2003 Report, the
National Taxpayer Advocate recommends legislation to add a new subsection to
§ 7701 adopting the birthday rule. 2004 TNT 12-122.
8. The dependency exemption may be released by the custodial
parent in favor of the child's father to whom she was never married. King v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. No. 12 (9/26/03). The support tests of § 152(e) apply to
the unmarried parents of a minor child. This is because § 152(e)(1)(A)(iii) provides
that § 152(e) applies to "parents... who live apart at all times during the last 6
months of the calendar year." Inasmuch as the custodial parent released her claim
to exemption on Form 8332 for 1987 and "future years," Judge Goeke held that the
non-custodial parent was entitled to the exemption deduction for the child.
0 Note that the current version of Form
8332 contains instructions that the form should not be used by parents who never
married each other.
a. The Service will change Form 8332 in accordance
with the King decision. On 11/13/03, the IRS announced a change to the Internal
Revenue Manual that Form 8332 for 2003 is being revised by deleting all
references to the requirement that the custodial and non-custodial parents must be
or have been married to each other before the special support tests apply.
9. Is the kid like a car with respect to recordkeeping? 'He do the
entries in different inks."4 McCullar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-272
(9/17/03). If parents are divorced, §152(e) provides that custodial parent is
ordinarily entitled to claim the children as dependents. In a 'split-custody' case, the
father proved that he had physical custody of a child for more than one-half of the
14. Cf., Charles Dickens, Our Mutual Friend ("He do the police in different voices.").
This was the working title of T.S. Eliot's, "The Waste Land."
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year through a detailed logbook - with entries written in different ink and typed in
different fonts - covering the times the child was in his custody. Judge Halpern
stated, "Petitioner' s log gives detailed descriptions about the time he spent with and
without his daughter each day of 1998, written in different ink and typed in
different fonts. Respondent argues that the log contains errors. Given the testimony
of both petitioner and his ex-wife, we have determined that petitioner is a credible
witness and that his log is valid and not fabricated."
F. Education: Helping Pay College Tuition (or is it helping colleges increase
tuition?)
1. Is there any HOPE that the educational credit rules ever will
be understandable to anyone in the income range eligible to use them - like
the earned income tax credit rules? T.D. 9034, Education Tax Credit, 67 F.R.
78687 (12/26/02). The Treasury Department has promulgated final regulations
regarding the Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit under §
25A.
2. Notice 2003-53, 2003-33 I.R.B. (7/31/03). This notice provides
guidance for reporting requirements and transitional rules applicable to Coverdell
Education Savings Accounts ("CESAs") under § 530.
VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. Back to back § 351 transfers are OK. Rev. Rul. 2003-51,2003-
21 I.R.B. 938 (5/5/03). W Corporation and X Corporation (unrelated to W) both
engaged in the same line of business. W's business was worth $40x; X's business,
conducted through its subsidiary, Y Corporation, was worth $30x. Pursuant to a
prearranged binding agreement W and X consolidated their business operations in
a new corporation with a holding company structure. W formed Z Corporation by
transferring the business assets to Z in exchange for all of Z's stock. W
immediately contributed the Z stock to Y in exchange for Y stock of Y and X
simultaneously contributed $30x to Y (to meet the capital needs of the business)
in exchange for additional stock of Y. W and X owned 40 percent and 60 percent,
respectively, of the Y stock. Y, in turn, transferred all of its assets to Z. Viewed
separately, each of the first transfer, the combined second and third transfers, and
fourth transfer qualifies as a transfer described in § 351. The IRS ruled that the
second transfer - W's transfer of its Z stock to Y - did not cause the first transfer
- W's transfer of assets to Z - to fail the control requirement of § 351, even though
both transfers were undertaken pursuant to a prearranged binding agreement.
Citing Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88 (Situation 1), the IRS concluded that
treating a transfer of property that is followed by a nontaxable disposition of the
stock received as a § 351 transaction is "not necessarily inconsistent with the
purposes of § 351." The IRS distinguished Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73, in
which a transfer of assets of a proprietorship to a controlled corporation, followed
by an exchange of the subsidiary's stock for stock of an unrelated, widely held
corporation was treated as a direct transfer of assets to the other corporation in a
taxable transaction. In Rev. Rul. 70-140 no alternative form of transaction could
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have qualified for nonrecognition. In the instant case, however, W's transfer of the
business assets to Z was not necessary for W and X to combine their businesses in
a holding company structure that would have qualified under § 351. If in exchange
for Y stock, W had transferred the assets to Y and X had transferred $30x to Y, and
Y had transferred the business to Z in exchange for all of the Z stock, the transfers
would have would have qualified under § 351. [See Rev. Rul. 83-34; Rev. Rul. 77-
449.]
2. An ANPRM announcing that the Treasury intends to amend
the Code via regulations - and this time it might actually have the statutory
authority to do so. REG- 100818-01, Liabilities Assumed in Certain Transactions,
68 F.R. 23931 (5/6/03). The IRS and Treasury are concerned that §§ 357(d) and
362(d) [providing rules for determining the amount of liability treated as assumed
for purposes of §§ 357, 358(d), 358(h), 362(d), 368(a)(1)(C), and 368(a)(2)(B)],
enacted as part of the Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999,
Public Law 106-36, 113 Stat. 127, do not always produce appropriate results and
that it might be desirable to modify certain rules by regulation, as permitted by §
357(d)(3). This notice explains the issues and the rules the IRS and Treasury are
considering proposing. The major proposals are as follows:
0 (1) To modify § 357(d)(1)(B) to provide
that if the transferor and the transferee have no agreement regarding the
satisfaction of a nonrecourse liability, the transferee will not be treated as assuming
the entire amount of the nonrecourse liability; if one or more of the assets that
secure a nonrecourse liability are transferred to a transferee, the transferee would
be treated as assuming a pro rata amount of the nonrecourse liability, based on
relative fair market values of the transferred assets securing the liability and the fair
market value of all of the assets securing the liability that are retained by the
transferor.
• (2) To treat a transferee's express
assumption of a nonrecourse debt of the transferor as a debt assumption even if no
assets secured by the debt have been transferred if the transferee is expected to
satisfy the nonrecourse liability.
* (3) To modify § 357(d)(2) to reduce the
amount of the nonrecourse liability a transferee is treated as assuming to reflect the
amount another person has agreed, and is expected, to satisfy, even if such amount
is in excess of the fair market value of the assets subject to such liability that the
other person owns after the transfer.
0 (4) To apply standards similar to those
used to determine whether a transferee has assumed a recourse liability to
determine whether a transferee has assumed a nonrecourse liability, if the
transferee agrees to satisfy all or a portion of the liability. In such a case should the
amount of liability assumed by a subsequent transferee be determined with
reference to the rules pertaining to assumptions of nonrecourse liabilities or with
reference to the rules pertaining to assumptions of recourse liabilities?
* (5) To respect an agreement that the
transferee will satisfy only a portion of a nonrecourse debt secured by transferred
property with a value greater than the agreed upon portion where the transferor
does not agree to indemnify the transferee against a loss in excess of the agreed
upon debt assumption.
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* (6) To provide that if a transferee has
agreed to satisfy an amount of a liability that is greater than the amount that it is
expected to satisfy, the transferee will be treated as having agreed to satisfy only
the amount of the liability that it is expected to satisfy [only if the transferor, the
transferee, and each person related to the transferor and transferee within the
meaning of § § 267(b) and 707(b) treat the transferee as having agreed to satisfy the
amount of the liability that it is expected to satisfy].
* (7) To provide that a debt assumed by
a transferee will no longer be treated as a debt of the transferor for any purposes,
including a subsequent application of § 357(d).
0 (8) To extend the rules of § 357 to §§
304 and 336.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. The Tax Court is bearish on Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch &
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 12 (1/15/03). In 1986 and 1987 Merrill Lynch
structured several transactions to sell certain assets of first-tier and second-tier
subsidiaries and not only eliminate any tax on the gains, but to create losses. To
take advantage of the interaction of the consolidated return regulations and § 304
[before the promulgation of Reg. § 1.1502-80(b), rendering § 304 inoperative in
consolidated returns], Merrill Lynch caused the subsidiaries holding the assets to
drop the assets to be retained into new lower level subsidiaries [in § 351
transactions], following which the new subsidiaries were sold cross chain to other
Merrill Lynch subsidiaries. The sales proceeds were then distributed to its parent
by the subsidiary to be sold, and that subsidiary was then sold. The plan was that
the cross chain sale would be recharacterized as a dividend under § 304, which
would result in a basis increase under Reg. §§ 1.1502-32 and -33 [as then in effect]
in the stock of the subsidiaries to be sold. The IRS did not contest that § 304
applied, but responded that the "distributions" coupled with the sales of the
subsidiaries outside the group were part of a firm and fixed plan by the subsidiaries
that were sold outside the group to dispose of the stock of the lower tier
subsidiaries that had been sold cross chain. Therefore, even after applying § 304
the distributions were treated as amounts received in a redemption under
§302(b)(3) [applying Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954)]. The Tax
Court (Judge Marvel) held that under the principles of Niedermeyer v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), a firm and fixed plan existed with respect to
every such sale and held for the IRS.
The record establishes that on the dates of the cross-chain sales,
petitioner had agreed upon, and had begun to implement, a firm
and fixed plan to completely terminate the target corporations'
ownership interests in the issuing corporations (the subsidiaries
whose stock was sold cross-chain). The plan was carefully
structured to achieve very favorable tax basis adjustments
resulting from the interplay of section 304 and the consolidated
return regulations, and the steps of the plan were described in
detail in written summaries prepared for meetings of Merrill
Parent's board of directors. As described in those written
summaries, the cross-chain sales of the issuing corporations'
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stock and the sales of the target corporations were part of the
same seamless web of corporate activity intended by petitioner to
culminate in the sale of the target corporations outside the
consolidated group.
2. Nothing succeeds like the sweet smell of success. Delta Plastics,
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-54 (2/28/03). Shareholder loans to a start-
up corporation were respected as such, and an interest deduction allowed, even
thought the corporation's debt-equity ratio was 26:1. The corporation was
capitalized with $183,500. It incurred $2,322,838 of secured startup loans -
$2,169,013 from three unrelated creditors and $153,825 from a 47 percent
shareholder. The corporation borrowed another $1,337,500 from a group of
individuals consisting of six of its seven shareholders and the father of the one
shareholder who did not make a loan to the corporation. The shareholder loans
were roughly proportional to stock holdings, but they had all of the formal indicia
of debt. They were evidenced by debenture notes, bore reasonable interest, and had
a 10-year repayment schedule. Payments were not dependent upon profits or
losses. Although the notes were unsecured and subordinated to secured creditors,
and the debenture holders could enforce payment on the debenture notes only if the
holders of more than 50 percent of the value of all the outstanding debenture notes
joined in a proceeding to enforce payment, the corporation made all scheduled
payments due. In just over 3 years, as a result of successful operations, the
taxpayer's debt-equity ratio (treating the notes as debt and not as equity) was
reduced from approximately 26:1 to approximately 4: 1. However, the corporation
paid no dividends. After examining those debt-equity analysis factors that it found
relevant, the court concluded, "credible trial testimony was offered that a debtor-
creditor relationship was intended between petitioner and the debenture holders
with regard to the debenture funds."
3. Which dividends are taxed at capital gains rates? See V.A. l.a.,
above.
C. Liquidations
1. Rev. Rul. 2003-125, 2003-52 I.R.B. 1243 (12/29/03). This
revenue ruling holds that when an election is made to change the classification of
an entity from a corporation to a disregarded entity, the shareholder of such entity
is allowed a worthless security deduction under § 165(g)(3) if the fair market value
of the assets of the entity (including intangible assets such as goodwill and going
concern value) does not exceed the entity's liabilities. In that case, in the deemed
liquidation of the entity the shareholder receives no distribution on its stock.
D. S Corporations
1. Excusing late elections is now simpler. Rev. Proc. 2003-43,
2003-23 I.R.B. 998 (6/9/03). This revenue procedure provides a simplified method
for taxpayers to request relief for late S corporation elections, ESBT elections,
QSST elections and Qsub elections. Generally, relief is provided if the request for
relief is filed within 24 months of the due date of the election.
20041
Florida Tax Review
2. When your S corporation goes into bankruptcy, watch out!
Mourad v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 1 (7/2/03). The filing of a bankruptcy petition
by taxpayer's wholly-owned S corporation for a chapter 11 plan of reorganization
(in which an independent trustee was appointed by the Bankruptcy Court) neither
terminates an S election nor creates a separate taxable entity. Judge Ruwe held that
the taxpayer is liable for the tax on the sale by the S corporation of its principal
assets.
* Query: How could taxpayer have
planned this better?
3. Stacking qualified subpart E or testamentary trust status and
a QSST or ESBT election. T.D. 9078, Qualified Subchapter S Trust Election for
Testamentary Trusts, 68 F.R. 42251 (7/17/03). The Treasury has promulgated
amendments to Reg. § 1.1361-1 relating to the two-year period for which former
qualified subpart E trusts and testamentary trusts continue as qualified shareholders
of S corporations and QSST elections for testamentary trusts at the termination of
that period. The final regulations provide that a testamentary trust includes a trust
that receives S corporation stock from a § 645 electing trust. The regulations also
clarify that an ESBT election may be made for a former qualified subpart E trust
or a testamentary trust that qualifies as an ESBT. Subject to certain exceptions, the
regulations are effective 7/18/03.
4. T.D. 9081; REG- 129709-03, Prohibited Allocations of Securities
in an S Corporation, 68 F.R. 42970 (7/21/03). The Treasury Department has
promulgated temporary regulations and published identical proposed regulations
under § 409(p) concerning requirements for ESOPs holding stock of S
corporations. The regulations prohibit allocations or accruals to the ESOP for any
year that "meaningful benefits" are not provided to rank-and-file employees. The
temporary and proposed regulations provide rules defining terms, such as
"synthetic equity" and "disqualified persons."
5. Four-year spread for short-year income occasioned by a
change in the annual accounting period to the calendar year during a
transition period. Rev. Proc. 2003-79,2003-45 I.R.B. 1036 (11/10/03). Rev. Proc.
2002-38, 2002-1 C.B. 1037, and Rev. Proc. 2002-39, 2002-1 C.B. 1046, provide
procedures for an corporation to change its annual accounting period if its current
taxable year no longer qualifies as a natural business year (or, for certain S
corporations, an ownership taxable year). This new revenue procedure provides
procedures under which a shareholder of such an S corporation may elect to take
into account ratably over four taxable years the shareholder's income from the S
corporation that is attributable to the short taxable year ending on or after May 10,
2002, but before June 1, 2004.
E. Affiliated Corporations
1. Suspended loss rules to be promulgated. Notice 2002-18,2002-
12 I.R.B. 644 (3/25/02). The Service announced that it and the Treasury
intend to issue regulations that will prevent a consolidated group
from obtaining a tax benefit from both the utilization of a loss
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from the disposition of stock (or another asset that reflects the
basis of stock) and the utilization of a loss or deduction with
respect to another asset that reflects the same economic loss. For
example, where a member of a group contributes built-in loss
assets to another member of the group in exchange for stock of
such member in a transaction in which the basis of such stock is.
determined, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by
reference to the basis of such assets and the transferor member
sells such stock without causing the deconsolidation of the
transferee, the group may benefit from the built-in loss in the
contributed assets more than once. It is expected that the
regulations will defer or otherwise limit utilization of the loss on
the stock in such transactions and other transactions that facilitate
the group's utilization of a single loss more than once.
a. The proposed suspended loss regulations are here.
REG- 131478-02, Guidance Under Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on Certain
StockDispositions, 67 F.R. 65060(10/23/02). Temp. Reg. § 1.337(d)-2T (3/7/02),
which generally allows a loss on the disposition of subsidiary member stock only
to the extent that a taxpayer can establish that the stock loss is not attributable to the
recognition of built-in gain, does not disallow stock loss that reflects loss
carryforwards, deferred deductions, or built-in asset losses of the subsidiary
member.
b. Final regulations on suspended losses. T.D. 9048,
Guidance Under Section 1502; Suspension of Losses on Certain Stock
Dispositions, 68 F.R. 12287 (3/14/03); Reg- 131478-02,68 F.R. 12324 (3/14/03)."s
The Treasury Departmenthas promulgated Temp. § 1. 1502-35T, amendedvarious
provisions, and published identical proposed regulations that: (1) require a
consolidated group to redetermine the basis in subsidiary stock it owns
immediately before certain transactions involving the subsidiary; and (2) suspend
certain losses that the group recognizes on the disposition of subsidiary stock.
These regulations implement Notice 2002-18, 2002-12 I.R.B. 644.
0 Basis Redetermination: If a group
member transfers subsidiary stock with a basis exceeding its value ("loss shares")
but the subsidiary remains a member of the group, the basis of the subsidiary's
stock held by members of the group immediately before the transfer must be
redetermined as follows: (1) all members of the group aggregate their bases in all
shares of the subsidiary; and (2) that basis is allocated, (a) first to the shares of the
subsidiary's preferred stock owned by the members of the group in proportion to,
but not in excess of, their value on the date of the transfer, then (b) second, among
all common shares of the subsidiary held by members of the group in proportion
to their value on the date of the transfer.
0 If a group member owns loss shares in
a subsidiary before the subsidiary deconsolidates, the basis of the subsidiary's stock
held by members of the group immediately before the deconsolidation must be
redetermined as follows: (1) the group's basis in subsidiary loss shares is reduced
15. We are indebted to Prof. Don Leatherman, University of Tennessee College of Law,
for assistance with this description. Any errors that remain are our own.
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by the "reallocable basis amount;" and (2) the "reallocable basis amount" is
allocated (a) to increase the basis of all preferred shares of the subsidiary held by
members of the group after the transfer to increase the basis of each share to its
value immediately before the transfer, and then (b) to increase the group's basis in
common shares in the subsidiary so that to the extent possible each share has the
same ratio of basis to value The "reallocable basis amount" is the lesser of (1) the
aggregate loss in the group's subsidiary loss shares immediately before the
deconsolidation, or (2) the subsidiary's items of deduction and loss that the group
took into account in computing its basis adjustments for any subsidiary shares that
were not loss shares. The basis redetermination rule does not apply if, among other
things, the group disposes of all of its subsidiary stock to nonmembers in a single
taxable year in one or more fully taxable transactions, or is allowed a worthless
stock deduction with respect to all of its subsidiary stock (other than any transferred
stock).
0 Suspended Losses: If, after applying the
basis redetermination rule, a member of the consolidated group recognizes a loss
on the disposition of stock of a subsidiary that remains a member of the group, the
loss is suspended to the extent of the "duplicated loss" with respect to that stock.
The aggregate amount of duplicated loss for a subsidiary is the excess of (1) the
sum of (a) the aggregate basis of the subsidiary's assets (excluding stock in other
subsidiaries), (b) the subsidiary's losses that are carried to its first taxable year after
the disposition, and (c) the subsidiary's deductions that have been recognized but
deferred under another provision, over (2) the sum of (a) the value of stock of the
subsidiary and (b) the subsidiary's liabilities that have been taken into account for
tax purposes. The group must allocate that aggregate amount among all subsidiary
shares, including the transferred shares. The suspended loss is limited to the
duplicated loss for the transferred shares. The suspended loss is thereafter reduced,
i.e., disallowed, as the subsidiary's deductions and losses are taken into account
(i.e., absorbed) in determining the group's consolidated taxable income (or loss).
But the loss reduction loss is limited to the excess of (1) the amount of the
subsidiary's losses and deductions, over (2) the amount of those items the group
takes into account in basis adjustments under the investment adjustment rules. An
item of income or deduction is not taken into account to the extent the group can
establish that the item was not reflected in the computation of the subsidiary's
duplicated loss. Any suspended stock loss remaining at the time the subsidiary
leaves the group is allowed (to the extent otherwise allowable). The regulations
also provide that the loss suspension rule will not to be applied in a manner that
permanently disallows an otherwise allowable deduction for an economic loss.
• Worthlessness, Etc.: If a member treats
subsidiary stock as worthless under § 165(g) and § 1.1502-80(c) or if a member
disposes of subsidiary member stock and on the following day the subsidiary is not
a member of the group and does not have a separate return year, e.g., a liquidation
or worthless stock deduction, the unabsorbed losses of the subsidiary are treated as
expired at the beginning of the group's next consolidated return year. However, the
deemed expiration does not result in a negative basis adjustment to any member's
stock under Reg. § 1.1502-32.
* All of the rules are subject to various
exceptions and tiering rules. The regulations are generally effective after March 7,
2002, but only if the return is due after March 14, 2003.
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2. So just when will this suspended loss be allowed? Textron. Inc.
v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 104 (8/7/00). In 1967, when AVCO acquired Paul
Revere (PR) and PR became part of the AVCO group, PR owned 4 million shares
of AVCO. In 1977, AVCO redeemed its shares owned by PR, and pursuant to
former Reg. § 1.1502- 14(b)(1), PR did not recognize its loss, but pursuant to former
Reg. § 1.1502-31(b)(2)(ii) PR's basis in the stock was reallocated to the note. In
1987, after Textron acquired AVCO, AVCO redeemed the note held by PR, on
which PR realized a $15,000,000 loss, following which PR was liquidated into
AVCO in a § 332 liquidation. Judge Laro agreed with the Commissioner that
former Reg. § 1.1504-14(d)(4)(i) "deferred" PR's loss in 1987 [because the note
was received in exchange for property, i.e., AVCO stock, in an exchanged basis
transaction and the note was never held by a nonmember]. Judge Laro held that the
determination of whether a note has been held by a nonmember under former Reg.§ 1.1502-14(d)(4)(i)(c) looks to whether the holder of the note is a nonmember at
the time of the redemption, not to whether the holder of a note was a nonmember
when the note was received when the holder becomes a member before the
redemption. Finally, under former Reg. § 1.1502-14(d)(4)(ii) and (e)(2), the
liquidation of PR in a § 332 liquidation did free up the suspended loss because
AVCO inherited PR's tax characteristics.
0 The analytical methodology of the
Textron opinion is at odds with Tax Court Judge Wells's opinions in CSI
Hydrostatic Testers v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 398 (1994) and Intermet Corp. v.
Commissioner, 111 T.C. 294 (12/8/98), rev 'd, 209 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 4/20/00).6
Those cases strictly construed the consolidated return regulations even though the
results were difficult to support theoretically. In contrast, in Textron, Judge Laro
interpreted Reg. § 1. 1502-14(d)(4)(i) in a manner that is difficult to justify under
the literal language, but which reached a sensible theoretical result [under the
single-entity theory of consolidated returns. He concluded that Reg. § 1.1502-
14(d)(4)(i) required PR to defer its loss on the redemption of the obligation it
received for its AVCO stock even though one of the conditions for that section to
apply is that the obligation "never have been held by a nonmember." Since PR
acquired the obligation before it became a member of the Textron group that
redeemed the obligation, Judge Laro's conclusion that membership status was
determined at the time that the obligation was redeemed effectively read out of the
rule the word. He could have more effectively reached the same result by looking
to former Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(2) to note that the AVCO group was a predecessor
group to the Textron, so that Paul Revere should not have been considered ever to
have been a nonmember.
* Note that if the redemption by AVCO
of its stock held by PR had occurred after July 12, 1995, the loss would have been
permanently disallowed under Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(6), which disallows any loss to
a member on the sale or exchange of stock of the common parent corporation of
a consolidated group. Under current regulations, if AVCO and PR both had been
subsidiary members of the same consolidated group and the redemption was
described in § 302(a) - which would be unlikely - Reg. § 1.1502-20(a) would
disallow the loss, although a portion of it might be allowed under Reg. § 1.1502-
20(c). Section 267(f) would not defer the loss because Reg. § 1.267(f)-1(c)(1)
16. We are indebted to Prof. Don Leatherman, University of Tennessee College of Law,
for insightful suggestions regarding the analysis of the Textron case.
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adopts the acceleration rule of Reg. § 1.1502-13(d). The loss might, however, be
subject to the anti-avoidance rules of both Reg. § 1.267(0- 1(h) and § 1.1502-13(h).
a. Exactly when the taxpayer wanted it to, says the court
of appeals. "Plain meaning" carries the day. Reversed. Textron v. United States,
336 F.3d 26, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5373, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,571 (1st Cir.
7/16/03). The Court of Appeals (Judge Porfilio) applied Gitliz style "plain
meaning" analysis to interpreting the regulations and allowed the loss deduction.
Since former Reg. § 1.1504-14(d)(4)(i)(c) required that the note never have been
held by a nonmenber, and PR was a nonmember when it acquired the note, the
condition in the regulation for deferring the loss had not been satisfied.
3. T.D. 9084, Dual Consolidated Return Computation, 68 F.R.
44616 (7/30/03). Final regulations providing that certain events will not trigger
recapture of a dual consolidated loss or payment of the associated interest charge.
4. Schizophrenic temporary regulations for consolidated group
discharge of indebtedness income and reduction of attributes. T.D. 9089,
Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a
Consolidated Group, 68 F.R. 52487 (9/4/03). The Treasury Department has
promulgated temporary regulations under § 1502, amending Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-
19T(b) and (h), Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-21T(b), and Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-32T, and
adding Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-28T, governing the application of § 108 when a
member of a consolidated group realizes discharge of indebtedness income. The
regulations provide that the amount of discharge of indebtedness income excluded
from gross income in the case in which the debtor-corporation is insolvent is
determined based on the assets and liabilities of only the member with discharge
of indebtedness income. However, applying an interpretation of Dominion
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001), the regulations provide that
the group's consolidated attributes in their entirety are subject to reduction under
§ 108(b), but the attributes attributable to the debtor member are the first attributes
reduced. The regulations also adopt a look-through rule that applies if the debtor
member's attribute that is reduced is the basis of stock of another group member.
In this case, corresponding adjustments are made to the attributes attributable to the
lower-tier member. Identical proposed regulations have been published. 68 F.R.
52542 (9/4/03).
a. Temporary regulations are amended. T.D. 9098,
Guidance Under Section 1502; Application of Section 108 to Members of a
Consolidated Group, 68 F.R. 69024 (12/11/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-28T(a)(4)
provides that when a member of a consolidated group realizes COD income
excluded under § 108(a), after the reduction of the tax attributes attributable to the
debtor member under § 108(b), tax attributes attributable to other members other
than the debtor member (other than asset basis) that arose in a separate return year
or that arose (or are treated as arising) in a separate return limitation year to the
extent that no SRLY limitation applies to the use of such attributes by the group are
subject to reduction. The regulations are generally effective as of 8/29/03.
5. Sixth Circuit holds ITC recapture is proper despite seemingly-
contradictory consolidated returns regulations. Aeroquip-Vickers. Inc. v.
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Commissioner, 347 F.3d 173,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6555,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,693
(6th Cir. 10/20/03) (2-1), rev'g Trinova Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 68
(2/27/97). Taxpayer transferred all of its assets relating to a glass manufacturing
business, including property for which it had previously claimed investment tax
credits, into a wholly-owned subsidiary, and then transferred the stock of the
subsidiary outside the consolidated group.
0 The Tax Court determined that taxpayer
was not liable for ITC recapture because pursuant to Reg. § 1.1502-3(f)(2)(i) "a
transfer of section 38 property from one member of the group to another.member
of such group during a consolidated return year shall not be treated as a disposition
or cessation within the meaning of section 47(a)(1)." It also followed Example (5)
of that regulation, which permitted the sale of all the stock of the subsidiary to a
third party in a subsequent year without 1TC recapture. It refused to follow Rev.
Rul. 82-20, 1982-1 C.B. 6, which held the contrary where the spin-off of the
subsidiary "immediately" follows the asset transfer.
* The Sixth Circuit followed the Second
and Ninth Circuits in finding that Rev. Rul 82-20 is entitled to receive "some
deference," and under the "end-result test" variation of the step transaction
doctrine, the transaction "must be treated as a single unit." Therefore, inasmuch as
taxpayer entered into the transaction to move the section 38 property out of the
consolidated group, ITC recapture is appropriate.
F. Reorganizations
1. Merging tax somethings into tax nothings is OK, but not the
opposite! T.D. 9038, Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 68 F.R. 3384
(1/24/03), and REG-126485-01, Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 68 F.R.
3477 (1/24/03). In REG-126485-01, Statutory Mergers and Consolidations, 66 F.R.
57400 (11/15/01), the Treasury withdrew the proposed regulations [REG-106186-
98, Certain Corporate Reorganizations Involving Disregarded Entities, 65 F.R.
31115 (5/16/00)] that would have provided that neither the merger of a disregarded
entity into a corporation nor the merger of a target corporation into a disregarded
entity was a statutory merger qualifying as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A),
and proposed more liberal regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1)]. Under the 2001
proposed regulations, a merger of a corporation into a disregarded entity that is
wholly owned by another corporation could qualify as a type (A) merger. The
Treasury Department has now promulgated the 2001 proposed regulations, with
some modifications, as Temp. Reg. § 1.368-2T(b) and. simultaneously published
new identical proposed regulations.
0 The main point of the regulations is that
the merger of a target corporation into an LLC wholly owned by another
corporation (thereby rendering the LLC a disregarded entity) can qualify as a type
(A) reorganization and under more complex structures as a triangular
reorganization; that the merger of a corporation into a Q-Sub [also a disregarded
entity] can qualify as a type (A) reorganization; and that a merger into a qualified
REIT subsidiary can qualify as a type (A) reorganization.
0 Nevertheless, the new regulations
introduce significant definitional jargon. The term "disregarded entity" means a
business entity (as defined in Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)) that is disregarded as an entity
separate from its owner for federal tax purposes, including single member
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corporate-owned LLCs, qualified REIT subsidiaries, and Q-Subs. "Combining
entity" means a corporation [as defined in Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)] that is not a
disregarded entity. "Combining unit" means a combining entity and all disregarded
entities, if any, the assets of which are treated as owned by such combining entity
for federal tax purposes. Under the proposed regulations, a statutory merger or
consolidation under § 368(a)(1)(A) must be effected pursuant to the laws of the
United States, a state or the District of Columbia. [Foreign statutory mergers still
do not qualify, but the domestic statute no longer needs to be a "corporate" law.]
All of the following events must occur simultaneously: (1) all of the assets (other
than those distributed in the transaction) and liabilities (except to the extent
satisfied or discharged in the transaction) of each member of one or more
combining units (each a transferor unit) become the assets and liabilities of one or
more members of one other combining unit (the transferee unit); and (2) the
combining entity of each transferor unit ceases its separate legal existence
[although its formal existence can continue under state law for certain limited
purposes that are not inconsistent with the "all of the assets" requirement.]. The
examples provide all of the details of the rules: Divisive mergers [see Rev. Rul.
2000-5, 2000-1 C.B. 436] cannot qualify (Ex. 1); forward triangular mergers (into
a disregarded entity owned by a subsidiary) are allowed (Ex. 2 & 4); the merger of
a target S corporation that owns a Q-Sub into a disregarded entity owned by a C
corporation qualifies as to both the target S corporation and its Q-sub (Ex. 3); the
owner of the disregarded entity must be a corporation (Ex. 5); mergers of
disregarded entities into corporations do not qualify (Ex. 6); none of the
consideration received by the target shareholders may be interests in the
disregarded entity (Ex. 7); and the target can be tailored by selling assets and
distributing proceeds, as long as all of the remaining assets are transferred to the
disregarded entity in the merger (Ex. 8).
0 These regulations became effective on
January 24, 2003.
2. CALIGULA XXI had COBE. Payne v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-90 (3/27/03). The transfer from one corporation to another
corporation wholly owned by the same shareholder of the substantially all assets
associated with operation of a Houston strip club [CALIGULA XXI] in a
transaction that met all of the statutory requirements of § 368(a)(1)(D) was a tax-
free reorganization, even though at the time of the transfer the shareholder
contemplated selling strip club and three months later the transferee corporation did
sell all of its assets. Judge Halpern held that the continuity of business enterprise
requirement of Reg. § 1.368-1(d) was met:
[T]here is no direct evidence that JKP's actual sale of its assets
was part of an overall plan existing at the time of the transfer of
the club's operation from 2618 to JKP; and we do not infer the
existence of such a plan by reason of the proximity in time of the
two transactions. The mere fact that petitioner may have
contemplated selling the club at the time of its transfer from 2618
to JKP does not require a finding that such transfer lacked COBE.
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[In Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1St
Cir. 1984, the taxpayer's] plan contemplated
that the new company would carry on the...
business, and this was done. Although
petitioners' intention was to dispose of the...
[business] eventually, the fact that a going
business was transferred and operated left the
new company and petitioners, its shareholders,
in a position where they stood to gain or lose
from operations just as before the transfer; if
business conditions warranted it, the business
could have been continued indefinitely.
We hold that the reasoning of the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in Lewis v. Commissioner, supra, applies to this case and that the
transfer of the club from 2618 to JKP possessed COBE.
3. Rev. Proc. 2003-33,2003-16 I.R.B. 803 (4/21/03). This procedure
provides guidance to taxpayers in obtaining an extension of time under Reg. §
301.9100-3 to file § 338 elections [Form 8023].
4. Mutual-to-Stock F reorganization followed by a second
reorganization is OK (Part I). Rev. Rul. 2003-19, 2003-7 I.R.B. 468 (2/18/03).
* Situation 1 involved the conversion of
a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company. The mutual amended
its articles of incorporation to authorize the issuance of stock and changed its name.
Members of the mutual exchanged theirinterests for all the stock company's voting
common stock, but persons holding mutual membership interests under contracts
covered by § 403(b) or § 408(b) received policy credits in exchange for those
interests. The IRS ruled that the conversion was either a § 368(a)(1)(E)
recapitalization or a § 368(a)(1)(F) reorganization.
* Situation 2 involved the conversion of
a mutual insurance company to a stock insurance company and the creation of a
holding company structure. Mutual incorporated a Mutual Holding Company,
which incorporated a Stock Holding Company. Mutual amended its articles of
incorporation to authorize the issuance of stock and changed its name. Mutual's
members received Mutual Holding Company membership interests in exchange for
their mutual membership interests. Stock Company issued all of its stock directly
to Mutual Holding Company; and Mutual Holding Company transferred all of its
Stock Company stock to Stock Holding Company in exchange for voting stock of
Stock Holding Company. The IRS ruled that the conversion was a reorganization
under either § 368(a)(1)(E) or § 368(a)(1)(F). Furthermore, the result was not
altered by the subsequent change in the direct ownership of the converted
company, citing Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(1); Rev. Rul. 96-29, 1996-1 C.B. 50; and Rev.
Rul. 77-415, 1977-2 C.B. 311. In addition, the acquisition by Stock Holding
Company of Stock Company qualified as reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B), as
well as a § 351 transfer.
* In Situation 3 Mutual Holding Company
owned all of the stock of Stock Holding Company, which owned all of the stock
of Stock Company 1, a stock insurance company. Mutual Company amended its
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articles to authorize the issuance of stock and changed its name to Stock Company
2; Mutual Company's members received Mutual Holding Company interests in
exchange for their Mutual Company interests; Stock Company 2 issued all of its
stock directly to Mutual Holding Company; and Mutual Holding Company
transferred all of its Stock Company 2 stock to Stock Holding Company in
exchange for voting stock of Stock Holding Company. The conversion from
Mutual Company to Stock Company 2 qualified as a reorganization under both §
368(a)(1)(E) and § 368(a)(1)(F). In addition, Mutual Holding Companys
acquisition of either an interest equivalent to the stock of Stock Company 2 or the
actual stock of Stock Company 2 qualified as a § 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization.
Mutual Holding Company's transfer of its Stock Company 2 stock to Stock
Holding Company qualified as both a § 368(a)(1)(B) reorganization and as a § 351
transfer.
5. Mutual-to-Stock F reorganization followed by a second
reorganization is OK (Part I). Rev. Rul. 2003-48,2003-19 I.R.B. 863 (5/12/03).
The revenue ruling applied the principles developed in Rev. Rul. 2003-19,2003-7
I.R.B. 468 (2/18/03), to the conversion of mutual savings banks to stock banks, as
well as the adoption of holding company structures. The initial conversion and
creation of a holding company qualified under § 351 and under § 368(a)(1)(E) and
(F).
* But in Situation 1, which involved a
reverse triangular merger of the stock bank, into which the mutual bank had been
converted, into a transitory subsidiary of the Mutual Holding Company [to invert
the parent-subsidiary relationship of the converted mutual and the Mutual Holding
Company] followed by a prearranged drop of the stock savings bank to a Stock
Holding Company [more than 50 percent, but less than 80 percent of the stock of
which was owned by the Mutual Holding Company], the merger was not a
reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(B) or § 368(a)(2)(E) because mutual holding did
not control stock holding. However, because pursuant to the integrated plan the
Stock Holding Company had issued more than 20 percent but less than 50 percent
of its common stock to the public in a qualified underwriting transaction [as
defined in Reg. § 1.35 1-1 (a)(3)], the merger transfer was entitled to nonrecognition
under § 351.
* In Situation 2, not more than 20 percent
of the stock of Stock Holding Company was issued to the public. In that situation,
the merger qualified under both § 368(a)(1)(B) and § 368(a)(2)(E).
6. Turning off the step transaction doctrine when the acquirer
so chooses. T.D. 9071, Effect of Elections in Certain Multi-step Transactions, 68
F.R. 40766 (7/9/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.338(h)(10)-1OT(c)(2) provides that the step
transaction doctrine will not be applied if a taxpayer makes a valid § 338(h)(10)
election with respect to a stock acquisition that, standing alone, is a qualified stock
purchase, even if the transaction is part of a multi-step transaction that would
otherwise qualify as a reorganization. The effective date of these temporary
regulations is 7/9/03. See also, REG-143679-02, for proposed regulations that
mirror the temporary regulations. The principles underlying Rev. Rul. 2001-46,
2001-2 C.B. 321, are reflected in these regulations.
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G. Corporate Divisions
1. Does this ruling apply when the Geo dealer buys a Mercedes
dealership? Rev. Rul. 2003-18,2003-7 I.R.B. 467 (1/22/03). This rulinglheld that
the taxable acquisition of a franchise to sell and service brand Y automobiles and
the assets to operate the franchise by a corporation that had a five-year history of
being a dealer of brand X automobiles constituted an expansion of the brand X
business rather than the acquisition of a new or different business under Reg.
§1.355-3(b)(3)(ii). The facts of the ruling state that the brand X and brand Y
dealership businesses were conducted on adjacentleaseholds, but the analysis does
not pursue this fact. The analysis states:
[B]ecause (i) the product of the brand X automobile dealership is
similar to the product of the brand Y automobile dealership, (ii)
the business activities associated with the operation of the brand
X automobile dealership (i.e., sales and service) are the same as
the business activities associated with the operation of the brand
Y automobile dealership, and (iii) the operation of the brand Y
automobile dealership involves the use of the experience and
know-how that D developed in the operation of the brand X
automobile dealership, the brand Y automobile dealership is in
the same line of business as the brand X dealership and its
acquisition does not constitute the acquisition of a new ordifferent business .... 0 Rev. Rul. 57-190,1957-1 C.B. 121 was
obsoleted.
0 Althoughthe quoted language mightbe
read as a factual conclusion that the specific cars involved were similar, e.g.,
Toyotas and Hondas, IRS Chief Counsel's Office views it as a conclusion of law,
e.g., Geos are the same as Mercedes.
2. Bricks to clicks business expansion passes the SMOAKE test.'
Rev. Rul. 2003-38, 2003-17 I.R.B. 811 (4/28/03). Corporation D operated a retail
shoe store business in shopping malls and other locations, under the name "D" for
more than five years. D's business enjoyed favorable name recognition, customer
loyalty, and goodwill in the retail shoe market. D created an Internet web site and
began selling shoes at retail through the Internt. To take advantage of D's name
recognition, customer loyalty, and established goodwill, and to enhance the web
site's chances for success, the web site was named "D.com," To a significant
extent, the operation of the web site drew upon D's experience and know-how.
Two years later, D transferred the web site based business's assets and liabilities
to C, a newly formed controlled subsidiary, and spun-off C pro rata. The IRS ruled
that under Reg. § 1.355- 3(b)(3)(ii), the Internet sales operation was an expansion
of the retail store business, not a new business. Thus, each of D and C was engaged
in the active conduct of a five-year trade or business. See Rev. Rul. 2003-18 and
§ 1.355-3(c), Examples (7) and (8). The products and the principal business
activities of the retail shoe store business and the internet-based business were the
17. Shared (1) subject matter; (2) operational activities; and (3) knowledge and
experience.
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same. Although selling shoes on the Internet required some know-how different
from operating a retail store (different marketing approaches, distribution chains,
and technical operations issues), the web site's operation drew significantly on D's
existing experience and know-how, and its success would depend largely on D's
pre-existing goodwill.
0 The analytical model used by the
Revenue Ruling to determine that the clicks business was an expansion of the
bricks business was based on analyzing the extent that the two shared (1) subject
matter; (2) operational activities; and (3) knowledge and experience. [The
SMOAKE test?] The first two were met and the third was not, but the deficiency
was cured by the overlapping goodwill.
3. Beef for the boy and grass for the girl equals business
purpose. Rev. Rul. 2003-52, 2003-22 I.R.B. 960 (6/2/03). The IRS ruled that the
business purpose requirement of Reg. § 1.355-2(b) was satisfied in the following
circumstances. X Corporation was engaged in the farming business, consisting of
breeding and raising livestock and growing grain, for more than five years. The
stock of X was owned equally by Father, age 68, Mother, age 67, Son, and
Daughter. Father and Mother participated in some major management decisions,
but Son and Daughter performed most of the management. Son and Daughter
generally cooperated and operated the farm without disruption, but they disagreed
about the appropriate future direction of the farming business. Son wanted to
expand the livestock business, while Daughter wanted to sell the livestock business
and concentrate on the grain business. The disagreement prevented them from
developing, as they saw fit, the business in which each of them was most
interested. Father and Mother were neutral regarding the disagreement, but because
of the disagreement, they wanted to bequeath separate interests in the farm business
to the children. For reasons unrelated to the farm, Son and Daughter's husband
dislike each other. Although this did not impair the farm's operation, Father and
Mother believed that requiring Son and Daughter to run a single business together
was eventually likely to cause family discord. To enable Son and Daughter each
to devote his or her undivided attention to, and apply a consistent business strategy
to, the farming business in which he or she is most interested, to further the estate
planning goals of Father and Mother, and to promote family harmony, X transfers
the livestock business to a newly formed wholly owned subsidiary, Y Corporation,
and X distributed 50 percent of the Y stock to Son in exchange for all of his X
stock. The remaining Y stock was distributed equally to Father and Mother in
exchange for half of their X stock. Thereafter, Father and Mother (who each owned
25 percent of the outstanding stock of X and Y) continued to participate in some
major management decisions related to the business of each corporation. Daughter,
who had no interest in the livestock corporation, managed and operated X, and Son
managed and operated Y and had no interest in X. Father and Mother amended
their wills to devise their Y stock to Son and their X stock to Daughter. The IRS
reasoned that the distribution eliminated a disagreement that prevented the
development of the business and "allowed each sibling to devote his or her
undivided attention to, and apply a consistent business strategy to, the farming
business in which he or she is most interested, with the expectation that each
business would benefit. Therefore, although the distribution is intended, in part, to
further the personal estate planning of Father and Mother and to promote family
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harmony, it is motivated in substantial part by a real and substantial non-Federal
tax purpose that is germane to the business of X."
4. You only have to be pure of mind at the time of the
distribution. Rev. Rul. 2003-55, 2003-22 I.R.B. 961 (6/2/03). The IRS ruled that
the business purpose requirement of Reg. § 1.355-2(b) is satisfied if the
distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation is, at the time of the
distribution, motivated, in whole or substantial part, by a corporate business
purpose, but that purpose cannot be achieved as the result of an unexpected change
in circumstances following the distribution. "The regulations do not require that the
corporation in fact succeed in meeting its corporate business purpose, as long as,
at the time of the distribution, such a purpose exists and motivates, in whole or
substantial part, the distribution." The specific facts were as follows. D, a publicly
traded corporation conducted two businesses directly and a third business through
its wholly owned subsidiary, C. To invest in plant and equipment and to make
acquisitions, C had to raise a substantial amount of capital. D's investment banker
advised D that the best way to raise this capital was by a public offering of C stock
after C was separated from D. D distributed the C stock to its shareholders, and C
prepared to offer its stock to the public, with a target date approximately six
months after the distribution. Following the distribution and before the offering
could be undertaken, market conditions unexpectedly deteriorated to such an extent
that the public offering was postponed. One year after the distribution, conditions
still had not improved sufficiently to permit the offering to go forward and C
funded its capital needs through the sale of debentures.
5. Management focus is a business purpose. Rev. Rul. 2003-74,
2003-29 I.R.B. 77 (7/21/03). Distributing is a publicly traded corporation that
conducts a software technology business. Controlled is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Distributing and conducts a paper products business. Management of each
corporation would prefer to concentrate its efforts solely on the business conducted
by that corporation, but the ownership of Controlled by Distributing prevents
Distributing's management from concentrating solely on the software business.
Held, the distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation by a distributing
corporation to enable the management of each corporation to concentrate on its
own business satisfies the business purpose requirement of Reg. § 1.355-2(b).
6. Competing for investors and lenders is a business purpose.
Rev. Rul. 2003-75, 2003-29 I.R.B. 79 (7/21/03). Distributing is a publicly traded
corporation that conducts a pharmaceuticals business. Controlled is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Distributing and conducts a cosmetics business. These
businesses compete for capital from borrowing and internal cash flows. The
distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation to resolve a capital allocation
problem between the two corporations satisfies the business purpose requirement
of Reg. § 1.355-2(b).
7. Private letter rulings under § 355 will be harder to come by
after August 8th. Rev. Proc. 2003-48, 2003-29 I.R.B. 86 (7/21/03). This revenue
procedure notes that in the past the IRS has not adhered to its policy of not giving
"comfort rulings" in the § 355 area. It sets up a one-year pilot program for rulings
postmarked after 8/8/03 of not ruling on three issues with respect to corporate
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divisions. The National Office will not determine (1) whether a proposed or
completed distribution of the stock of a controlled corporation is being carried out
for one or more corporate business purposes, (2) whether the transaction is used
principally as a device, or (3) whether the distribution and an acquisition are part
of a plan under § 355(e).
8. "Nephew of Morris Trust" transaction is blessed. Rev. Rul.
2003-79, 2003-29 I.R.B. 80 (7/21/03). A spin-off of one of two business of equal
size by means of a transfer of the assets of one of the businesses to a controlled
corporation, followed by the acquisition of substantially all the assets of the
controlled corporation by an unrelated corporation in the same business, meets all
the requirements of §§ 368(a)(1)(D), 355(a), and 368(a)(1)(C) - even though an
acquisition of the same properties from the distributing corporation would have
failed this requirement if the transfer of those properties had not been made to the
controlled corporation.
9. Pesticides and baby food? A statement of facts that only a tax
professor could have invented! Rev. Rul. 2003-110, 2003-46 I.R.B. 1083
(11/17/03). A publicly traded corporation that conducted a pesticide business spun-
off its controlled subsidiary that conducted a baby food business to deal with
"public perception problems" that caused potential baby food buyers from dealing
with the subsidiary as long as it was affiliated with a pesticide producer. In
determining whether the distribution of the stock of the controlled corporation
satisfied the business purpose requirement in Reg. § 1.355-2(b), which requires that
the distribution be motivated, in whole or substantial part, by one or more corporate
business purposes, the fact that § 355 permits the distributing corporation to
distribute the stock of a controlled corporation without recognition of gain
otherwise required under § 311 (b) does not present a potential for the avoidance
of Federal taxes.
H. Personal Holding Companies and Accumulated Earnings Tax
1. Personal holding company tax rate reduced to 15 percent.
Because the 2003 Act reduced the maximum tax rate on dividends to 15 percent,
§ 541 was amended to reduce the personal holding company tax rate to 15 percent.
2. Accumulated earnings tax rate reduced to 15 percent. Because
the 2003 Act reduced the maximum tax rate on dividends to 15 percent, § 531 was
amended to reduce the accumulated earnings tax rate to 15 percent.
3. Debt aversion avoids AET. Otto Candies, LLC v. United States,
288 F.Supp.2d 730,91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2520,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,516 (E.D. La.
5/28/03). The taxpayer [an LLC taxed as an S corporation that was a successor to
a C corporation], a family corporation with three shareholders that was "one of the
leading providers of marine transportation in the Gulf of Mexico," was held not to
be liable for the § 531 accumulated earnings tax. The corporation, which had
accumulated reserves of between $15 and $21 million during the years in question,
was engaged in a volatile business and the dominant shareholder was conservative
and avoided debt. Accumulations were required to fund necessary periodic fleet
replacement, including newer vessels with modem technology meeting customer
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demands, new ventures into related businesses, and to internally fund future
redemptions [under a contract] upon the death of a shareholder.
4. Advanced Delivery and Chemical Systems of Nevada, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-250 (8/20/03). The taxpayer-holding company
was not liable for accumulated earnings tax. Under Reg. § 1.537-3(b), the business
activities of its subsidiaries and partnerships in which it was a partner were
attributed to the taxpayer. In light of the rapid growth of the affiliates' businesses,
the accumulations did not exceed the taxpayer's reasonable needs for expansion of
the affiliates, and on the particular facts [including a reorganization to reduce state
taxes], even if the accumulations did exceed the taxpayer's reasonable needs, there
was not tax avoidance purpose.
I. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. Repeal of collapsible corporation rules. With dividends and
long-term capital gains taxed at the same rate, the tax avoidance issues at which §
341 was directed no longer exist. Accordingly, § 341 was repealed in the 2003 Act.
2. The Tax Court continues on its capitalization spree. Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 39 (7/31/01). The taxpayer acquired
the assets of another corporation [for approximately $126 million] in a taxable
transaction in which the taxpayer assumed the target's liabilities, including a
contingent liability for a patent infringement claim, [Lemelson v. Champion Spark
Plug Co., 975 F.2d 869 (1992)], for which it established a reserve of $350,000.
Subsequently, the taxpayer, as the target's successor was held liable for damages,
interest, and court costs [totaling over $17 million], which it paid. The Tax Court
(Judge Cohen) upheld the Commissioner's treatment requiring capitalization of the
payments as a cost of acquiring the assets rather than a deductible expense, even
though the parties had not adjusted the purchase price to reflect the contingent
liability. The liability was known, was considered in setting the price, and was
expressly assumed. That the taxpayer considered it highly unlikely that it would be
called upon to pay was not relevant.
0 The Commissioner conceded the
deductibility of the judgment in two respects: (1) pre-judgment interest accruing
after the acquisition date was deductible; and (2) to the extent that the additional
purchase price was allocable to assets the taxpayer had disposed of, the judgment
was deductible.
0 Note that in many, if not most, cases, the
disposition of a portion of target's assets will not affect the characterization of the
payments because, under § 1060 and Reg. § 1.1060-1, the capitalized contingent
liability will be allocated to Class VI and VII amortizable intangibles for which no
loss is allowed until the complete disposition of all such intangibles acquired from
the target. See § 197(f)(1). The grounds for the Commissioner's concession were
not clearly articulated in the opinion.
a. Affirmed. 355 F.3d 997,93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-548,2004-
1 U.S.T.C. 50,130 (7th Cir. 1/21/04). The Seventh Circuit held that the contingent
liability was one that taxpayer was aware of when it acquired the assets of the
DeVilbiss Co., and taxpayer's payment of the liability was a cost of acquiring the
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business assets and had to be capitalized. The court followed David R. Webb Co.
v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'g 77 T.C. 1134 (1981), noting
that Webb stood for the proposition that, "generally, the payment of a liability of
a preceding owner of property by the person acquiring such property, whether or
not such liability was fixed or contingent at the time such property was acquired,
is not an ordinary and necessary business expense." (emphasis in original)
0 Judge Kanne, in footnote 4 of the
opinion, defends Tax Court Judge Cohen against taxpayer's attack that she failed
"to engage in the appropriate open-minded, fact-based inquiry advocated [by the
7th Circuit in A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482 (1997)]."
We find it curious that ITW would choose to attack Judge Cohen
for failing to engage in the appropriate open-minded, fact-based
inquiry advocated in Staley. Judge Cohen, who served as trial
judge in the Staley case, as well as here, dissented from the tax
court opinion from which the Staley appeal was taken.A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166,210 (1995) (Cohen, J.,
dissenting). It was her dissent that this Court cited favorably in its
ruling reversing the tax court. See Staley, 119 F.3d at 491 n.8. And,
in her closing instructions to the parties about their posttrial briefs
in the present matter, she discusses Staley and its possible
implications, describing her involvement in that case. (Tr. at 214-
15.)
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during 2003.
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis
1. No more "inappropriate" increases or decreases in the
adjusted basis of a corporate partner's interest in a partnership. T.D. 8986,
Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest; Special Rules, 67 F.R. 15112
(3/29/02). The Treasury has finalized Reg. § 1.705-2 [proposed in REG-106702-
00, Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest; Special Rules, 66 F.R. 315
(1/3/01)] which is intended to prevent what the IRS has determined to be
"inappropriate" increases or decreases in the adjusted basis of a corporate partner's
interest in a partnership [consistent with Notice 99-57, 1999-2 C.B. 692] resulting
from the partnership's disposition of the corporate partner's stock [under the
general principles of Rev. Rul. 99-57, 1999-2 C.B. 678] when: (1) a corporation
acquires an interest in a partnership that holds stock in the corporation, (2) the
partnership does not have a § 754 election in effect for the year in which the
corporation acquires the interest, and (3) the partnership later sells or exchanges the
stock. The increase or decrease in the corporation's adjusted basis in its partnership
interest resulting from the sale or exchange of the stock equals the amount of gain
or loss that the corporate partner would have recognized (absent the application of
§ 1032) if, for the tax year in which the corporation acquired the interest, a § 754
election had been in effect. The final regulations require appropriate adjustments
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to the basis of tiered partnerships to prevent evasion of their purpose where a
corporation acquires an indirect interest in its own stock though a chain of
partnerships and gain or loss from the sale of stock is subsequently allocated to the
corporation. The regulation is effective retroactively to gain or loss allocated on
sales or exchanges of stock occurring after 12/6/99.
a. Proposed amendments before the ink is dry. REG-
167648-01, Amendments to Rules for Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest;
Special Rules, 67 F.R. 15132 (3/29/02). The Treasury has proposed amendments
to Reg. § 1.705-2, which was finalized on the same day the proposed amendments
were published, "to address remaining issues that [were] considered during the
development of the final regulations. The proposed amendments would extend the
rules of Reg. § 1.705-2 to situations in which a corporation owns a direct or
indirect interest in a partnership that owns stock in that corporation, the partnership
distributes money or other property to another partner and that partner recognizes
gain on the distribution during a year in which the partnership does not have a §
754 election in effect, and the partnership subsequently sells or exchanges the
stock. The proposed amendments also clarify that "stock" of a corporate partner
includes any position with respect to stock of a corporate partner. The proposed
amendments would be effective retroactively to gain or loss allocated on sales or
exchanges of stock occurring after 3/29/02.
b. Finalized. T.D. 9049, Amendments to Rules for
Determination of Basis of Partner's Interest; Special Rules, 68 F.R. 12815
(3/18/03). The proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.705-2 have been finalized with
a generally effective date of after 12/6/99. The final regulations extend the rules of
the proposed regulations to situations in which a corporation owns a direct or
indirect interest in a partnership that owns stock in that corporation, the partnership
distributes money or other property to another partner and that partner recognizes
loss on the distribution or the basis of the property distributed to that partner is
adjusted during a year in which the partnership does not have an election under §
754 in effect, and the partnership subsequently sells or exchanges the stock.
2. What happens when § 752 meets a deferred like-kind
exchange that straddles year-end? Rev. Rul. 2003-56, 2003-23 I.R.B. 985
(5/9/03). The ruling deals with the treatment of partnership liabilities under § 752
when a partnership enters into a deferred § 1031 like kind exchange in which
property subject to a liability is transferred in one taxable year and replacement
property subject to a liability is received in the following taxable year. The IRS
ruled that the liabilities are netted for purposes of § 752. A net decrease in a
partner's share of partnership liability is treated as a distribution under § 752(b) in
the year the surrendered property was transferred; and under Reg. § 1.731-
1(a)(1)(ii) and Rev. Rul. 94-4, 1994-1 C.B. 196, it is treated as an advance or draw
of money to the extent of each partner's distributive share of income for that year,
with the result that basis increases for partnership income for the year are taken into
accounting for the deemed distribution. The gain recognized under § 1031
attributable to the boot that results from net debt relief is treated as recognized in
the year in which the relinquished property has been transferred; thus the gain from
the § 1031 transaction is taken into account in determining whether the § 752(b)
deemed distribution exceeds the partner's basis in the partnership interest under §
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731. [If the relinquished liability and the replacement liability are nonrecourse,
under Reg. § 1.704-2(d), the partnership minimum gain on the last day of the first
taxable year of the partnership is computed by using the replacement property and
its tax basis as determined under § 1031(d) and the replacement nonrecourse
liability (but only to the extent of the relinquished nonrecourse liability).] A net
increase in a partner's share of partnership liability is taken into account under §
752(a) in the year in which the partnership receives the replacement property.
3. Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses through
partnerships before June 24,2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities,
68 F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules
applicable to corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the duplication and acceleration
of loss through the assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in. a
nonrecognition transaction. Under the temporary regulations, if a partnership
assumes a liability, as defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner (other than a liability to
which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721 transaction, after application of §§ 752(a)
and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not below the adjusted
value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term
"liability" includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without
regard to whether the obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax
purposes. Reduction of a partner's basis generally is not required if: (1) the trade
or business with which the liability is associated is transferred to the partnership,
or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are
contributed to the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of
substantially all of the assets does not apply to a transaction described in Notice
2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar transaction).
0 The temporary regulations are effective
for transactions occurring after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03.
4. Defining the term "liability" in § 752 and fighting duplication
and acceleration of losses through partnerships after June 24, 2003. REG-
106736-00, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37434 (6/24/03). The
Treasury has proposed extraordinarily complex, verging on incomprehensible,
regulations: (1) defining liabilities under § 752; (2) dealing with a partnership's
assumption of certain fixed and contingent obligations in exchange for a
partnership interest [Prop. Reg. § 1.752-7]; and (3) providing rules under § 358(h)
for assumptions of liabilities by corporations from partners and partnerships [Prop.
Reg. § 1.358-7]. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(1)(i) would be amended to include the
principles of Rev. Rul. 88-77, 1988-2 C.B. 128; an obligation is a liability to the
extent that incurring the obligation: (1) creates or increases the basis of any of the
obligor's assets (including cash); (2) gives rise to an immediate deduction; or (3)
gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in computing taxable income and is
not properly chargeable to capital. Prop. Reg. § 1.752-7 deals with the assumption
by a partnership of a partner's fixed or contingent obligation to make payment that
is not one of the three types described in Reg. § 1.752-1 (a)(1)(i) [including accrual
method liabilities the deduction for which was deferred under § 453(h)]. Unlike
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T, the proposed regulations do not reduce the partner's
outside basis when the partnership assumes a § 1.752-7 liability. If the partnership
satisfies the liability while the partner remains in the partnership, the deduction
with respect to the built-in loss associated with the § 1.752-7 liability is allocated
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to the partner, reducing that partner's outside basis. Alternatively, if one of three
events occurs that separate the partner from the liability, then the partner's outside
basis is reduced immediately before the occurrence of the event. The events are: (1)
a disposition (or partial disposition) of the partnership interest by the partner, (2)
a liquidation of the partner's partnership interest, and (3) the assumption (orpartial
assumption) of the liability by another partner. The basis reduction generally is the
lesser of (1) the excess of the partner's basis in the partnership interest over the
adjusted value of the interest, or (2) the remaining built-in loss associated with the
liability. (In the event of a partial disposition, the reduction is pro rated.) Thereafter,
to the extent of the remaining built-in loss associated with the liability, the
partnership (or the assuming partner) is not entitled to any deduction or capital
expense upon satisfaction (or economic performance) of the liability, but if the
partnership notifies the partner, the partner is entitled to a loss or deduction. If
another partner assumed the liability, the partnership must immediately reduce the
basis of its assets by the built-in loss, and upon satisfaction, the assuming partner
must make certain basis adjustments to his partnership interest. There are
exceptions for (1) transfer of the trade or business with which the liability is
associated is transferred to the partnership, and (2) de minimis transactions
(liabilities less that 10 percent of the partnership's assets or $1,000,000). Unlike
under the temporary regulations, there is no exception for transactions in which
substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated are contributed
to the partnership. When finalized, the regulations will be effective for transactions
occurring after 6/24/03.
5. "[Olne brother got the... income without paying all of the
tax, while the other brother paid the tax without getting any of the income."
Estate of Ballantyne v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 802, 92 A.F.T.R. 2d 2003-5694,
2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,120 (8th Cir. 8/7/03), affg T.C. Memo. 2002-160 (6/24/02).
The decedent taxpayer (Melvin) and his brother (Russell) for many years operated
a partnership that engaged in the oil and gas business, run by the decedent, and the
farming business, run by the decedent's brother. The partnership was an oral
partnership, and the brothers consistently reported as equal partners, even though
the decedent consistently withdrew the profits from the oil and gas business and
decedent's brother consistently withdrew the profits from the fanning business.
After the decedent's death, the estate took the position that all of the income from
the farming activity was reportable as the decedent's brother's distributive share.
Because the partnership did not maintain capital accounts, the allocation lacked
economic substance, and the partners' interests in the partnership were determined
under the facts and circumstances test of Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3). Based on the
evidence, the estate could not overcome the presumption that the partners were
equal partners. There was no record of capital contributions; the amount of profits
of each activity varied from year to year, as did withdrawals but the partners'
economic interests and interests in cash flow could not be determined because the
partnership books and records were inadequate. However, the "facts" - mostly the
witnesses' "beliefs" that the brothers were 50/50 partners - indicated that they
were to share liquidating distributions equally. That factor, combined with the
brothers long-time consistent reporting as equal partners and the absence of any
evidence that the brothers' reporting position involved tax avoidance, was
sufficient to convince Judge Ruwe that they were equal partners.
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0 The Court of Appeals (Judge Beam)
affirmed. First, the claimed allocation did not have economic effect because the
partnership failed to comply with the capital account rules in the § 704(b)
regulations. Second, the Tax Court correctly applied the regulations to determine
the partners' distributive shares based upon their interests in the partnership based
on all the facts and circumstances. The court rejected the estate's argument that it
was clear that the brothers had agreed that Russell would get farming profits and
Melvin the oil profits, because it was also "clear that the brothers had evenly split
some of the burdens, i.e., the tax consequences of the combined profits and losses."
Finally, the brothers' interests in cash flow and liquidating distributions supported
the Tax Court's conclusion. Actual operating distributions were not based on the
clear-cut delineation claimed by the taxpayer - to some extent the brothers shared
the profits from the two businesses.
6. REG-160330-02, Section 704(c), Installment Obligations and
Contributed Contracts, 68 F.R. 65864 (11/24/03). The Treasury has published
proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(8) clarifying that if a partnership
disposes of § 704(c) property in exchange for an installment obligation the
installment obligation is § 704(c) property; likewise if a partner contributes a
contract that is § 704(c) property and pursuant to the contract the partnership
obtains property in a transaction in which less than all of the gain or loss is
recognized, the property is § 704(c) property. Proposed amendments to Reg. §
1.704-4(d)(1) provide that an installment obligation received by a partnership and
property acquired pursuant to a contributed contract are treated as § 704(c)
property for purposes of § 704(c)(1)(B) to the extent that the installment obligation
or the acquired property is § 704(c) property under Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(8). The
regulations are effective as of 11/24/03.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners
1. Partnership capital shifts resulting from option exercises
won't be taxable. REG-103580-02, Noncompensatory Partnership Options, 68
F.R. 2930 (1/22/03). The Treasury Department has published proposed regulations
dealing with noncompensatory partnership options, including convertible debt and
convertible equity interests. The proposed regulations do not address compensatory
options, and the preamble states that no inferences regarding the treatment of
compensatory options should be drawn. Under the proposed regulations, neither
the grant nor the exercise of an option generally results in the recognition of gain
or loss to either the partnership or the option holder. Prop. Reg. § 1.721-2. The
issuance of an option is not governed by § 721, but rather (under general tax
principles) is an open transaction for the issuer and an investment (capital
expenditure) by the holder. If the holder uses appreciated or depreciated property
to acquire the option, the holder recognizes gain or loss.
* Upon exercise, the option holder is
treated as contributing property in the form of the premium, the exercise price, and
the option privilege to the partnership in exchange for the partnership interest, and
§ 721 applies, even if the conversion results in a shift of capital from the old
partners to the option holder. The conversion right in convertible debt or
convertible equity is taken into account for tax purposes as part of the underlying
instrument. (The proposed regulations do not deal with the consequences of a right
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to convert partnership debt into an interest in the issuing partnership to the extent
of any accrued but unpaid interest on the debt.) An amendment to Reg. § 1.1271-
1 (e) would treat partnership interests as stock for purposes of the special OID rules
for convertible debt instruments. Section 721 does not apply to the lapse of an
option; the lapse of an option results in recognition of income by the partnership
and the recognition of loss by the former option holder.
0 The proposed regulations amend the
§704 regulations to deal with the fact that the option holder generally receives a
partnership interest with a value that is greater or less than the sum of the option
premium and exercise price, i.e., there is a capital shift. The option holder's initial
capital account equals the consideration paid to the partnership for the option plus
the fair market value of any property (other than the option itself) contributed to the
partnership upon exercise. To meet the substantial economic effect test of Reg. §
1.704-1 (b), the partnership must revalue its property following the exercise of the
option, and must allocate the unrealized income, gain, loss, and deduction from the
revaluation, first, to the option holder to reflect the holder's right to partnership
capital, and, then, to the historic partners. To the extent that unrealized appreciation
or depreciation in the partnership's assets has been allocated to the option holder's
capital account, under § 704(c) principles the holder will recognize any income or
loss attributable to that appreciation or depreciation as the underlying assets are
sold, depreciated, or amortized. If after all of the unrealized appreciation or
depreciation in the partnership's assets has been allocated to the option holder, the
option holder's capital account still does not equal the amount of partnership
capital to which the option holder is entitled, the partnership must adjust the capital
accounts of the historic partners by the amounts necessary to provide the option
holder with a capital account equal to the holder's rights to partnership capital
under the agreement. Starting with the year the option is exercised, the partnership
must make corrective allocations of tax items - that differ from the partnership's
allocations of book items - of gross income or loss to the partners to reflect any
shift in the partners' capital accounts occurring as a result of the exercise of an
option.
0 The proposed regulations also provide
rules for revaluing the partners' capital accounts under Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(J)
while an option is outstanding. The aggregate value of partnership property is
reduced by the amount by which the value of the option exceeds it price or is
increased by the amount by which price of the option exceeds its value.
* An option holder will be recharacterized
as a partner if (1) under a facts and circumstances test, the option holder's rights are
substantially similar to the rights afforded to a partner and (2) as of the date that the
noncompensatory option is issued, transferred, or modified, there is a strong
likelihood that the failure to treat the option holder as a partner would result in a
substantial reduction in the present value of the partners' and the option holder's
aggregate tax liabilities. Prop. Reg. § 1.761-3. If an option is reasonably certain to
be exercised, the first half of this test is generally met. If the option holder is treated
as a partner under the proposed regulations, then the holder's distributive share of
the partnerships income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit must be determined in
accordance with such partner's interest in the partnership under Reg. § 1.704-
1 (b)(3). For this purpose, the option holder's share of partnership items should
reflect the lesser amount of capital investment if appropriate; the option holder's
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distributive share of partnership losses and deductions may be limited by § § 704(b)
and (d) to the amount paid for the option.
0 The proposed regulations do not apply
to options issued by single member LLCs.
0 The regulations will apply to
noncompensatory options issued on or after the date final regulations are
published.
2. Permitting a partnership book-up when you can't make the
regs work if you don't do it. REG-139796-02, Section 704(b) and Capital
Account Revaluations, 68 F.R. 39498 (7/2/03). Proposed amendments to the §
704(b) regulations would expressly allow partnerships to increase or decrease the
capital accounts of the partners to reflect a revaluation of partnership property on
the partnership's books in connection with the grant of an interest in the partnership
(other than a de minimis interest) in consideration of services to the partnership by
an existing partner acting in a partner capacity or by a new partner acting in a
partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner. The regulation will be
effective when finalized.
3. If you want § 707(a) treatment, document the transaction as
such. Bitker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-209 (7/15/03). The taxpayers
owned farmland that they allowed a family partnership engaged in the farming
business to use in that business without any express rental agreement. The
partnership made payments of principal and interest on the taxpayer's mortgage
debt secured by on the land, and the taxpayers claimed that the payments should
be deductible by the partnership as rental expenses and includable by them as
passive activity rental income. Although this type of transaction could be so
characterized under § 707(a), the taxpayer's offered no evidence that partnership
actually made the payments as rent for such use or the payments represented fair
rental value. Accordingly, the taxpayers' shares of partnership income were not
reduced for rent, their income from their rental real estate activity was not
increased for such rent, and the payments were treated as partnership distributions
(which, on the facts, were not in excess of basis).
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during 2003.
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
1. Partnership inside basis adjustments fully coordinated with
§§ 197 and 1060. T.D. 9059, Coordination of Sections 755 and 1060; Allocation
of Basis Among Partnership Assets and Application of the Residual Method to
Certain Partnership Transactions, 68 F.R. 34293 (6/9/03). The Treasury has
promulgated final regulations [proposed in REG-107872-99, 65 F.R. 17829
(4/5/00) to replace Temp. Reg. § 1.755-2T] relating to the allocation of basis
adjustments among partnership assets under § 755 to implement § 1060(d) [which
applies the residual method to partnership transactions in connection with
determining the value of § 197 intangibles].
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0 The new rules are amendments to Reg.
§ 1.755-1. As amended, Reg. § 1.775-1 applies the residual method to all
allocations for § 743(b) and § 734(d) inside basis adjustments under § 755. Reg.
§ 1.755-1(a) uses the residual method to value all § 197 intangibles [not just
goodwill and going concern value, as would have been the rule under the proposed
regulations]. Values are assigned to assets as follows. First, the partnership
determines the values of its assets other than § 197 intangibles [taking into account
§ 7701(g)]. Second, the partnership determines the "partnership gross value."
Third, the partnership determines the value of its § 197 intangibles under the
residual method [partnership gross value minus value of assets other than § 197
intangibles]. If the aggregate value of partnership property other than § 197
intangibles is equal to or greater than the partnership gross value, all § 197
intangibles are treated has having zero value. If there is any value assigned to the
§ 197 intangibles, that value is allocated among § 197 intangibles other than
goodwill and going concern value before any value is assigned to goodwill and
going concern value. In allocating values and basis to § 197 intangibles, value is
assigned first to those § 197 intangibles (other than goodwill and going concern
value) that would produce § 751(c) flush language unrealized receivables [i.e.,
previously amortized or depreciated] to the extent of basis and the unrealized
receivable amount; then among all § 197 intangibles (other than goodwill and
going concern value) relative to fair market value. For most § 743(b) basis
adjustments, the benchmark for determining the gross partnership value is the
amount paid for a transferred partnership interest. Partnership gross value is the
amount that, if assigned to all partnership property, would result in a liquidating
distribution to the transferee partner equal to that partner's basis (reduced by the
amount, if any, of such basis that is attributable to partnership liabilities) in the
transferred partnership interest immediately following the relevant transfer. In cases
involving § 734(b) basis adjustments [and § 743(b) basis adjustments resulting
from substituted basis transactions], partnership gross value is the value of the
entire partnership as a going concern, increased by the amount of partnership
liabilities.
F. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Even the IRS doesn't know when it has to have a partnership
level audit in order to send a valid deficiency notice to a partner. Katz v.
Commissioner, 335 F.3d 1121, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5153, 2003-2 U.S.T.C.
50,557 (10th Cir. 77/03), rev'g 116 T.C. 5 (2001). The Commissioner disallowed
the taxpayer's losses claimed as a distributive share of partnership income in 1990,
the year he filed a bankruptcy petition, on the grounds that the distributive share for
the entire partnership taxable year was reportable by bankruptcy estate.
0 The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) denied
the taxpayer's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, in which the taxpayer
argued that the deficiency notice was invalid because there had not been any FPAA
under the partnership audit provisions. Judge Vasquez held that the allocation of
the distributive share of partnership loses between the bankrupt partner and his
bankruptcy estate was not a partnership item that would require a partnership-level
proceeding, because the bankrupt partner and his bankruptcy estate were a single
partner as far as the partnership-level audit rules were concerned. On the merits, he
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held that the entire distributive share of partnership losses was properly reportableby the bankruptcy estate. b The Court of Appeals (Judge Hartz)
reversed. First, the court held that Reg. § 301.6231 (c)-7T(a), which converts items
that otherwise would be partnership items into nonpartnership items if they arose
in a taxable year "ending on or before the last day of the latest taxable year of the
partner with respect to which the United States could file a claim for income tax
due in the bankruptcy proceeding," was not controlling because 1989 was the latest
taxable year for which the United States could file a claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Second, the court held that the partner's share of partnership losses was
a partnership item that could not be determined without a partnership-level
proceeding even though the allocation of the distributive share of losses between
the bankrupt partner and his bankruptcy estate did not affect other partners. The
holding was grounded on the idea that regardless of whether the items were
properly the bankrupt partner's or the bankruptcy estate's, the partnership return
was required to show the allocation and the allocation is a partnership item that can
be challenged only in a partnership-level proceeding, even if there might be "sound
policy reasons for not requiring a full-blown partnership-level proceeding when an
alleged error in one partner's return affects only one other taxpayer rather than all
the partners."
G. Miscellaneous
1. Four-year spread for short-year income occasioned by a
change in the annual accounting period to the calendar year during a
transition period. Rev. Proc. 2003-79,2003-45 I.R.B. 1036 (11/10/03). Rev. Proc.
2002-38, 2002-1 C.B. 1037, and Rev. Proc. 2002-39, 2002-1 C.B. 1046, provide
procedures for a partnership to change its annual accounting period if its current
taxable year no longer qualifies as a natural business year. This new revenue
procedure provides procedures under which a partner in such a partnership may
elect to take into account ratably over four taxable years the partner's share of
income from the partnership that is attributable to the short taxable year ending on
or after May 10, 2002, but before June 1, 2004.
VIII. TAx SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases
1. Tax shelter benefits from § 453 contingent sale partnership
tax shelter not allowed because the tax shelter is a sham and "serves no
economic purpose other than tax savings." Merrill Lynch's persistence
overcomes initial doubts of tax department. ACM Partnership v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1997-115 (3/5/97) affid in part, rev'd in part, 157 F.3d 231, 82
A.F.T.R.2d98-6682, 98-2 U.S.T.C. 50,790 (3d Cir. 10/13/98) (2-1), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1017 (3/22/99). Judge Laro found a § 453 contingent sale partnership tax
shelter to be a prearranged sham, "tax-driven and devoid of economic purpose,"
and "serv[ing] no economic purpose other than tax savings," following Goldstein
v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Under the scheme to shelter Colgate's $105 million 1988 capital gain, a partnership
was formed in 1989; its three partners were affiliates of (a) a foreign bank (about
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90%), (b) Colgate (about 9%), and (c) Merrill Lynch (about 1%). A bank note was
purchased by the partnership and immediately sold for a large immediate payment
and much smaller future contingent payments. Under the contingent payment sale
provisions of the temporary regulations [§ 15a.453-1(c)] the partnership's basis
was to be allocated ratably over the several years in which contingent payments
could be made, resulting in a large 1989 installment sale gain to the partnership.
The lion's share of that installment sale gain was allocated to the foreign bank
(which was not taxable on U.S. source capital gain), followed by the redemption
of the foreign bank's partnership interest. This left Colgate as the 90 percent
partner. In 1991, the installment sale obligation was sold by the partnership,
triggering about $100 million of capital losses, which Colgate attempted to use to
shelter its 1988 capital gain.
0 The Third Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's application of the "economic substance" doctrine, which eliminated the
capital gains and losses attributable to ACM's application of the ratable basis
recovery rule of the contingent installment sale provisions. The Third Circuit held,
however, that out-of-pocket amounts were deductible.
2. Judge Foley finds another Merrill Lynch § 453 partnership
plan does not work because, under the facts, there was no partnership. ASA
Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-305 (8/20/98). In
another Merrill Lynch § 453 partnership plan to create capital losses to shelter
earlier capital gains, AlliedSignal lost when Judge Foley held that the parties to the
partnership agreement did not join together for a common purpose of investing in
interest-bearing instruments, and they did not share profits and losses.
a. Affirmed, ASA Investerings Partnership v.
Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505,85 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-675,2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,185
(D.C. Cir. 2/1/00), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871 (10/2/00). The D.C. Circuit's opinion
noted that it disagreed with the Tax Court's statements that persons with
"divergent business goals" are precluded from having the requisite intent to form
a partnership; however, this view was not essential to the Tax Court's conclusion
that the parties did not intend to join together as partners to conduct business
activities for a purpose other than tax avoidance. The court held that there was a
single business purpose rule.
3. Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-359
(10/27/99). Brunswick's (the taxpayer's) transactions, which were identical to
ACM's, were found to lack economic substance. Judge Nims held that the
transactions lacked nontax business purposes and that Congress did not intend to
favor such transactions "regardless of their economic substance." He held that fees
paid for the organization of the partnership were deductible subject to the
limitations of § 709(b) [60-month amortization], but that the fees paid with respect
to the sham transactions were not deductible.
a. D.C. Circuit remands Saba for reconsideration in
light of its opinion in ASA Investerings. Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 273
F.3d 1135, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-7318, 2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,145 (D.C. Cir.
12/21/01), remanding for reconsideration in light ofASA Investerings T.C. Memo.
1999-359 (10/27/99), on remand to T.C. Memo. 2003-31 (2/11/03). The court felt
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this case was indistinguishable from ASA Investerings, which was decided on a
sham partnership theory, as opposed to Judge Nims' decision in the Tax Court,
which was grounded on a sham transaction theory. The court of appeals refused to
simply- affirm the Tax Court's decision on the alternative ground that the
partnerships were shams. Even the government conceded that the sham transaction
and sham partnership approaches yield different results; the adjustments under the
sham transaction theory would be different from those under the sham partnership
theory [although the government apparently conceded at oral argument that under
either approach, Brunswick could deduct actual losses from the transactions]. The
government argued that the court of appeals should applyASA Investerings to hold
that the partnerships were shams, and remand the case to the Tax Court for the
limited purpose of determining the amount of any necessary adjustments. But the
court of appeals accepted the taxpayer's argument that the "question of whether 'an
entity should be regarded as a partnership for federal tax purposes is inherently
factual,"' and remanded to allow the taxpayer to address the question to the trial
court, even though it doubted that the Tax Court's "findings are inadequate because
of 'significant differences' alleged by the taxpayer "between the actions of
Brunswick in this case and those of [the taxpayer] in ASA." Indeed, the court of
appeals opinion said: "As far as we can tell, the only difference between this case
and ASA is that Brunswick and ABN did not meet in Bermuda." In remanding,
Judge Tatel foreshadowed what he expected to be the result on remand:
In any case, ASA makes clear that "the absence of a nontax
business purpose is fatal" to the argument that the Commissioner
should respect an entity for federal tax purposes. ... Here, the Tax
Court specifically found "overwhelming evidence in the record
that Saba and Otrabanda were organized solely to generate tax
benefits for Brunswick." . . . Arguably, this broader finding
subsumes any factual differences that might exist between this
case and ASA. [citations omitted].
... Although the present record might strongly suggest that Saba
and Otrabanda were sham partnerships organized for the sole
purpose of generating paper tax losses for Brunswick, fairness
dictates that we ought not affirm on this ground. In particular, in
presenting its case in the Tax Court, Brunswick may have acted
on the mistaken belief that the Supreme Court's decision in
Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 87 L. Ed.
1499, 63 S. Ct. 1132 (1943), established a two-part test under
which Saba and Otrabanda must be respected simply because
they engaged in some business activity, an interpretation thatASA
squarely rejected .... 0 Note the effect of this opinion on the
Boca Investerings case, below.
b. On remand, the same result, following the Court of
Appeals' instructions. T.C. Memo. 2003-31 (2/11/03). On remand Judge Nims
again denied the deductions. He found the case indistinguishable from ASA
Inversterings. The partnerships were not recognized for tax purposes because they
had no business purpose other than tax avoidance. The minimal business activity
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of the partnership with respect to commercial paper did not amount to a nontax
purpose.
4. Same arrangement as earlier failed shelters, different trial
court judge - it's a business deal, not a shelter. Boca Investerings Partnership
v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298, 88 A.F.T.R.2d 2001-6252, 2001-2 U.S.T.C.
50,690 (D. D.C. 10/5/01). American Home Products [now Wyeth] entered into
a Merrill Lynch marketed tax shelter virtually identical to those in ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 82 A.F.T.R.2d 98-6682, 98-2
U.S.T.C. 50,790 (3d Cir. 10/13/98), affig T.C. Memo. 1997-115 (3/5/97), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999), ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, 201
F.3d 505,2000-1 U.S.T.C. 50,185 (D.C. Cir. 2/1/00), affgT.C. Memo. 1998-305
(8/20/98), and Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-359
(10/27/99), judgment vacated by 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001), on remand to
T.C. Memo. 2003-31. The losses from the transaction sheltered the gain on the sale
of a corporate subsidiary. Judge Friedman held that a valid partnership existed and
that the losses were allowable because he found that the taxpayer had both a
business purpose and an objective profit potential in entering into the transaction.
a. Reversed: ASA Investerings is followed. Boca
Investerings Partnership v. United States, 314 F.3d 625, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-444,
2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,181 (1/10/03). The D.C. Circuit held that the district court
"erred as a matter of law when it did not properly apply the holding of ASA
Investerings, requiring that a legitimate non-tax business necessity exist for the
creation of the otherwise sham entity inserted into the partnership for tax avoidance
reasons in order to meet the intent test of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.
733 (1949), as applied to this type of partnership transaction." Judge Sentelle
quoted ASA to make clear that "the absence of a nontax business purpose" is fatal
to an argument that the Commissioner should respect an entity for federal tax
purposes.
5. Lease-strip transaction by pseudo-black box intermediary
fails in the Tax Court; affirmed by Second Circuit. Nicole Rose Cor. v.
Commissioner, 117 T.C. 328 (12/28/01), affd by summary order, 320 F.3d 282,
90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-7702, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,137 (2d Cir. 12/13/02) (per
curiam), publication status changed by the court from unpublished to published,
(2d Cir. 2/24/03). The taxpayer corporation's stock was sold to an intermediary
[which then merged downstream], following which its assets were sold to the
prearranged ultimate purchaser. To offset the gains realized on the asset sale, the
taxpayer acquired by a § 351 transaction interests in certain equipment leaseback
transactions [secured by trusts that resulted in a circular cash flow] that had no
foreseeable value, which it immediately transferred to a Dutch bank, the sole
consideration for which was assumption of taxpayer's obligations [of which there
were in reality none]. Taxpayer claimed a $22 million ordinary business expense
deduction as a result of the transfer of the leaseback interests. The deduction was
denied because the transactions lacked business purpose and economic substance
under "any version" of the tests. Judge Swift held that the transaction lacked
business purpose and economic substance even as measured against the Eleventh
Circuit's broad articulation of the test in UPS of America, Inc. v. Commissioner,
254 F.3d 1014 (1 1th Cir. 2001), that "a transaction has a 'business purpose' when
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we are talking about a going concern.... as long as it figures in a bona fide, profit-
seeking business."
6. The Tax Court hammers another shelter, and in the process
tells us the "purpose" of the legislative plan." Andantech L.L.C. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-97 (4/9/02), aff'd and remanded, 331 F.3d 972,
91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2623,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,530 (D.C. Cir. 6/17/03). Norwest,
through its equipment-leasing subsidiary, engaged in a complex [seven PowerPoint
slides worth] purchase and leaseback tax shelter transaction involving 40 IBM
mainframe computers already under lease to end-users. The promoter [Comdisco]
sold the computers for cash and notes to an LLC owned by two nonresident aliens,
which leased them back to the promoter, who retained all responsibilities to the
end-users; the LLC sold the stream of rental payment to be received for net present
value, thereby accelerating income realization, and applied the proceeds to the
balance due on the note. Less than three months later, one of the nonresident aliens
[indirectly] transferred his 2 percent LLC interest to a trust established by
promoter, and Norwest, thorough a subsidiary, acquired the remaining 98 percent
interest in the LLC [thereby closing the taxable year in which the income had been
realized] for an amount roughly equal to one half of one percent of the
approximately $122 million basis of the computers. Norwest subsequently reported
its distributive share of depreciation deductions, but was allocated no income. After
three years, the computers were reconveyed to the promoter, pursuant to an "early
termination option," which the court found the "economics of the transaction ...
mandate[d]," and the LLC was liquidated.
S The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) struck
down the shelter. He concluded that neither the original LLC, with the foreign
partners, nor the subsequent LLC of which Norwest' s subsidiary was a member,
was a valid partnership to be recognized for federal tax purposes; in neither case
did the purported partners intend to join together as partners for the purpose of
carrying on a business, i.e., they did not join together to share in the profits or
losses from an equipment leasing activity. Alternatively, Judge Jacobs would have
disregarded the participation of the foreign LLC members in the transactions under
the step transaction doctrine [applying either the end result or mutual
interdependence test]. Furthermore, the LLC's sale-leaseback transaction with the
promoter was a sham because it (a) was not a true multiple-party transaction, (b)
lacked economic substance, (c) was not compelled or encouraged by business
realities, and (d) was shaped solely by tax-avoidance features. As far as Norwest
and its subsidiary were concerned, the transaction was not respected because it
lacked both business purpose and economic substance. The LLC, and Norwest's
subsidiary, had no reasonable possibility of making an economic profit, but the tax
benefits were more than sufficient to cover any potential losses. The Norwest
subsidiary never acquired the benefits and burdens of ownership of the depreciable
equipment, and thus was not entitled to depreciation deductions. In addition, the
LLC's debts were not bonafide and no interest deductions were allowable.
* Finally, Judge Jacobs concluded by
looking back to early Supreme Court jurisprudence:
In Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. [473] at 476-477 [19401, the Supreme Court
stated:
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There is no illusion about the payment of a tax exaction. Each
tax, according to a legislative plan, raises funds to carry on
government. The purpose here is to tax earnings and profits less
expenses and losses. If one or the other factor in any calculation
is unreal, it distorts the liability of the particular taxpayer to the
detriment or advantage of the entire tax-paying group....
The sale-leaseback transaction was designed by Comdisco to create just
such a distortion.
It is axiomatic that taxpayers may structure transactions to take
advantage of tax benefits. But "After a certain point, . . . , the
transaction ceases to have any economic substance and becomes
no more than a sale of tax profits." Hines v. United States, 912
F.2d 736, 741 (4th Cir.1990). Here, the evidence in the record
clearly indicates that the investment scheme devised and
orchestrated by Comdisco "reached the point where the tax tail
began to wag the dog." Id.
a. The Sixth Circuit (Judge Sentelle) concluded that the
partnership should be disregarded and remanded to the Tax Court for a
determination as to how the reported income and losses should be allocated. The
court followed ASA Investerings and determined that the purported partners "did
not intend to join together in order to share any profit or loss from the business
activity of Andantech [partnership,] namely the sale and leaseback of computer
equipment," and "'the absence of a nontax business purpose' is fatal to the validity
of a partnership."
7. Third Circuit comes down hard on COLI, with lots of
language the government will love. Internal Revenue Service v. CM Holdings
Inc. (In re CM Holdings Inc.), 301 F.3d 96, 90 A.F.T.R2d 2002-5850, 2002-2
U.S.T.C. 50,596 (3d Cir. 8/16/02), affg 254 B.R. 578,86 A.F.T.R.2d 2000-6470,
2000-2 U.S.T.C. 50,791 (D. Del. 10/16/00). In CMI's bankruptcy, the IRS filed
proofs of claim for taxes based on the disallowance of interest deductions that CMI
claimed for its COLI plan (involving policies on 1400 employees).
e The district court held no interest
deduction was allowable under § 163(a) because the entire transaction was a "sham
in substance" that lacked subjective business purpose. Apart from tax savings from
the interest deduction, CMI could not reasonably expect a positive cash flow from
the COLI plan in any year and could not expect to benefit from the inside cash
value build-up [which continuously remained at zero throughout the plan] or profit
from the death benefits on covered employees. Interest deductions were
disallowed, and § 6662 substantial understatement penalties were imposed because
the transaction lacked economic substance. The transaction was entered into
without a reasonable expectation of profit - in the absence of the interest
deductions - over the life of the 40-year transaction from either the inside build-up
or mortality components of the plan.
* The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
(Judge Ambro) affirmed on the ground that the "COLI policies lacked economic
substance and therefore were economic shams." [The court did not reach the issue
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of whether the transactions were factual shams.] The court dismissed out of hand
the need to examine the "intersection of... statutory details."
[Plursuant to Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), and
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), courts have
looked beyond taxpayers' formal compliance with the Code and
analyzed the fundamental substance of transactions. Economic
substance is a prerequisite to the application of any Code
provision allowing deductions.... It is the Government's trump
card; even if a transaction complies precisely with all
requirements for obtaining a deduction, if it lacks economic
substance it "simply is not recognized for federal taxation
purposes, for better or for worse."
In holding for the government, the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that
[based on Gregory, Knetsch, ACM Partnership and other cases] the application of
the economic shams doctrine properly hinges on the "'fleeting and
inconsequential' nature" of the transaction under scrutiny. Rather, the court
concluded that "[d]uration alone cannot sanctify a transaction that lacks economic
substance. The appropriate examination is of the net financial effect to the
taxpayer, be it short or long term. The point of our analysis in ACM Partnership
is that the transactions 'offset one another with no net effect on ACM's financial
position."' In any event, the court found the COLI transactions bore "striking
similarities" to Knetsch. The court further rejected the argument that for analytical
purposes the pre-tax profit should have been "grossed-up" by the anticipated tax
benefits because,
[t]he point of the analysis is to remove from consideration the
challenged tax deduction, and evaluate the transaction on its
merits, to see if it makes sense economically or is mere tax
arbitrage. Courts use "pre-tax" as shorthand for this, but they do
not imply that the court must imagine a world without taxes, and
evaluate the transaction accordingly. Instead they focus on the
abuse of the deductions claimed: "[w]here a transaction has no
substance other than to create deductions, the transaction is
disregarded for tax purposes." [citation omitted] Choosing a tax-
favored investment vehicle is fine, but engaging in an empty
transaction that shuffles payments for the sole purpose of
generating a deduction is not.
0 Finally, the court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that because "the transaction had objective non-tax economic effects..
. the Court must not look further," and that the district court improperly applied a
subjective analysis. Rather, the Court of Appeals read Gregory to permit an inquiry
into motive. "If Congress intends to encourage an activity, and to use taxpayers'
desire to avoid taxes as a means to do it, then a subjective motive of tax avoidance
is permissible. But to engage in an activity solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes
where that is not the statute's goal is to conduct an economic sham." Because the
court found that nothing in statute to indicate that Congress intended to encourage
leveraged COLI investments, the inquiry into motive was proper. In this regard, it
was significant that "the plan was marketed as a tax-driven investment." Because
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the COLI "plan had no net effect on Camelot's economic position,. . . it fails the
objective prong of the economic sham analysis." Because there was no "legitimate
business purpose behind the plan, ... it fails the subjective prong as well."
Penalties were also upheld.
a. But a District Court finds for the taxpayer in an
incredible opinion. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 91
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1489, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,346 (E.D. Mich. 3/31/03). In a
carefully detailed opinion, Judge Lawson found that Dow did correctly almost
everything that Camelot and AEP did incorrectly. The interest rate on policy loans
was not unreasonably high, and a positive pre-tax cash flow was expected. The
court found that there was a business purpose for the COLI arrangements, i.e., to
provide retiree benefits. The premiums for the first three years were payable with
policy loans and the premiums for years four through seven were payable 90%
with partial [cash] withdrawals (from policies whose cash value had been
previously borrowed) and 10% with cash from the taxpayer. Judge Lawson found
that the partial withdrawals were "shams in fact" because there was no cash value
left in the policies to borrow, but that the § 264(c)(1) test was met because of the
payments of 10% of the premiums by taxpayer with its own cash in years four
through seven. The court found that the § 264(c)(1) safe harbor did not require
level premiums over the first seven years and that the "premium" for each of years
four to seven was the 10% paid in cash. Judge Lawson found that Reg. § 1.264-
4(c)(1)(ii) (which required level premiums) was invalid, and he rejected the holding
in both CM Holdings and AEP that the four-out-of-seven test required level
premiums.
0 In finding that taxpayer expected a
positive pre-tax cash flow, Judge Lawson refused to admit into evidence a
statement in taxpayer's protest that could have led to a contrary conclusion on the
ground that Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that statements
made during settlement negotiations are inadmissible at trial.
b. There's no harm in asking? Not from asking Judge
Lawson! Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 278 F.Supp.2d 844,92 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-6418, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,681 (E.D. Mich. 8/12/03). The government's
motion to amend the court's judgment was granted in part and denied in part, but
left intact the same judgment and basic result. Ironically, since the motion opened
up all findings of fact, Judge Lawson reversed his earlier finding that the partial
withdrawals in years four through seven were "shams in fact," thus making moot
the government's argument relating to the logical consequences of this earlier
finding, i.e., that taxpayer did not meet the four-of-seven test because it did not pay
the entire premium in each of years four through seven from its own funds.
c. The circuit to which Dow is appealable (Sixth Circuit)
holds for the government in a COLI case. American Electric Power Co. v.
United States, 326 F.3d 737,91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2060,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,416
(6th Cir. 4/28/03). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a the District Court
finding that taxpayer's COLI plan was an economic sham because it would lose a
substantial amount of money absent the policy-loan interest deductions. The court
declined to decide whether the dividends in years 4-7, generated by circular
cashless netting transactions, were factual shams.
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d. One of the costs of COLI in Texas is that the employer
does not have an insurable interest in ordinary employees. Mayo v. Hartford
Life Insurance Co., 354 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 1/5/04). Wal-Mart employee's estate
sued Wal-Mart on the claim that the life insurance policy on the employee's life
was void on the ground that it violated the Texas insurable interest doctrine. In
such a case, Texas law applies the equitable remedy of constructive trust to enable
recovery by the lawful beneficiary of the proceeds unlawfully procured by a named
beneficiary that lacks an insurable interest. The district court concluded that the
policy was void because Wal-Mart lacked a sufficient financial interest in the lives
of its rank-and-file employees.
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
1. Notice 2003-22, 2003-18 I.R.B. 851 (4/4/03). This notice
addresses an abusive arrangement designed to evade income and employment
taxes on compensation income through the use of unrelated conduit domestic and
foreign employee leasing companies. The arrangements are "listed transactions."
See VIII.D., below for a more complete description.
2. Temporary and proposed Son-of-Boss regulations. T.D. 9062,
Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37414 (6/24/03); REG-106736-00,
Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37434 (6/24/03). The Treasury
Department has promulgated Temporary regulations and published proposed
regulations regarding a partnership's assumption of a partner's liabilities in a
transaction substantially similar to the Son-of-Boss transactions described in Notice
2000-44. These regulations prevent taxpayers from relying on the exceptions in §
358(h)(2)(B) [for transfers of the trade or business with which the liability is
associated is, or substantially all of the assets with which the liability is associated
are, transferred to the partnership assuming the liability], which were intended to
exclude ordinary business transactions from the application of § 358(h), and were
not intended to allow taxpayers to engage in transactions that create noneconomic
tax losses.
3. Lease strips are made a listed transaction. Notice 2003-55,
2003-34 I.R.B. 395 (7/21/03), superseding Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 354. The
IRS has concluded - based upon its victories in Andantech LL.C. v.
Commissioner, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and Nicole Rose Corp. v.
Commissioner, 320 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2002) - that lease strips improperly separate
income from related deductions. The notice also states that the IRS may challenge
lease strips on other grounds, including (1) assignments or accelerations of future
payments as fmancings, (2) lack of a valid partnership, and (3) judicial doctrines
such as lack of business purpose, step transaction, sham, etc.
a. But not on § 482 grounds. Rev. Rul. 2003-96, 2003-34
I.R.B. 386 (7/21/03). The IRS has concluded the inapplicability of the § 482
rationale of Notice 95-53 because an agreement between unrelated parties to
arbitrarily shift income or deductions "does not by itself evidence the type of
control necessary to satisfy [§ 482]."
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4. Restates and updates the list of 24 transactions determined by
the IRS to be "listed transactions." Notice 2003-76, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1181
(11/7/03), supplementing and superseding Notice 2001-51, 2001-34 I.R.B. 190
(8/3/0 1). The IRS has identified 24 listed transactions for purposes of Reg. §§
1.6011-4(b)(2) and 301.6111-2(b)(2). As restated andupdated, thelist includes: (1)
Rev. Rul. 90-105, 1990-2 C.B. 69, transactions (deductions for contributions to
certain pension plans attributable to future year's compensation); (2) Notice 95-34,
1995-1 C.B. 309, certain trust arrangements (purported multiple employer welfare
benefit funds); (3) Notice 98-5, 1998-1 C.B. 334, transactions in which the
expected economic profit is insubstantial in comparison to the value of the
expected FTCs; (4) ASA Investerings-type and ACM-type transactions; (5) Prop.
Reg. § 1.643(a)-8 transactions involving distributions from charitable remainder
trusts; (6) Notice 99-59, 1999-2 C.B. 761, transactions involvingthe distribution
of encumbered property in which taxpayers claim tax losses for capital outlays that
they have in fact recovered (the PwC so-called BOSS tax shelter); (7) Reg. §
1.7701(1)-3 fast-pay arrangements; (8) Rev. Rul. 2000-12, 2000-11 I.R.B. 744,
certain transactions involving the acquisition of two debt instruments the values of
which are expected to change significantly at about the same time in opposite
directions; (9) Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255, transactions generatinglosses
resulting from artificially inflatingthe basis ofpartnership interests (the KPMG so-
called BLIPS' tax shelter); (10) Notice 2000-60,2000-49 I.R.B. 568, transactions
involving the purchase of a parent corporation's stock by a subsidiary, a subsequent
transfer of the purchased parent stock from the subsidiary to the parent's
employees, and the eventual liquidation or sale of the subsidiary; (11) Notice 2000-
61, 2000-49 I.R.B. 569, transactions purporting to apply § 935 to Guamanian
trusts; (12) Notice 2001-16, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730, intermediary sales transactions;
(13) Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730, contingent liability § 351 transfer
transactions; (14) Notice 2001-45, 2001-33 I.R.B. 129, certain redemptions of
stock in transactions not subject to U.S. tax in which the basis of the redeemed
stockpurports to shift to a U.S. taxpayer; (15) Notice 2002-21, 2002-1 C.B. 730,
transactions involving the use of a loan assumption agreement to inflate basis in
assets acquired from another party in order to claim losses; (16) Notice 2002-35,
2002-1 C.B. 992, transactions involving the use of a notional principal contract to
claim current deductions for periodic payments made by a taxpayer while
disregarding the accrual of a right to receive offsetting future payments; (17)
Notice 2002-50, 2002-2 C.B. 98, transactions involving the use of a straddle, a
tiered partnership structure, a transitory partner and the absence of a § 754 election
to claim a permanent non-economic loss, and similar transactions identified in
Notice 2002-65,2002-2 C.B. 690, andNotice 2003-54,2003-33 I.R.B. 363; (18)
Rev. Ru12002-69,2002-2 C.B. 760, modifying and superseding Rev. Rul. 99-14,
1999-1 C.B. 835, lease-in/lease-out [LILO] transactions); (19) Notice 2002-70,
2002-2 C.B. 765, transactions involving reinsurance. arrangements between a
taxpayer and the taxpayer's own reinsurance company; (20) Rev. Rul. 2003-6,
2003-3 I.R.B. 286, arrangements involving the transfer of ESOPs that hold stock
in an S corporation for the purpose of claiming eligibility for the delayed effective
date of § 409(p); (21) Notice 2003-22,2003-18 I.R.B. 851, arrangements involving
foreign leasing companies used to evade or avoid federal income and employment
taxes; (22) Notice 2003-24, 2003-18 I.R.B. 853, arrangements that purportedly
18. See 2003 TNT 112-12.
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qualify as collectively bargained welfare benefit funds excepted from the account
limits of §§ 419 and 419A; (23) Notice 2003-47, 2003-30 I.R.B. 132, transactions
involving compensatory stock options and related persons to avoid or evade federal
income and employment taxes; and (24) Notice 2003-55, 2003-34 I.R.B. 395,
modifying and superseding Notice 95-53, 1995-2 C.B. 334, transactions in which
one participant claims to realize rental income and another participant claims the
deductions related to that income (often referred to as "lease strips").
5. In less than a month after Notice 2003-76, here's another one!
Notice 2003-77, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1182 (11/19/03), clarified (12/1/03). Certain
contested liability trusts used improperly to attempt to accelerate deductions under
§ 461(f) are identified as "listed transactions." See I.D., above, for contested
liability trusts used for an attempted acceleration of deductions under § 461(f).
6. And, yet one more! Notice 2003-81, 2003-51 I.R.B. 1123
(12/4/03). This transaction involves the purchase by the taxpayer of offsetting
options on foreign currency (which are § 1256 contracts) [the "purchased options"]
and the receipt of premiums by the taxpayer for writing offsetting options on a
different foreign currency that has a very high positive correlation with the first
currency, but which is not traded through regulated futures contracts (which are not
§ 1256 contracts) [the "written options"]. The taxpayer assigns to a charity both (1)
the purchased option that has a loss (which is marked to market when it is assigned
to the charity and recognized by the taxpayer) and (2) the offsetting written option
that has a gain (which is limited to the premium received for the option, and which
the taxpayer does not recognize).
7. S corporation stock owned by ESOPs that fail to provide
benefits to rank-and-t'de employees. Rev. Rul. 2003-4, 2004-6 I.R.B. 414
(1/23/04). Ownership structures of S corporations designed to allow taxpayers to
take advantage of the tax-exempt status of the S corporation that results from the
ownership of its outstanding stock by the ESOP but which result in the ESOP not
providing benefits to rank-and-file employees will cause the S corporation income
to be taxed to the person who earned it. Transactions that are the same or
substantially similar to the following transaction are identified as "listed
transactions." These are transactions in which (i) at least 50 percent of the
outstanding shares of an S corporation are employer securities held by an ESOP,
(ii) the profits of the S corporation generated by the business activities of a specific
individual are accumulated and held for the benefit of that individual in a QSub or
similar entity, (iii) these profits are not paid to the individual as compensation
within 2-1/2 months after the end of the year in which earned, and (iv) the
individual has rights to acquire shares of stock of the QSub or similar entity
representing 50 percent or more of the fair market value of the stock of such QSub
or similar entity.
8. Abusive Roth IRA transactions are listed transactions. Notice
2004-8, 2004-4 I.R.B. 333 (12/31/03). In these transactions a taxpayer who owns
a pre-existing business sells property from the business, such as accounts
receivable, for less than fair market value to a corporation owned by taxpayer's
Roth IRA. The Notice applies to any arrangement between the Roth IRA and the
taxpayer that has the effect of transferring value to the corporation owned by the
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Roth IRA that is comparable to a contribution to the Roth IRA that exceeds the
statutory limits on such contributions contained in § 408A.
9. SILO transactions. Interestingly enough, sale-in, lease-out
(SILO) deals [under which a tax-exempt or foreign entity sells property to the
taxpayer and leases it back, with the lessee depositing collateral in defeasance of
its obligation] were not made "listed transactions," although President Bush's
budget proposal seeks a legislative remedy for this widespread perceived abuse.
2004 TNT 19-3.
10. See I.D., above, for a "listed transaction" relating to contested
liability trusts and VII.D., below, for additional "listed transactions" aimed at
individuals.
C. Disclosure and Settlement
1. June 2002 temporary and proposed regulations. T.D. 9000,
Modification of Tax Shelter Rules 111, 67 F.R. 41324 and REG-1 10311-92,67
F.R. 41324 and 41362 (6/18/02). These temporary and proposed regulations
modify the disclosure, registration and list maintenance rules under § § 6011 (a),
6111 (d) and 6112 with respect to tax shelters.
* The new regulations extend the
requirement to disclose listed and other reportable transactions under Reg. §
1.6011-4T to individuals, trusts, partnerships, and S corporations that participate,
directly or indirectly, in listed transactions. Further, they clarify indirect
participation in a reportable transaction. A taxpayer indirectly participates in a
reportable transaction if the taxpayer knows or has reason to know that the tax
benefits claimed from the transaction are derived from a reportable transaction.
* The IRS notes that some taxpayers and
promoters have applied the "substantially similar" standard in Reg. §§ 1.6011-4T
and 301.6111-2T in an overly narrow manner to avoid disclosure, and the
regulations to clarify that the term "substantially similar" includes any transaction
that is expected to obtain the same or similar types of tax benefits and that is either
factually similar or based on the same or similar tax strategy. Further, the term
"substantially similar" must be broadly construed in favor of disclosure.
a. Additional guidance in October 2002. T.D. 9017, Tax
Shelter Disclosure Statements, 67 F.R. 64799, and REG-103735-00, Tax Shelter
Disclosure Statements, 67 F.R. 64840 (10/22/02). The IRS has promulgated
temporary and proposed regulations to provide additional guidance needed to
comply with the § 6011(a) disclosure rules. The regulations cover tax shelter
transactions involving income, estate, gift, employment, or exempt organizations
excise taxes. They revise the categories of transactions that must be disclosed on
returns: (1) listed transactions; (2) confidential transactions; (3) transactions with
contractual protection; (4) loss transactions above stated thresholds; (5) transactions
with a significant book-tax difference; and (6) transactions involving a less-than-
45-day holding period that result in a tax credit exceeding $250,000. These
temporary regulations are effective 1/1/03.
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(1) T.D. 9018 and REG-103736-00,
Requirement to Maintain a List of Investors in Potentially Abusive Tax Shelters,
67 F.R. 64807 and 64842 (10/22/02). The IRS has promulgated conforming
temporary and proposed regulations, which modify the list maintenance
requirements under § 6112.
2. February 2003 final regulations. T.D. 9046, Tax Shelter
Regulations, 68 F.R. 10161 (2/28/03). This Treasury decision modifies and
finalizes the rules relating to tax shelter disclosure statements to be filed with tax
returns under § 6011(a), as well as the rules relating to the registration of
confidential corporate tax shelters under § 6111(d) and the resulting list
maintenance requirements under § 6112. The amendments retain the six disclosure
categories contained in the October 2002 temporary regulations, see L.a., above,
with the following modifications: (1) they delete the clarification that a claim of
privilege does not cause a transaction to be confidential because a privilege does
not restrict the taxpayer's ability to disclose the tax treatment or tax structure of the
transaction; (2) they change the focus to provide that this refers to refunds of fees
to be received back from a person who stated what the tax consequences of the
transaction would be, or from the person on whose behalf the statement was made;
(3) a list of the loss which need not be taken into account for reporting is contained
in Rev. Proc. 2003-24, 2003-11 I.R.B. 599 (3/17/03); (4) a list of the transactions
with significant book-tax difference which need not be taken into account for
reporting is contained in Rev. Proc. 2003-25, 2003-11 I.R.B. 601 (3/17/03).
0 Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)(iii) contains a
presumption relating to whether a transaction is confidential:
Presumption. Unless the facts and circumstances indicate
otherwise, a transaction is not considered offered to a taxpayer
under conditions of confidentiality if every person who makes or
provides a statement, oral or written, to the taxpayer (or for
whose benefit a statement is made or provided to the taxpayer) as
to the potential tax consequences that may result from the
transaction, provides express written authorization to the taxpayer
in substantially the following form: "the taxpayer (and each
employee, representative, or other agent of the taxpayer) may
disclose to any and all persons, without limitation of any kind, the
tax treatment and tax structure of the transaction and all materials
of any kind (including opinions or other tax analyses) that are
provided to the taxpayer relating to such tax treatment and tax
structure." Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of this
section, this presumption is available only in cases in which each
written authorization permits the taxpayer to disclose the tax
treatment and tax structure of the transaction immediately upon
commencement of discussions with the person providing the
authorization and each written authorization is given no later than
30 days from the day the person providing the written
authorization first makes or provides a statement to the taxpayer
regarding the tax consequences of the transaction. A transaction
that is claimed to be exclusive or proprietary to any party other
than the taxpayer will not be considered a confidential transaction
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under this paragraph (b)(3) if written authorization to disclose is
provided to the taxpayer in accordance with this paragraph
(b)(3)(iii) and the transaction is not otherwise confidential.
0 These regulations are effective for
transactions entered into on or after 2/28/03, except that taxpayers may elect to
apply them for transactions entered into on or after 1/1/03.
a. Rules on disclosure of confidential transactions are
clarified. T.D. 9108, Confidential Transactions, 68 F.R. 75128 (12/30/03). Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(3) provides that certain confidential transactions are reportable
transactions that are subject to the disclosure rules under § 1.6011-4 and the list
maintenance rules under § 301.6112-1. Under the February 2003 regulations, a
confidential transaction is a transaction that is offered under conditions of
confidentiality. (The February 2003 regulations also provided that there was a
presumption of non-confidentiality if the taxpayer receives written authorization
to disclose the tax treatment and tax structure of the transaction.)
* Under these amended final regulations,
the confidentiality filter is limited to situations in which an advisor is paid a large
fee and imposes a limitation on disclosure that protects the confidentiality of the
advisor's tax strategies.
* Transactions in which confidentiality is
imposed by a party to the transaction acting in such capacity will no longer be
reportable. Further, the exceptions and presumption language have been removed
because they no longer are necessary under this narrower rule.
* Effective 12/29/03.
3. Warm-up the photocopier for those tax accrual workpapers.
Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (7/8/02). In auditing returns filed after
7/1/02 that claim any tax benefits from a "listed transaction," see Notice 2001-51,
2001-34 I.R.B. 190, the IRS may request tax accrual workpapers. Listed
transactions will be determined "at the time of the request." Neither the attorney
client privilege nor the § 7525 tax practitioner privilege protects the confidentiality
of the workpapers.
a. Specific procedures regarding requests for tax accrual
workpapers. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-012 (4/9/03). Procedures to be used
regarding requests for tax accrual and other financial audit workpapers.
4. "The IRS and Treasury believe that taxpayers have
improperly relied on opinions or advice issued by tax advisors to establish
reasonable cause and good faith as a basis for avoiding the accuracy-related
penalty." REG-126016-01, Establishing Defenses to the Imposition of the
Accuracy-Related Penalty, 67 F.R. 79894 (12/31/02). The Treasury Department
has published proposed amendments to the regulations under §§ 6662 and 6664
[Regs. §§ 1.6662-3; 1.6664-4] to limit the available defenses to an accuracy-related
penalty when a taxpayer (1) fails to disclose a reportable transaction or (2) fails to
disclose that it has taken a position on a return based upon a regulation being
invalid. Under the proposed amendments, a taxpayer who takes a position that a
regulation is invalid cannot rely on an opinion or advice to satisfy the reasonable
cause and good faith exception under § 6664(c) with respect to that position unless
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the position was disclosed on a return (including disclosing the position that the
regulation in question is invalid). A taxpayer who engages in a reportable
transaction [See Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T] cannot rely on an opinion or advice to
satisfy the reasonable cause and good faith exception under § 6664(c) with respect
to the transaction unless the transaction was disclosed pursuant to the § 6011
regulations. Finally, a taxpayer who engages in a reportable transaction cannot rely
on the realistic possibility standard under § 6662 to avoid the accuracy-related
penalty for negligence or disregard of rules or regulations if the position regarding
the reportable transaction is contrary to a revenue ruling or notice. When finalized,
the amendments will apply to returns filed after 12/30/02, with respect to
transactions entered into after 12/31/02.
0 But be careful about over-reliance on
effective dates. The preamble states:
The IRS, however, cautions taxpayers and tax practitioners that
it will rigorously apply the existing facts and circumstances
standard under § 1.6664-4(c) regarding a taxpayer's reasonable
reliance in good faith on advice from a tax professional, as well
as the other provisions of the regulations under sections 6662 and
6664, including § 1.6664-4(c) relating to special rules for the
substantial understatement penalty attributable to tax shelter items
of a corporation. In addition to the modifications contained in
these proposed regulations, and regardless of when a transaction
was entered into, the IRS, in appropriate circumstances, may
consider a taxpayer's failure to disclose a reportable transaction
or failure to disclose a position that a regulation is invalid as a
factor in determining whether the taxpayer has satisfied the
reasonable cause and good faith exception under section 6664(c)
to the accuracy-related penalty.
a. Regulations are now final. T.D. 9109, Establishing
Defenses to the Imposition of the Accuracy-Related Penalty, 68 F.R. 75126
(12/30/03). The key provision is as follows:
§ 1.6664-4 -- Reasonable cause and good faith exception to section 6662
penalties.
• .c) Reliance on opinion or advice -(1) Facts and
circumstances; minimum requirements. All facts and
circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether
a taxpayer has reasonably relied in good faith on advice
(including the opinion of a professional tax advisor) as to the
treatment of the taxpayer (or any entity, plan, or arrangement)
under Federal tax law. For example, the taxpayer's education,
sophistication and business experience will be relevant in
determining whether the taxpayer's reliance on tax advice was
reasonable and made in good faith. In no event will a taxpayer be
considered to have reasonably relied in good faith on advice
(including an opinion) unless the requirements of this paragraph
(c)(1) are satisfied. The fact that these requirements are satisfied,
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however, will not necessarily establish that the taxpayer
reasonably relied on the advice (including the opinion of a tax
advisor) in good faith. For example, reliance may not be
reasonable or in good faith if the taxpayer knew, or reasonably
should have known, that the advisor lacked knowledge in the
relevant aspects of Federal tax law. . . In addition, the
requirements of this paragraph (c)(1) are not satisfied if the
taxpayer fails to disclose a fact that it knows, or reasonably
should know, to be relevant to the proper tax treatment of an
item.
(iii) Reliance on the invalidity of a regulation. A taxpayer may
not rely on an opinion or advice that a regulation is invalid to
establish that the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and good
faith unless the taxpayer adequately disclosed, in accordance with
§ 1.6662-3(c)(2), the position that the regulation in question is
invalid.
b. Penalty Policy Statement issued by Commissioner
Mark W. Everson goes beyond the regulations to provide that taxpayers may
not rely on the advice of a "conflicted" tax advisor. Penalty Policy Statement
issued by Commissioner Mark W. Everson to the LMSB and SB/SE
Commissioners, 2003 TNT 249-9 (12/30/03). This document instructs IRS
employees that taxpayers may not rely on the advice of a tax advisor who has a
financial arrangement or referral agreement with a tax shelter promoter because his
independent judgment is compromised. Moreover, the IRS will question the
reasonableness and good faith of taxpayers who know or have reason to know that
the tax advisor is not independent, and will not accept taxpayer reliance on an
opinion from a non-independent tax advisor as proof of "reasonable cause and
good faith." See, § 6664(c).
5. Proposed revisions to Circular 230 related to tax shelters
require disclosures in tax shelter opinions of relationship between practitioner
and promoter, etc. REG-122379-02, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 68 F.R. 75186 (12/30/03). New proposed amendments
to circular 230 differ from the 1/12/01 proposed amendments in several ways: (1)
§ 10.33 prescribes best practices for all tax advisors; (2) § 10.35 combines and
modifies the standards applicable to "marketed" and "more likely than not" tax
shelter opinions from former §§ 10.33 and 10.35; (3) § 10.36 contains the revised
procedures for ensuring compliance with §§ 10.33 and 10.35; and (4) new § 10.37
contains provisions relating to advisory committees to the Office of Professional
Responsibility.
0 Under § 10.33 "best practices" include:
(1) communicating clearly with the client regarding the terms of the engagement
and the form and scope of the advice or assistance to be rendered; (2) establishing
the relevant facts, including evaluating the reasonableness of any assumptions or
representations; (3) relating applicable law, including potentially applicablejudicial
doctrines, to the relevant facts; (4) arriving at a conclusion supported by the law
and the facts; (5) advising the client regarding the import of the conclusions
reached; and (6) acting fairly and with integrity in practice before the IRS.
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0 Tax shelter opinions covered by § 10.35
are more-likely-than-not and marketed tax shelter opinions; they, however, do not
include preliminary advice provided pursuant to an engagement in which the
practitioner is expected subsequently to provide an opinion that satisfies § 10.35.
The definition of "tax shelter," tracking the one found in § 6662 which was
contained in the 2001 proposed regulations, remains the same. The requirements
for tax shelter opinions include: (1) identifying and considering all relevant facts
and not relying on any unreasonable factual assumptions or representations; (2)
relating the applicable law to the relevant facts in a reasonable manner; (3)
considering all material Federal tax issues and reaching a conclusion supported by
the facts and the law with respect to each issue; and (4) providing an overall
conclusion as to the Federal tax treatment of each tax shelter item, and the reasons
for that conclusion and providing an overall conclusion as to the Federal tax
treatment of each tax shelter item and the reasons for that conclusion.
* Under § 10.35(d), a practitioner must
disclose any compensation arrangement he may have with any person (other than
the client for whom the opinion is prepared) with respect to the tax shelter
discussed in the opinion, as well as any other referral arrangement relating thereto.
The practitioner must also disclose that a marketed opinion may not be sufficient
for a taxpayer to use for the purpose of avoiding penalties under § 6662(d), and
must also state that taxpayers should seek advice from their own tax advisors. A
limited scope opinion must also disclose that additional issues may exist and that
the opinion cannot be used for penalty-avoidance purposes.
* Under § 10.36 procedures to ensure
compliance are required to be followed by tax advisors with responsibility for
overseeing a firm's practice before the IRS. These include ensuring that the firm
has adequate procedures in effect for purposes of complying with § 10.35.
* Under § 10.37 the Director of the Office
of Professional Responsibility is authorized to establish advisory committees to
review and make recommendations regarding professional standards or best
practices for tax advisors. They may also, more particularly, advise the Director
whether a practitioner may have violated §§ 10.35 or 10.36.
a. Here comes Cono! Treasury and IRS announced the
appointment of Caplin & Drysdale partner Cono R. Namorato as director of the
IRS's Office of Professional Responsibility on 12/29/03. 2003 TNT 249-1.
D. Individual Tax Shelters
1. Government misconduct amounting to fraud does not require
a showing of prejudice to justify relief. Tax shelter investors entitled to the
same deal received by the taxpayers who cooperated with the government.
Dixon v. Commissioner, 316 F.3d 1041, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-569, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,194 (9th Cir. 1/17/03), remanding T.C. Memo. 2000-116 and T.C.
Memo. 1999-101. The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court finding that
misconduct by IRS attorneys during the trial of test cases [secretly allowing the
deduction of attorney's fees in exchange for taxpayer cooperation] constituted
harmless error. The tax shelter was one designed and administered by Honolulu
businessman Henry Kersting, in which participants purchased stock with loans
from entities financed by two layers of promissory notes, resulting in their claiming
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interest deductions on their individual returns. Judge Hawkins held that the
taxpayers demonstrated fraud by the IRS attorneys and that a demonstration of
prejudice was unnecessary. The Tax Court was directed to enter judgment in favor
of taxpayers on terms equivalent to the secret settlement agreements entered into
with the test case taxpayers who cooperated with the government.
a. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-008 (2/3/03). This notice
reminds Chief Counsel attorneys of their obligation to adhere to the highest ethical
standards in all aspects of their responsibilities, including representation of the
Commissioner before the Tax Court. ABA Model Rules 3.3 [candor to tribunals],
3.4 [fairness to opposing party and counsel], 4.1 [truthfulness in statements to third
persons], and 8.4 [misconduct] were discussed in the notice.
2. Faux foreign. Notice 2003-22,2003-18 I.R.B. 851 (4/4/03). This
notice addresses an abusive arrangement designed to evade income and
employment taxes on compensation income through the use of unrelated conduit
domestic and foreign employee leasing companies. The taxpayer purports to
terminate his employment relationship with his employer, to enter unto an
employment relationship with a foreign employee leasing corporation, which leases
the employee to a domestic employee leasing corporation, which it turn leases the
employee to his original employer. Domestic leasing pays taxpayer substantially
less than the original employer and remits the balance (less a fee) to the foreign
company, which (1) claims treaty benefits resulting in no US tax because it has no
effectively connected income, and (2) effectively sets-aside the funds for the
taxpayer's benefit. The IRS will challenge these (and similar) arrangements on a
variety of theories, and will impose penalties. The arrangements are "listed
transactions."
3. Sale of nonqualified stock option to related person is a listed
transaction. Arrangements heavily promoted to executives to defer the tax on
the option gain by selling the option to a related person for a long-term
unsecured note, and claiming that the option gain is not taxable until
payments are made on the note.
a. The IRS attacks the E&Y, inter alia, nonstatutory
stock option deferral shelter, Act I. Notice 2003-47,2003-30 I.R.B. 132 (7/1/03).
Transactions involving the transfer of nonstatutory stock options to a related person
in exchange for a long-term, unsecured deferred payment obligation are not arm's
length transactions for purposes of Reg. § 1.83-7. The receipt of the deferred
payment obligation will not result in a deferral of the recognition of income arising
from the transfer. "[T]he IRS will argue that the option recipient recognizes income
to the extent that the amount of the deferred payment obligation transferred to the
option recipient, plus any cash or other property received by the individual,
exceeds the amount, if any, the option recipient paid for the option." The
transactions (and any substantially similar transactions) are "listed transactions" for
purposes of Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(2), 301.6111-2(b)(2), and 301.6112-1(b)(2).
b. Act H: The IRS hammers the nonstatutory stock
option deferral shelter. T.D. 9067, Transfers of Compensatory Options, 68 F.R.
39453 (7/2/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.83-7T provides that a sale or other disposition of
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a nonstatutory stock option to a related person will not be treated as a transaction
that closes the application of § 83 with respect to the option. A person is related to
the service provider if: (1) the person and the service provider bear a relationship
to each other that is specified in § 267(b) or § 707(b)(1), modified to replace "50
percent" with "20 percent" and to treat the spouse of any family member as a
family member for purposes of constructive stock ownership under § 267(c)(4), or
(2) the service provider and the person are engaged in trades or businesses under
common control (as defined in § 52(a) and (b)), excepting the service recipient
with respect to the option or the grantor of the option. The effective date is 7/2/03.
IX. ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. HMOs are not tax exempt. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 325 F.3d 1188, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1767, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,368 (10th Cir. 4/9/03), affg T.C. Memo. 2001-246. The Commissioner denied
the HMOs' requests for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3), and this decision was
affirmed by the Tax Court and by the Tenth Circuit on appeal. Judge Tacha held
that the HMOs did not operate primarily for the purpose of promoting health for
the benefit of the community - even though they covered fifty percent of Utah's
total Medicaid population and twenty percent of Utah's total population - because
providing health care services to all in the community in exchange for a fee is not
sufficient for charitable tax exemption. The organization must provide some
additional "plus," such as (1) providing free or below-cost services, (2) maintaining
an emergency room open to all regardless of ability to pay, or (3) devoting
surpluses to research, education and medical training. In the absence of any
"positive externalities," or "public goods," or "additional community or public
benefits" - however this "plus" is denominated - the HMOs do not provide a
community benefit in order to be charitable organizations exempt from taxation
under § 501(c)(3).
* Additionally, the HMOs do not qualify
for exemption as an "integral part" of IHC Health Services, Inc., a related §
501 (c)(3) organization that operates hospitals and provides charitable care, because
"separately incorporated entities must qualify for tax exemption on their own
merits," following and quoting Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d
494,498 (3d Cir. 1994).
2. Joint venture did not result in loss of tax exemption for
charity hospital despite its failure to meet the criteria of Revenue Ruling 98-
15. St. David's Health Care System v. United States, 89 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-2998,
2002-1 U.S.T.C. 50,452 (W.D. Tex. 617/02). Summary judgment was granted to
a community-owned, not-for-profit hospital on its tax-exempt status. The hospital's
entering into a limited partnership with HCA, Inc. [a for-profit health care
company], in which it had general and limited partnership interests of 49.5 percent
and in which the for-profit partner was the managing partner, did not result in
forfeiture of hospital's § 501(c)(3) exemption. The court held that the community
benefit standard did not absolutely require a community board, and that St. David's
satisfied this standard even though it appointed only half the board members where
the chairman's seat was reserved for a St. David's appointee. There was language
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in the partnership agreement requiring all the partnership's hospitals to operate in
accordance with the community benefit standard outline in Rev. Rul. 69-45, 1969-2
C.B. 117, and St. David's could unilaterally dissolve the partnership if they failed
to do so.
* Query whether Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1
C.B. 718, which provides an example of an acceptable joint venture in which the
nonprofit partner has numerical control of the board, will still be considered valid.
See also, Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), affid
per curiam, 242 F.3d 904, 87 AFTR2d 2001-642,2001-1 U.S.T.C. 50,271 (9th
Cir. 2001).
a. Litigation costs were ordered. St. David's Health Care
System v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-6878, 2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,745
(W.D. Tex. 9/20/02). The district court ordered the United States to pay $951,000
in litigation costs under § 7430 to St. David's. Judge Nowlin held that novelty of
the issues did not necessarily mean that any position that the government took was
reasonable, concluding,
Finally, the United States argues that, since this case involved
novel issues, it is more likely that its position was substantially
justified. While it is true that some of the specific issues had a
hint of novelty to them, that does not mean that any position
taken on those issues is reasonable. To the extent that there were
novel issues in this case, settled law clearly applied and disposed
of those issues.
b. Fifth Circuit vacates the district court's summary
judgment ruling and its award of attorney's fees, and remands for trial.
Exempt organization must have control of joint venture. St. David's Health
Care System v. United States, 349 F.3d 232, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6865, 2003-2
U.S.T.C. 50, 713 (5th Cir. 11/7/03). In vacating the district court decision, Judge
Garza's opinion relied upon Rev. Rul. 98-15 and found that the central issue was
not whether the partnership between St. David's and Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corporation provided some charitable services, but rather whether the activities
substantially further the profits-seeking interests of the for-profit partner. The
opinion further analyzed facts that showed it was likely that St. David's had, as a
practical matter, ceded control over the partnership to HCA - particularly with
respect to a noncompete provision in the partnership dissolution rights, which
would have prevented either party from competing in the Austin area for two years
and would have been inconvenient for HCA but disastrous for St. David's.
B. Charitable Giving
1. Professor donates his patent to the university, but . . .
Contributions of partial interests in patents aren't deductible. Rev. Rul. 2003-
28, 2003-11 I.R.B. 594 (2/26/03). No deduction is allowed under § 170 for a
charitable contribution of (1) a license to use a patent, if the taxpayer retains any
substantial right in the patent [e.g., a right to license to others], or (2) a patent
subject to a conditional reversion [e.g., a contribution of a patent to a university
subject to a reversion if a particular faculty member ceases to be a member of the
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faculty within 15 years], unless the likelihood of the reversion is so remote as to be
negligible. Both of these transfers are transfers of partial interests, a deduction for
which is disallowed by § 170(f)(3). A § 170 deduction is allowable for a charitable
contribution of a patent subject to a license or transfer restriction generally [e.g., a
restriction of transfer or licensing for 3 years], but the restriction reduces what
would otherwise be the value of the patent.
X. TAX PROCEDURE
A. Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1. This false W-2 resulted in a felony rather than a
misdemeanor. United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163,91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-330,
2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,162 (3d Cir. 1/3/03). An employer who files fraudulent W-2s
for the purpose of evading employment taxes and income tax withholding, and
who encourages employees to file fraudulent returns consistent with the W-2s, can
be convicted of a felony under § 7206(2). The exclusivity of § 7204, which makes
filing a false or fraudulent W-2 a misdemeanor in lieu of any other crime is limited
to instances in which the only action taken is "merely furnish[ing] false W-2s."
Conduct involving the furnishing of false W-2s, but not limited to filing false W-
2s, such as encouraging employees to file false returns, can be prosecuted under §
7206(2).
2. IRS announces an amnesty for offshore credit-card abusers
who clear up their tax liabilities by April 15th 2003. IRS News Release IR-
2003-5,2003 TNT 10-11 (1/14/03). An Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative
provides that "eligible taxpayers," who used offshore payment cards or other
offshore financial arrangements to hide their income, may avoid civil fraud and
information return penalties [but not failure to pay tax or accuracy-related
penalties] if they come forward and pay up by 4/15/03 and provide full details on
those who promoted or solicited the offshore scheme. Promoters and solicitors are
not eligible. The information release contains the following example:
For example, a taxpayer who understated his income to avoid $
100,000 in taxes in 1999 would wind up paying $ 149,319 to the
government. This includes the tax liability plus $ 29,319 in
interest and an additional accuracy-related penalty of $ 20,000.
a. Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-4 I.R.B. 311 (1/14/03). This
revenue procedure contains detailed procedures for the Offshore Voluntary
Compliance Initiative, including as an exhibit the "specific matters closing
agreement" to be executed by the taxpayer.
3. Rev. Rul. 2003-23, 2003-8 I.R.B. 511 (2/24/03). An individual
who files a late return for the preceding taxable year and pays as required the
installments properly based upon the tax shown on that return, will not be liable for
the § 6654(a) addition to tax for an underpayment of estimated tax for the current
taxable year. The § 6654(d)(1)(B)(ii) safe harbor does not require a timely return.
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4. The IRS foot-faulted on preparing a tax protestor's substitute
return and lost the failure to pay penalty, but salvages a frivolous position
penalty. Cabirac v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 163 (4/22/03). The taxpayer filed
income tax return forms with zeros on the relevant lines for computing tax liability.
The IRS prepared unsubscribed substitute returns showing zeros, and sent a
deficiency notice based on a calculation of taxable income and tax shown in a
revenue agent's report, which had not been attached to the substitute returns. The
Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the taxpayer was liable for the § 6651 (a)(1)
failure to file penalty, but not for the § 6651 (a)(2) failure to pay penalty. The
unsubscribed substitute returns showing zero taxes did not meet the requirements
for a § 6020(b) return, and the subsequently prepared notice of proposed
adjustments and the revenue agent's report, which were not attached to the
unsubscribed substitutes for return, whether viewed separately or in conjunction
with the substitute return, were not an adequate § 6020(b) return. However, a
$2,000 § 6673(a)(1) frivolous position penalty was assessed.
5. The Tax Court just says "no" to impermissible stacking of
penalties. Said v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-148 (5/22/03). Where one
spouse is liable for the civil fraud penalty on the entire underpayment relating to
a joint return, the § 6662 accuracy related penalty cannot be assessed against the
other spouse with respect to any part of the understatement.
6. Hot dog! No hot interest here. Med James, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. 147 (9/9/03). Section 6621(c) increases the interest on
corporate deficiencies to 5 percent above the short-term Federal rate [instead of the
normal 3 percent] if the deficiency exceeds $100,000. The Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) held that the increased ["hot"] interest under § 6621(c) does not apply
where an NOL that arose in a year before the deficiency notice was sent is carried
back to reduce the deficiency, which otherwise would have exceeded $100,000, to
less than $100,000.
7. Mendes v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 308 (12/11/03) (reviewed, 3
dissents). In an opinion by Judge Halpern, the majority held that a late return filed
after a deficiency notice has been issued is not taken into account in determining
whether the addition to tax for underpayment of estimated taxes is avoided under
§ 6654(d)(1)(B) even if the return shows that the tax due for the year was zero. The
penalty can be collected pursuant to deficiency notice on underlying tax liability.
Judge Foley (joined by Judges Laro and Marvel) dissented on the grounds that the
literal requirements of § 6654(d)(1)(B) had been met by the late filed return, and
that the proper question was whether the late filed return was indeed a valid return,
i.e., was it merely an attempt to avoid the penalty without an honest and reasonable
attempt to comply with the requirements for a return.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. The PwC deal. IR-2002-82 (6/27/02). The IRS announced in a
news release that it cut a deal with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to resolve tax
shelter registration and list maintenance issues. The IRS news release, which is
similar to one issued last August regarding Merrill Lynch, says that "without
admitting or denying liability, PwC has agreed to make a 'substantial payment' to
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the IRS to resolve issues in connection with advice rendered to clients dating back
to 1995." Under the agreement, PwC will provide to the IRS certain client
information in response to summonses. According to the release, PwC also will
"work with the IRS to develop processes to ensure ongoing compliance with [the
shelter registration and investor list maintenance requirements]."
a. The EY deal. IR-2003-84 (7/2/03). TheIRS announced
in a news release that it has settled Ernst & Young's potential liability under the tax
shelter registration and list maintenance penalty provisions for a nondeductible
payment of $15 million.
b. The KPMG deal. Rumored, but not here yet.19
2. Does the crime/fraud exceptionto the attorney client privilege
defeat privilege claim? United States v. BDO Seidman, 225 F.Supp.2d 918, 90
A.F.T.R. 2d 2002-6810,2002-2 U.S.T.C. 50,763 (N.D. Ill. 10/10/02). Documents
for which accounting firm claimed § 7525 privilege were ordered to be produced
for magistrate's in camera review. In his opinion, Judge Shadur noted,
One last point has occurred to this Court - something that has not
been addressed by either of the parties. Suppose that some of the
documents for which BDO claims privilege could otherwise fit
within the standards governing the attorney-client privilege (and
hence the equivalent statutory accountant-client privilege), but
that they relate to the types of "abusive tax shelters" that have
triggered the congressional enactment at issue here. In that event,
would the utilization of such an "abusive tax shelter" by a
taxpayer to whom BDO has given advice as to its use create the
potential of criminal as well as civil liability on the taxpayer's
part? And if so, would that trigger the application of the crime-
fraud exception to the privilege?
a. Decision on whether proposed intervenors could claim
"identity" privilege under § 7525. United States v. BDO Seidman. 91
A.F.T.R12d 2003-1651, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,255 (N.D. Ill. 2/4/03). Judge
Holderman decided that there are four criteria as to whether client identity is
privileged on a document-by-document basis: (1) Whether the purpose of the
representation was to provide tax advice? [must be "yes" to be privileged]; (2)
whether revealing identity would reveal client's motives for seeking tax advice
[must be "yes"]; (3) whether the IRS could determine that clients participated in the
transactions without obtaining their names from BDO [must be "no']; and (4)
whether the document was generated for the purpose of preparing tax returns [must
be "no"]. Findings for each in camera document followed.
b. Affirmed. Seventh Circuit say tax shelter disclosure
rules virtually preclude assertions of identity privilege by tax shelter investors.
United States v. BDO Seidman. 337 F.3d 802,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5443,2003-2
U. S.T. C. 50,582 (7th Cir. 7/23/03). The Court ofAppeals (Judge Ripple) affirmed
19. As of February 22, 2004.
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the district court's determination that the investors failed to establish that a
confidential communication would be disclosed if their identities were revealed.
Disclosure of their identities would disclose to the IRS only that they had
participated in one of the tax shelters described in the summonses, but no
confidential communication could be inferred from that information alone. The
court distinguished In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Cherney), 898 F.2d 565 (7th
Cir. 1990); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965), as cases in which
"the Government already knew much about the substance of the communications
between the attorney and his unidentified client," from this case, where "the IRS
knows relatively little about the interactions between BDO and the [the investors],
the nature of their relationship, or the substance of their conversations."
Furthermore, none of the summonsed documents were subject to any other
independent claim of privilege beyond identity. Then, in sweeping language, the
court concluded that the tax shelter disclosure rules virtually preclude assertions of
identity privilege by tax shelter investors.
More fundamentally, the Does' participation in potentially
abusive tax shelters is information ordinarily subject to full
disclosure under the federal tax law .... Congress has determined
that tax shelters are subject to special scrutiny, and anyone who
organizes or sells an interest in tax shelters is required, pursuant
to I.R.C. § 6112, to maintain a list identifying each person to
whom such an interest was sold. This list-keeping provision
precludes the Does from establishing an expectation of
confidentiality in their communications with BDO, an essential
element of the attorney-client privilege and, by extension, the §
7525 privilege.... At the time that the Does communicated their
interest in participating in tax shelters that BDO organized or
sold, the Does should have known that BDO was obligated to
disclose the identity of clients engaging in such financial
transactions. Because the Does cannot credibly argue that they
expected that their participation in such transactions would not be
disclosed, they cannot now establish that the documents
responsive to the summonses, which do not contain any tax
advice, reveal a confidential communication....
BDO's affirmative duty to disclose its clients' participation in
potentially abusive tax shelters renders the Does' situation easily
distinguishable from the limited circumstances in which we have
determined that a client's identity was information subject to the
attorney-client privilege....
c. You don't have to be a criminal to claim identity
privilege in Chicago. United States v. Arthur Andersen. LLP, 273 F.Supp.2d 955,
92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5207, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50553 (N.D. Ill. 7/2/03). Investors
in tax shelters promoted by Arthur Andersen successfully intervened anonymously
and asserted identity privilege under § 7525 when the IRS sought to enforce an
administrative summons to obtain the lists of investors. The court (Judge Castillio)
rejected the government's argument [based on In re Grand Jury Proceeding
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(Cherney), 898 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1990); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th
Cir. 1965)] that identity privilege can exist only where the client has engaged in past
criminal conduct, and applied the four part test of United States v. BDO Seidman,
91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1016, 20031 U.S.T.C. 50,255 (N.D. Ill. 2/4/03). (N.D. Ill.
2003) [United States v. BDO Seidman, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5443 (7th Cir.
7/2/03)]. Judge Castillio concluded that "revealing the clients' identities would
reveal their motives for seeking tax advice [because] [t]he IRS is seeking
information, including the identities... in an effort to determine whether or not
Andersen was complying with the IRS regulations governing potentially abusive
tax shelters.... Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how revealing the
identities of the Poes and the Does could amount to anything less than a revelation
of their motivations in seeking Andersen's tax advice-to invest in potentially
abusive tax shelters. This motivation, the "very substantive reason that the client
sought.., advice in the first place," is confidential and therefore privileged under
§ 7525. Judge Castilio held further that Reg. § 301.6112-IT Q & A-1 7(b) provides
that the § 7525 privilege trumps the requirements of § 6112. Finally, he rejected the
government's argument that the crime-fraud exception to privilege applied because
there was no prima facia showing of a crime.
0 It would appear that the Seventh
Circuit's subsequent opinion in BDO Seidman, see above, overrules Judge
Castillio's opinion in Arthur Andersen, LLP.
d. And indeed it does! United States v. Arthur Andersen
LLP, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5800, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,624 (N.D. M. 8/15/03).
Judge Castillo characterizes BDO as providing that "it appears that the Seventh
Circuit intended in BDO to pronounce a generally applicable prohibition on the
assertion of the identity privilege in IRS summons enforcement actions that does
not seem altered by differing factual scenarios," and reluctantly holds that the
intervenors may not assert a § 7525 privilege in their identities.
3. Now here's a legitimate case of identity privilege. United States
v. Braun, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5406 (N.D. Cal. 6/17/03). The IRS was
investigating the civil tax liability of W at the same time that W and C were under
investigation by a local police force for grand theft. C was charged by the U.S.
government with structuring transactions to avoid reporting under 31 U.S.C. §
5324(a)(3). C was represented in the criminal matter by attorney A. C waived
attorney client privilege and the IRS obtained documents from attorney A that
identified attorney B as the source of payments of C's legal fees. The district court
refused to enforce an IRS summons against attorney B seeking the identity of his
client who had sought legal representation for C, because, based on information in
the attorney's sealed affidavit, the court found that the client had disclosed
confidential information to the attorney that would necessarily be revealed if the
client's identity were known.
4. Are you practicing law or practicing tax when you write that
opinion letter? United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F.Supp.2d 35, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-317, 2003-1 U.S.T.C 50,174 (D. D.C. 12/20/02). The IRS served
administrative summonses on KPMG in connection with investigating KPMG's
promotion and participation in tax shelters and sought judicial enforcement when
it determined that KPMG had not complied. KPMG withheld documents that
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would have been responsive to the summonses on grounds that the documents were
privileged, and KPMG provided the IRS with a privilege log of the withheld
documents. Citing United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983), for the
principle that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications
between a taxpayer and his attorney simply for the purpose of preparing a tax
return, the court held that the § 7525 privilege does not extend to communications
between a taxpayer and tax practitioner simply for the purpose of preparing a tax
return. The court then went on to hold that KPMG's tax opinion letters to its clients
were not privileged because they were prepared in connection with the preparation
of tax returns. Furthermore, memoranda of KPMG's employees' discussions with
clients' lawyers were not privileged because the communications were in
connection with tax return preparation. Somewhat contradictorily, however, the
court held that opinion letters prepared by law firms in connection with preparation
of tax returns were privileged if the taxpayer, rather than the accounting firm,
retained the lawyer.
0 The court also held that § 7525 did not
protect accountant work product. With respect to attorney work product, the court
articulated the following standard: "The burden of showing that the materials
prepared were in anticipation of litigation is on the party asserting the privilege,"
and "this burden entails a showing that the documents were prepared for the
purpose of assisting an attorney in preparing for litigation, and not for some other
reason." After an in camera review and comparison of a random sample of thirty
allegedly privileged documents and the corresponding entries in the privilege log
prepared in response to the summons, the court found that only four of the
privilege log entries were completely supportable; accordingly it referred the matter
to a special master to conduct an examination of the withheld documents, evaluate
the asserted privileges, and submit a report and recommendation.
a. A subsequent KPMG magistrate's opinion. United
States v. KPMG LLP, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6498, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,691 (D.
D.C. 10/8/03). KPMG's documents were reviewed by a special master, who found
some of them protected by attorney-client privilege and some by § 7525.
5. District court finds subject-matter waiver of privilege in all
communications between two corporations and their outside tax counsel by
reason of the assertion of a "reasonable cause" defense. In re: G-I Holdings Inc.,
218, F.R. 428, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6451, 2004-1 USTC 50,154 (D. N.J.
7/18/03). The court (Judge Bassler) refused to bifurcate discovery and trial on the
issue of penalties pending resolution of the substantive tax issues because the
debtors waived any attorney-client privilege with respect to their outside tax
counsel [Bill McKee and Will Nelson] by asserting a "reasonable cause" defense
that placed attorney-client communications at issue. The court further found that
the debtors' communications with Michael Baldasaro [an accountant then with
Arthur Andersen] are not privileged under United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1961), because he was hired as a consultant - his expertise in partnership
transactions taxation was too great to consider him as a "translator or facilitator."
6. Magistrate denies government's motion to compel discovery
of 63 documents, including some between taxpayer's in-house attorneys and
Deloitte & Touche. The Black & Decker Corp. v. Untied States, 219 F.R. 87, 92
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A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6426,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 1 50,659 (D. Md. 9/15/03). In the course
of the taxpayer's refund suit arising from a series of transactions involving special
purpose entities formed to manage employee health care benefits, the government
sought discovery of numerous documents prepared by Deloitte & Touche, which
taxpayer had retained to give advice regarding the transaction. First, certain
communications to taxpayer's in house counsel were not subject to attorney-client
privilege under the Kovel doctrine, because the accounting firm's advice was not
necessary to facilitate communications between the taxpayer's attorney and its non-
attorney officers. The evidence that many of the communications in question were
directed to non-attorney employees of the taxpayer supported this conclusion.
Furthermore, the documents were not "'translation' services' but were hybrid...
tax and business advice."
0 Taxpayer, with the assistance of Deloitte
& Touche, created special purpose entities to manage its employee and retiree
health care benefits and claimed a large capital loss, as well as a total federal tax
refund of about $57 million for the years 1995 through 2000. The taxpayer did
provide a "short opinion" from D&T, and subsequently offered to provide a "long
opinion" from D&Y on the transaction and refused to produce 63 other documents.
(The production of the "long opinion" was conditioned on an agreement that the
government would not assert that such disclosure does not constitute a subject
matter waiver, a condition the government refused.) After reviewing the documents
in camera, the magistrate held that the attorney-client privilege [in its derivative
form under United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961] was inapplicable
because D&T was not primarily providing "translation" services to assist the in-
house attorneys in rendering legal advice to the taxpayer, but was instead providing
tax and business advice to the taxpayer. However, the work product doctrine was
held to apply to the documents [53 of which were opinion work product and 10 of
which were fact work product], and there was no waiver of this protection by the
provision of the "short" opinion letter to the government.
* Nevertheless, the documents were
protected under the work product doctrine. The government conceded that the
documents had been prepared in anticipation of litigation, but argued that the
"privilege" for work product had been waived. The court held that the work
product doctrine can be waived where the party puts the work "in issue," but that
the work in question had not been put in issue. That the documents may have
related to an opinion letter on which the taxpayer was going to rely in an effort to
avoid penalties - and with respect to which the taxpayer thus waived privilege -
did not result in waiving the work product doctrine, which is "broader and more
robust than the attorney-client privilege." However, the court did not explain,
however, how an accounting firm's work became "attorney work product." This
is significant because the § 7525 privilege [which was not expressly raised in the
case] does not have a "work product" variant.
0 The opinion discusses four factors
relevant to the applicability of the derivative privilege: (1) whether the advice was
provided to the counsel or the client; (2) whether the in-house counsel also acts as
a corporate officer; (3) whether the accountant is regularly employed as the client's
auditor or advisor; and (4) which parties initiated or received the communications.
7. Long-Term Capital Holdings rulings. Long-Term Capital
Holdings v. United States, 90 A.F.T.R.2d 2002-7446, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,105
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(D. Conn. 10/30/02), modified by, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1139, 2003-1 U.S.T.C.
50,304 (D. Conn. 2/14/03). In connection with a transaction, the taxpayer
obtained opinions from Sherman & Sterling and King & Spalding relating to
different aspects of the transaction. Without specifically disclosing the K&S
opinion letter itself, the taxpayer revealed to its tax accountant that it had a "more
likely than not" opinion with respect to the allowability of the deduction. The S&S
opinions, in contrast, were voluntarily disclosed in the course of the audit. The
magistrate held that disclosure of existence of the K&S opinion and that it was a
more likely than not opinion with respect to allowance of the deduction disclosed
the gist of the opinion and thus was an express subject matter waiver even though
the disclosure was extra-judicial. In addition, the magistrate alternatively reasoned
that voluntary disclosure of the S&S opinions, while asserting privilege as to K&S
opinion regarding a different aspect of the same transaction, was an attempt to use
the "privileged communications as both a shield and a sword." The magistrate
found implied waiver as to the K&S opinion. The alternative holding is confusing,
however, because the magistrate also factored in the express waiver resulting from
the disclosure of the existence of the K&S opinion to its tax accountant.
Nevertheless, the magistrate ultimately concluded that the K&S opinion could
constitute work product under Second Circuit's application of the doctrine to
documents prepared "in anticipation of litigation," in United States v. AdIman, 134
F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the magistrate required submission of
documents for an in camera inspection.
0 On reconsideration, the magistrate found
that the S&S opinion was not privileged because it was prepared for the purpose
of ascertaining the basis of a partnership interest and thus was a record that had to
be made available to the IRS under Reg. § 1.6001-1(a). Since the S&S opinion was
not privileged to begin with, its disclosure was not a subject matter waiver.
Furthermore, after considering additional facts the K&S opinion was found not to
deal with the same issues as the S&S opinion, and thus the disclosure of the S&S
opinion was not a waiver with respect to the K&S opinion. However, the
magistrate reaffirmed that the disclosure of existence of the K&S opinion and that
it was a more likely than not opinion with respect to the allowance of the deduction
disclosed the gist of opinion and thus was an express waiver, but rather than being
a subject matter waiver - as originally held - the waiver was only of those portions
of the opinion letter reflecting the matter actually disclosed. Finally, the magistrate
held that the K&S opinion was opinion attorney work product that was not
discoverable by the IRS.
8. Attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine can
shield documents from the IRS, but you've got to have a privilege log. Toler
v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2262,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,476 (S.D. Ohio
4/29/03). In connection with a criminal investigation [prior to a referral to the
Justice Department], the IRS issued a summons seeking the taxpayer's documents,
including all records used or resulting from preparation of the taxpayer's tax
returns, to Kiesling, an accountant-attorney, who had advised the taxpayer on
various tax matters in his capacity as an attorney. Kiesling represented the taxpayer
in the criminal matter until August 2000, when the taxpayer retained another law
firn, "SZD," which in turn retained Kiesling. Because prior to August 2000,
Kiesling did not possess any of the documents in question, the summons was
quashed in that regard. However, if Kiesling possessed any documents or obtained
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any information described in the summons that were created or obtained after the
taxpayer retained SZD - a fact that was not admitted - the documents and
information were protected by the attorney-client privilege to the extent that they
"serve[d] to disclose confidential legal communications between [taxpayer] and
SZD," since Kiesling was SZD's agent. Furthermore, to the extent any relevant
documents were prepared or created to assist in defending against the possible
criminal charges, they were protected by the work product doctrine, regardless of
whether Kiesling was acting as an attorney or accountant after being retained by
SZD. However, because the taxpayer failed to provide a privilege log, the motion
to quash was denied, without prejudice to renew following preparation of a
disclosure log. Finally, the pre-existing documents that were gathered after August
2000 were not protected by the Fifth Amendment because the "fact that the
contents of such documents, to the extent they exist, may be incriminating does not
render the production of those documents incriminating."
9. A lawyer's description and opinion regarding a prepackaged
tax shelter transaction is not privileged. Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corporation, 268
F.Supp.2d 627,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5125, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,558 (W.D. N.C.
6/24/03). The IRS served an administrative summons on Wachovia seeking
investor lists, documents, and other information relating to potentially abusive tax
shelters under Reg. § 301.6112-IT. Investors argued that disclosure of their names
would "be tantamount to disclosure of privileged information" provided by them
to KPMG [§ 7525 privilege] and to Jenkens & Gilchrist [attorney-client privilege],
and that other confidential privileged information would be disclosed by
compliance with the summons. The court found that there was no attorney-client
relationship between the investors and Jenkens & Gilchrist. Rather, Jenkens &
Gilchrist "appear[ed] to have merely sold a package to them which contained a
description of the transaction and a memorandum as to the potential tax
consequences stemming from the transaction." There was no evidence that any
investor "ever had so much as a conversation with an attorney at J & G," and there
was nothing uniquely tied to the individual investors' financial situation. The
package contained no confidential information, was sent to all investors without
any individual tailoring, and was delivered by Wachovia, not Jenkens & Gilchrist.
[I]n this case there is no evidence that J & G was (1) retained by
the client, as opposed to by Wachovia; (2) contacted by the
client, except through Wachovia; (3) providing legal advice
based on individual financial information, as opposed to selling
a tax advantaged structure; and (4) by the terms of its own
agreement, acting as an attorney for the "client."
0 Similarly, the § 7525 privilege did not
apply with respect to KPMG. First, the privilege only applies in cases by or against
the government and before the IRS. This was a suit by investors seeking an
injunction against Wachovia, not a proceeding in which the United States
appeared, and the issuance of an administrative summons to a bank is not a "tax
proceeding" before the IRS. Second, the privilege does not apply "to any written
communication between a federally authorized tax practitioner and a director,
shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or representative of a corporation in
[Vol.6:SI
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
connection with the promotion of the direct or indirect participation of such
corporation in any tax shelter," which exactly described this cases. Third, KPMG
did not provide any advice other than in the context of return preparation, which
is not privileged.
o On 6/26/03, the investors filed a potice
of intent to appeal.
10. There's no client identity privilege when it's the lawyer's tax
return being audited. Naii ar v. United States, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2166, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,470 (S.D. Ind. 4/11/03). The IRS issued a summons to the taxpayer-
lawyer's bank seeking documents relating to the taxpayer's account designated as
an Interest on Lawyers' Trust Account (IOLTA). The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the requested documents were protected by attorney client-privilege.
Banking transactions are not confidential communications between an attorney and
client; they are commercial transactions that disclose the identity of the parties to
the transaction to the third party banking institution. The requested documents were
relevant because "the clients themselves may be instrumental in identifying and
verifying non-income and income items in the attorney's trust account."
11. A § 7602 summons solely for a criminal investigation is OK!
Scotty' s Contracting and Stone, Inc. v. United States, 326 F.3d 785, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-2047, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,413 (6th Cir. 4/24/03). The IRS issued
summonses to accountants for Scotty's Contracting and its owner, Scott, "to
determine whether... has unreported federal income tax liabilities .. ., and
whether... Scott has committed any offense under the internal revenue laws." The
Court of Appeals (Judge Gibbons) rejected the government's argument that
Scotty's Contracting lacked standing to challenge the summonses because they
were issued for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation of Scott, not Scotty's.
However, the court held that under § 7602, as amended in 1982, the IRS may
validly issue a summons pursuant for the sole purpose of a criminal investigation,
as long as the case has not yet been referred to the Justice Department. Accord:
United States v. Millman, 822 F.2d 305,308 (2d Cir. 1987); Pickel v. United States,
746 F.2d 176, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. G & G Adver. Co., 762 F.2d
632 (8" Cir. 1985); United States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.1987); La
Mura v. United States, 765 F.2d 974 (11th Cir. 1985).
12. Chief Counsel sets forth the rules for playing hardball by
keeping secret certain Chief Counsel Advice. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-
022, 2003 TNT 129-3 (7/1/03), modifying and supplementing Chief Counsel
Notice CC-2002-026 (5/16/02). This notice apprises Chief Counsel employees of
the procedures for processing taxpayer specific Chief Counsel Advice when it is
determined that no portion of a particular CCA need be disclosed to the public
under the provision of § 6110.
C. Litigation Costs
1. Frivolous arguments are painful to lawyers' pocketbooks.
Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 285 (12/16/02). Judge Halpern sua sponte
awarded the government excess attorneys costs of $10,500, payable by
taxpayer's counsel, under § 6673(a)(2), where counsel continued to press a
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frivolous "§ 861 argument" [that only income earned from possessions,
corporations, or the Federal government is subject to tax] originally advanced by
the taxpayer acting pro se.
2. It will warm your heart to know that the sword to push the
IRS to settle has a keen edge. Gladden v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 446 (6/27/03).
The taxpayer made a "qualified offer" under § 7430(c)(4)(E), and after a judicial
decision relating to issues pertinent to the substantive tax adjustment the parties
finally settled the substantive tax adjustment for less than the offer. Temp. Reg. §
1.7430-7T(a) provides that "[t]he provisions of the qualified offer rule do not apply
if the taxpayer's liability under thejudgment... is determined exclusively pursuant
to a settlement... ." Because legal arguments and issues relating to the substantive
issues were litigated and decided by a court, the judgment was not regarded as
merely pursuant to a settlement. Thus the taxpayer's qualified offer was not limited
by the settlement limitation on qualified offers in section § 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I).
Accordingly, the taxpayers qualified as a prevailing party under § 7430(c)(4) by
reason of section 7430(c)(4)(E).
3. Florida Country Clubs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 3
(2/3/04). Even though § 7430(c)(2) provides that reasonable administrative cost
include costs incurred after the IRS sends a 30-day letter, attorney's fees are not
available with respect to a case in which the IRS has issued a 30-day letter but
which has been settled without either an deficiency notice or Appeals decision
having been issued. Although the definition of "reasonable administrative costs"
includes costs incurred from the date of the 30-day letter, the government still has
not "taken a position" for purposes of § 7430(c)(7) until a deficiency notice or
Appeals decision has been issued, and thus the taxpayer cannot be a "prevailing
party" as defined in § 7430(c)(4).
D. Statutory Notice
1. The IRS does not have to comply with at least one section of
the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998. Elings v. Commissioner, 324
F.3d 1110, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1648,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 150,357 (9th Cir. 4/8/03).
The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to comply with § 3463(a) of the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, an uncodified provision, stating that the
IRS "shall include on each notice of deficiency.., the date determined by [the
IRS] as the last day on which the taxpayer may file a petition in the Tax Court,"
does not invalidate the deficiency notice. Accord Rochelle v. Commissioner, 116
T.C. 356 (2001), aft'd, 293 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Commissioner, 275
F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2001).
E. Statute of Limitations
1. The Eighth Circuit rejects a thirty-year-old Revenue Ruling.
Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-374, 2003-1
U.S.T.C. 50,164 (8th Cir. 1/3/03). Section 6532(a) allows the IRS to agree to an
extension of time [beyond the normal two year period of limitations] for filing a
refund suit. In Rev. Rul. 71-57, 1971-1 C.B. 405, the IRS ruled that such an
agreement was valid only if the agreement is executed before the statutory time
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expired. The court of appeals held that Rev. Rul. 71-57 misconstrues § 6532(a)(2),
and that an agreement to extend the statute of limitations executed by the IRS after
it had expired was valid. The court reasoned that § 6501, the provision limiting the
period for the IRS's to assess taxes allows the period to be extended "by
subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period
previously agreed upon," but that § 6532(a)(2) contains no such language; and the
inference therefore is that the agreement need not be entered into before the period
expires, because to "do so renders the above quoted portion of § 6501
'insignificant, if not wholly superfluous."'
2. Brosi v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 5 (1/13/03). Tolling of the
statute of limitation under § 6511(h) is not available to a taxpayer who serves as a
"care-giver" to a relative; it applies only in the case of a serious mental or physical
disability of the individual taxpayer seeking relief.
3. The government end-runs the statute of limitations via a
setoff. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 271, 91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-1035, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,267 (2/20/03). Without any particular statutory
authority, the government may setoff an erroneous refund against other refunds due
to the taxpayer. If the other refund relates to the same taxpayer, tax, and tax year,
the government can setoff the prior erroneous refund even if the statute of
limitations on bringing suit for the erroneous refund has expired. In this case, an
erroneous overpayment of interest on overpayment of income tax was setoff
against a subsequent refund claim. The IRS did allow the taxpayer a deduction for
the amount of the setoff in the year of the setoff.
4. Counting the days on the calendar. Rev. Rul. 2003-41,2003-17
I.R.B. 814 (4/28/03). If pursuant to § 7503 [providing that, if the last day for filing
a return falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the return will be considered
timely if filed on the next succeeding day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday], a taxpayer files a timely return after April 15, e.g., on April 17, then the
§ 6511 statute of limitations for filing a refund claim expires three years after the
extended filing date, e.g. April 17. But if the taxpayer had filed a timely return
before April 15, when the due date was extended by § 7503 to a later date, a refund
claim filed after April 15 three years later is not timely, because §6513(b)(1) treats
wage withholding as paid on April 15, and § 7503 does not affect § 6513(b)(1).
5. Regulations on the statute of limitations suspension when
enforcement is sought with respect to a designated summons issued to a
corporation. REG-208199-91, Suspension of Limitations Period, 68 F.R. 44905
(7/31/03). Proposed regulations under § 6503(j), relating to the suspension of the
statute of limitations when a case is brought with respect to a "designated" or
"related" summons issued to a corporation.
6. No Mulligan for the Tax Court and the IRS. Carroll v. United
States, 339 F.3d 61, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5650,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,608 (2d Cir.
8/5/03). For purposes of suspending the statute of limitations for deficiencies
pending a Tax Court order in a docketed case, the order is entered under § 7459
when it is signed, docketed, and served, even if the document itself is undated due
to a clerical error. The Tax Court's order vacating its earlier undated order and
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reentering the original order did not restart the statute of limitations - either
because the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to vacate its first order or because the
second order was a "non-substantive housekeeping document" - and the
assessment was untimely.
7. When does a taxpayer become subject to the "duty of
consistency" rule? Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
6298,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,705 (6th Cir. 9/30/03), rev'g T.C. Memo. 2001-48. The
Sixth Circuit held that the duty of consistency rule does not apply when the
taxpayer merely makes a mistake of law that the Commissioner does not challenge
(a "mutual mistake of law"), rather than an affirmative misrepresentation; in such
a case the taxpayer subsequently may claim the deduction in the proper year, even
though the year of the erroneous deduction is closed. The taxpayer originally
claimed an alimony deduction in 1993, when an amount escrowed with the state
court was paid to his ex-wife; in a subsequent Tax Court proceeding with respect
to 1990, the taxpayer claimed the deduction properly should have been allowed
under § 461(f) in 1990 when the amount was paid over to the state court. The case
was remanded for a finding on whether the taxpayer made a misrepresentation or
there was merely a mutual mistake of law [and whether the payment actually was
alimony].
8. Martin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-288 (10/8/03). An
unauthorized Tax Court petition filed by the taxpayer's former wife's attorney with
respect to a statutory notice relating to a year for which they filed ajoint return, and
which was dismissed with respect to the taxpayer on his motion, nevertheless
[pursuant to § 6503(a)(1)] suspended the statute of limitations on assessment.
9. The statute of limitations remains suspended until the IRS
acknowledges the withdrawal of an offer in compromise. United States v.
Donovan, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-6762 (6th Cir. 10/31/03). Form 656, on which an
offer in compromise is submitted provides that the statute of limitations is
suspended "while the offer is pending (see (m) above).., and for one additional
year beyond each of the time periods identified in this paragraph." Paragraph (m)
provides: "The offer is pending starting with the date an authorized IRS official
signs this form and accepts my/our waiver of the statutory periods of limitation.
The offer remains pending until an authorized IRS official accepts, rejects or
acknowledges withdrawal of the offer in writing." The court of appeals (Judge
Boggs) held that when the taxpayer withdrew his offer on April 18, 2000, the
statute of limitations continued to be suspended until the IRS acknowledged the
withdrawal on April 28, 2000. As a result, the statute of limitations expired the day
after the suit for collection was filed, not nine days earlier.
F. Liens and Collections
1. A QDRO creates an interest in a pension fund that trumps a
later federal tax lien. United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 947,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
5606,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,636 (8th Cir. 7/31/03). When the IRS attempted to levy
on a delinquent taxpayer's pension fund, his ex-wife, who had an interest in the
fund under a valid QDRO, intervened. The court (Judge Riley) held that as a result
of the QDRO, the ex-wife was a "judgment lien creditor" with a perfected interest,
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regardless of whether she had satisfied state law perfection requirements.
Furthermore, a modification of the QDRO related back to the date of the original
QDRO. Accordingly, her claim had priority over a subsequent federal tax lien.
2. The taxpayer won the procedural battle but lost the
substantive war. Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 114 (3/6/03). In a
reviewed opinion by Judge Chiechi, the Tax Court held (majority of 8, with 7
judges concurring) that in a § 6330 due process hearing, the Tax Court has
jurisdiction to determine whether the U.S. Bankruptcy Court previously had
discharged the taxpayers from unpaid income tax liabilities for the years in
question. [The bankruptcy court order simply provided "the Debtor is released
from all dischargeable debts."] PS - the taxpayer lost on the merits.
3. It can be expensive to seek judicial review of a §§ 6320/6330
due process hearing primarily for purposes of delay. Roberts v. Commissioner,
329 F.3d 1224, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1673, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,359 (11th Cir.
3/13/03), affg 118 T.C. 365 (5/3/02). In reviewing the Appeals Officer's decision
in a §§ 6320/6330 due process hearing that collection of a tax shown on the return
but not paid was warranted, Judge Chiechi held that a computer generated record
of assessment on Form RACS 006 complied with the requirements of Reg. §
301.6203-1; a signed Assessment Certificate, Form 23C, is not required. A $10,000
penalty under § 6673(a)(1) was imposed on the taxpayer for petitioning for review
of the §§ 6320/6330 due process hearing primarily for purposes of delay. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the taxpayer's due process claims without merit
and that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions.
4. Administrative levy on property held as tenants by the
entirety for one spouse's tax liability is OK. Hatchett v. United States, 330 F.3d
875, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-2457, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,504 (6th Cir. 6/4/03). The
Sixth Circuit held that pursuant to Craft v. United States, 535 U.S. 274 (2002)
[holding that under § 6321 a tax lien for one spouse's tax liability attached to that
spouse's interest in real property held with his wife an tenants by the entirely], the
IRS had to power under § 6331 to levy on the taxpayer-husband's interest in real
property held as tenants by the entirety by seizing and selling the entire property
and accounting to the wife for her interest.
5. Timeliness counts. Herrick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-
167 (6/9/03). Special Trial Judge Armen held that where the taxpayer fails to file
a timely request for a collection due process hearing, the Tax Court lacks
jurisdiction to review a the IRS's decision in a "decision letter" following an
"equivalent hearing." It was irrelevant that the IRS had erroneously advised the
taxpayer that he had been granted an extension of time to request the due process
hearing, because Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255 (2001), held that the
Commissioner is not authorized to waive the time period requirements in § 6330.
6. You have a right to make an oral recording of the frivolous
arguments you make in a due process hearing, even if you can't do so in an
ordinary Appeals conference. Keene v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 8 (7/8/03). In
a reviewed opinion (Judge Dawson) adopting the opinion of Special Trial Judge
Armen, the Tax Court held that § 7521(a)(1) provides taxpayers the right to audio
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record a § 6330 due process hearing. Several concurrences pointed out that the
holding did not invalidate any other IRS procedures or regulations regarding the
ordinary Appeals process.
* Judge Chiechi (joined by Judge Cohen
and Swift) dissented on the grounds that § 7521 was intended to apply only to the
in-person audit interviews and the in-person collection interviews that existed in
1988, when § 7521 was enacted, and did not intend the provision to apply to
voluntary conferences initiated by taxpayers "conducted in an informal setting in
order to review and consider actions taken by the examination division or the
collection division of the IRS and to discuss the facts and the law relating to such
actions for the purpose of settling or resolving those matters without resort to
litigation."
* Judge Swift dissented on the grounds
that the taxpayer had raised only frivolous argument and should not be permitted
to complain about procedural questions to further delay the proceedings.
7. Sometimes it's a return, sometimes it isn't. Swanson v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. 111 (8/28/03). A substitute for a return prepared by the
IRS pursuant to § 6020 is not a return for purposes of § 523(a)(1)(B) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Because the taxpayer had not filed any returns for the year in
issue, he was not discharged from his income tax liabilities by the discharge in
bankruptcy.
8. Procedures for submitting an offer in compromise. Rev. Proc.
2003-71, 2003-36 I.R.B. 517 (9/8/03). This revenue procedure explains the
procedures for submitting an offer in compromise, and the procedures followed by
the IRS in processing the offer. It is effective as of 8/21/03, except the fee
provisions, which are effective 11/1/03.
9. Rev. Rul. 2003-108,2003-44 I.R.B. 963 (11/3/03). For purposes
of § 6323(a), a purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor or
judgment lien creditor is protected against a statutory tax lien for which a notice of
federal tax lien has not been filed notwithstanding actual knowledge of the
statutory tax lien.
10. Montgomery v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 1 (1/22/04).
Because no deficiency notice is issued when the IRS attempts to collect unpaid
taxes shown as due on the return filed by the taxpayer, at a § 6330 collection due
process hearing the taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of the tax
liability reported on the original tax return. The taxpayer's did not have any other
opportunity to "contest" the liability.
G. Innocent Spouse
1. A limitation on claiming the assessment is barred by the
statute of limitations. Block v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 62 (1/23/03). Judge Ruwe
held that he Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 6015(e) to review the
Commissioner's denial of innocent spouse relief pursuant to a stand alone petition
does not permit the taxpayer seeking innocent spouse relief to raise other
substantive or procedural claims (e.g., the statute of limitations on assessments).
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2. Appeal rights for taxpayers seeking relief under § 66. Rev.
Proc. 2003-19, 2003-5 I.R.B. 371 (2/3/03). This revenue procedure provides
guidance regarding administrative appeal rights of a taxpayer seeking relief from
tax liability under § 66(c). [Section 66(c) provides relief for a spouse who does not
file a joint return, and does not know of or include in income certain items of
community income attributable to the other spouse, if it would be "inequitable" to
include the items in the innocent spouse's gross income.]
3. Sorry Kathryn, the Tax Court is indeed a court of limited
jurisdiction. Bernal v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 102 (2/20/03). The taxpayer, a
resident of a community property state, sought relief under § 66(c) from tax
liability for community income earned by her spouse, from whom she lived apart
and was in the process of divorcing and with whom she did not file a joint return.
The Commissioner denied the relief. And the taxpayer filed a stand-alone petition
for review of the Commissioner's decision. The Tax Court dismissed the petition
because § 66(c) does not contain a provision parallel to § 6015(e) providing for
review by the Tax Court of the Commissioner's decision not to grant innocent
spouse relief: 'There is nothing in the statute or legislative history from which we
could conclude that Congress intended to provide independent ("stand alone")
review by the Tax Court of the denial of a claim for relief under section 66."
4. Innocent spouse relief for the dead. Rev. Rul. 2003-36,2003-18
I.R.B. 849 (5/5/03). An executor may pursue an existing § 6015 request for
innocent spouse relief made during decedent's lifetime, and he has authority under
§ 6903 to file a request for innocent spouse relief under § 6015 "as long as the
decedent had satisfied any applicable requirements while alive."
5. "[S]ince refunds are included in the relief provided under
section 6015,... a request for relief under section 6015 encompasses a request
for a refund of tax to the extent permitted under section 6015." Washington v.
Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137 (4/21/03). The taxpayer and her then husband filed
a joint return for 1989, reflecting her salary income and his self-employment
income, that showed tax owed, but did not pay the tax, beyond the wage
withholding on the taxpayer's salary. The IRS garnished the taxpayer's wages and
applied overpayments of her tax from 1992 and 1994-98 to the unpaid 1989 tax
liability. The IRS denied the taxpayer's request for § 6015 equitable relief. Judge
Jacobs held that the IRS had abused its discretion because it had not taken into
account the extent of the economic hardship that the taxpayer would suffer if relief
were not granted and the facts established that the unpaid tax was attributable to the
taxpayer's former husband's income and she had no knowledge of reason to
believe at the time the returns was signed that he would not pay it. No factors in
Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 or Reg. § 301.6343-1 weighed against
granting relief. The court also rejected the IRS's argument that even if the taxpayer
was entitled to relief under § 6015(f), the provision did not apply to the portion of
the tax liability that was paid on or before July 22, 1998 [the date of enactment of
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998], for which she
was seeking a refund. Section 6015 applies to the full amount of any preexisting
tax liability for a particular taxable year, if any of that liability remained unpaid as
of July 28, 1998, and not just to the portion of tax liability that remained unpaid
thereafter [following Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49 (2001)]. However,
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pursuant to § 6015(g)(1) the taxpayer's right to a refund was limited to amounts for
which claims were filed within the periods in § 6511 - in this case amounts paid
within two years prior to filing the refund claim. Taxpayer's letters to a revenue
officer seeking to have her account placed on "uncollectible status" and requesting
abatement of interest and penalties on the grounds that her husband owned the
taxes constituted a sufficient informal refund request.
6. The Tax Court is the Chancellor under § 6015(f). Wiest v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-91 (3/27/03). The Commissioner's denial of §
6015(f) equitable innocent spouse relief was arbitrary where only $900 of a $4,162
underpayment (after wage withholding) was attributable to the requesting spouse's
income, and the nonrequesting spouse had handled the preparation and filing of the
return. In light of the nonrequesting spouse's "pattern of deception," the taxpayer
had no reason to know that she would not pay the tax shown on the return, and the
IRS erred in treating signing the return as knowledge or reason to know that the tax
would not be paid. Furthermore, the IRS's calculation of the taxpayer's share of the
unpaid tax was arbitrary.
7. You might be able to wriggle out of a closing agreement under
the power of § 6015. Hopkins v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 451 (6/30/03). The
taxpayer-wife (Yvonne) filed a request for innocent spouse relief under § 6015
with respect to 1982 and 1983. The taxpayers had reported losses from a
partnership for those years; in 1988 they signed a closing agreement under § 7121
with respect to adjustments relating to the deductions. In a subsequent bankruptcy
the taxpayer-wife sought innocent spouse relief under former § 6013(e), but the
bankruptcy court, in a decision that was affirmed [In re Hopkins, 146 F.3d 729 (9th
Cir. 1998)], held that the closing agreement precluded innocent spouse relief. In the
instant case the Commissioner argued that the closing agreement precluded a claim
for relief under § 6015, and also argued that resjudicata and collateral estoppel
precluded the taxpayer's claim. Judge Ruwe held that a closing agreement entered
into prior to the effective date of § 6015 does not preclude the taxpayer from
seeking § 6015 innocent spouse relief, which may be available for any tax that
remained unpaid as of 6/22/98. Nor did resjudicata or collateral estoppel preclude
the claim.
8. When they both have income and erroneous deductions, how
do you apportion liability? Hopkins v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 73 (7/29/03). Mr.
and Mrs. Hopkins filed a joint return on which he claimed erroneous deductions
passed-through from a partnership and she claimed erroneous NOL deductions.
Mrs. Hopkins (Marianne) was denied innocent spouse relief under § 6015(b), but
was granted some apportioned liability relief under § 6015(c). She was granted
relief from tax liability attributable to Mr. Hopkins' erroneous partnership
deductions except for the portion, if any, that offset her income. She was liable for
any deficiencies attributable to her erroneous NOL deductions to the extent they
offset her income, but she was relieved of liability for any remaining portion of the
deficiencies attributable to the NOL that offsets his income. Decision was entered
under Rule 155.
9. But you can't wriggle out of a priorjudgment in a stand alone
innocent spouse petition. Just one bite at the innocent spouse apple. Thurner
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v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 43 (7/11/03). Judge Cohen held that a taxpayer who
had failed to raise a innocent spouse claim in a prior district court proceeding
instituted by the IRS to reduce an assessment to judgment was barred by res
judicata from raising the claim in a stand alone petition if the taxpayer participated
meaningfully in the prior action. Because Mr. Thurner had meaningfully
participated, his claim was barred; whether Mrs. Thurner had materially
participated could not be determined on a motion for summary judgment. On
another issue, the court held that § 6015 relief is not available for tax liabilities that
had been paid prior to 6/22/98.
10. Community property income on separate returns. T.D. 9074,
Treatment of Community Income for Certain Individuals Not Filing Joint Returns,
68 F.R. 41067 (7/10/03). The Treasury has promulgated final regulations under §
66, relating to the treatment of married individuals in community property states
who do not file joint income tax returns. The regulations deal primarily with issues
under § 66(c) [relief from community property rules]. The regulations apply only
to community income, and provide that the law of the state in which the taxpayer
is domiciled determines whether income is community property. The regulations
apply an item-by-item approach to § 66(c) relief, and provide that knowledge of
the source of community income or the income-producing activity, without
knowledge of the specific amount of income, is sufficient knowledge to preclude
relief.
11. "Equitable relief" revenue procedure. Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
2003-32 I.R.B. 296 (7/24/03). Rules for spouses requesting equitable relied from
income tax liability under § 6015(f) or its community-property equivalent, § 66(c).
12. Zoglman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-268 (9/12/03). The
Tax Court denied § 6015(c) apportioned innocent spouse relief with respect to an
understatement attributable to the taxpayer's spouse's omitted social security
benefits because the taxpayer had actual knowledge of the amount of spouse's
social security benefits.
13. Principal purpose of separation was to transfer assets under
the guise of state family law. Ohrman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-301
(10/29/03). Section 6015(c)(4) provides that an allocated liability election under §
6015(c) is ineffective to the extent of the value of property transferred from the
spouse to whom an erroneous item is attributable to the spouse making the election,
if the principal purpose of the transfer was tax avoidance. Any transfer occurring
after the date one year before the taxpayer receives a thirty-day letter proposing a
deficiency is presumed to have the proscribed purpose regardless of its actual
motivation, unless the transfer was pursuant to a divorce or separation and the
taxpayer proves that it did not have the proscribed purpose. Judge Cohen held that
a transfer of assets pursuant to legal separation within one year before taxpayers
received a thirty-day letter, after which the spouses continued to reside together,
was subject to the § 5015(c)(4) exception to apportioned liability because the
principal purpose for the legal separation was to transfer assets under the guise of
state family law.
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14. Election not made within two years of first collection activity.
Campbell v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 290 (11/24/03). Pursuant to §§
6015(b)(1)(E) and (c)(3)(B) [and Rev. Proc. 2000-15, § 5, 2001-1 C.B. 447], an
innocent spouse election must be made within two years of the IRS's first
collection activity against the individual making the election. In this case, Judge
Foley held that an offset of an overpayment for one year as credit against an unpaid
tax liability for another year, pursuant to § 6402(a), is a collection activity. As a
result, the taxpayer's election was not timely.
15. Ewing v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. No. 2 (1/28/04). In a reviewed
opinion by Judge Colvin, the Tax Court held that even though the standard for
reviewing the Commissioner's failure to grant equitable relief under § 6015(f) is
abuse of discretion, the Tax Court's review is not necessarily limited to the facts
that were in the administrative record. Judges Halpem, Holmes, Chiechi, and Foley
dissented.
16. They're literally dying to try to get § 6015(c) relief. Jonson's
Estate v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106 (2/8/02). In an innocent spouse case
involving tax shelter deductions that was appealable to the Tenth Circuit, the Tax
Court applied the Ninth Circuit's liberal standard from Price v. Commissioner, 887
F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989), requiring only that a spouse seeking relief "establish that
she did not know and had no reason to know that the deduction would give rise to
a substantial understatement," on the basis of a favorable citation to Price in an
unpublished Tenth Circuit opinion. However, the Tax Court denied § 6015(b) relief
because the spouse was well educated, active in her husband's financial affairs, had
full knowledge of the facts of the investment, and benefited from the
understatement. The deceased wife's personal representative [her husband] made
a § 6015(c) apportioned liability election more than 12 months after her death [and
the Commissioner did not challenge the representative's procedural right to make
the election], but § 6015(c) relief was denied. The personal representative "stepped
into the shoes" of the deceased spouse, and she did not qualify for § 6015(c) relief
because at the time of her death she and her husband were not divorced or
separated and were members of the same household. Although H. Rept. No. 105-
559 at page 252, n.16 states that a taxpayer is no longer married if he or she is
widowed, Congress did not intend § 6015(c) to apply to the estate of a spouse who
was "happily married" at the time of death. Equitable relief under § 6015(f) also
was denied.
a. Affirmed, but possibly on different grounds. 353 F.3d
1181,93 A.F.T.R.2d 2004-323,2004-1 U.S.T.C. 50,122 (10th Cir. 12/30/03). The
Tenth Circuit (Judge Hartz) affirmed, but the reasoning might [or might not be]
slightly different. The court of appeals concluded that although the estate could
perform the act of filing request for relief, it could not satisfy the condition that the
"individual" seeking relief was "no longer married to" or "not a member of the
same household as" the other the spouse. Only an "individual" can meet that
condition and an "individual" is a living being, not a decedent's estate. Thus, there
was no individual eligible for relief.
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H. Miscellaneous
1. Published guidance will be followed by the courts. Rauenhorst
v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157 (10/7/02). Taxpayers transferred warrants to four
charities, which the charities sold shortly thereafter. At the time of the transfer, the
taxpayers knew of a contemplated acquisition of the corporation. Judge Ruwe held
that the taxpayers were not subject to tax on the charities' sale of warrants, under
the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, because Rev. Rul. 78-197, 1978-1
C.B. 83, holds that the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable
to donated property where the charitable donees are not legally obligated, nor can
they be compelled, to sell the contributed property.
a. Chief Counsel reminds IRS lawyers. Chief Counsel
Notice CC-2002-043 (10/17/02). The IRS reminds Chief Counsel attorneys of the
requirement to follow published guidance in papers filed in the Tax Court or in
defense or suit letters sent to the Department of Justice.
b. And again, this time with more specificity. Chief
Counsel Notice CC-2003-014 (5/8/03). Clarifies the guidance of CC-2002-043 to
provide specific rules regarding the requirement to follow published guidance.
* Rule 1: Chief Counsel attorneys may not
argue contrary to final guidance; they should generally follow final or temporary
regulations in force even if the Service has subsequently issued proposed
regulations which might yield a different result;
0 Rule 2: proposed regulations have no
legal effect unless and until they are adopted; proposed regulations should not be
the subject of PLRs and TAMs;
0 Rule 3: if there are no final or temporary
regulations, Chief Counsel attorneys may not take a position that is inconsistent
with proposed regulations;
* Rule 4: perceived conflict between
proposed regulations and final guidance (or between two or more pieces of
nonregulatory final guidance) should be coordinated;
0 Rule 5: case law invalidating or
disagreeing with the Service's published guidance does not alter rule 1 or 3; and
0 Rule 6: The government's authority to
resolve cases through settlement or other dispute resolution mechanisms remains
unchanged, so long as the rules set forth above are not violated.
2. Just how detailed a fimding on the burden of proof issue does
the Eighth Circuit want the Tax Court to make? Griffin v. Commissioner, 315
F.3d 1017,91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-486,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 150,186 (8th Cir. 1/14/03),
rev'g T.C. Memo. 2002-6 (1/8/02). Reversing the Tax Court, the Eighth Circuit,
in a per curiam opinion, held that the taxpayer had introduced credible evidence
that payments of real estate taxes on property owned by an S corporation in which
he was a shareholder were made in his capacity as a proprietor of a business, not
in his capacity as a shareholder. (If the payments had been made in his capacity as
a proprietor they could have been deductible.) The court accepted the
Commissioner's definition of "credible evidence": "'the quality of evidence which,
after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision
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on the issue if no contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to the judicial
presumption of IRS correctness)"', and found this standard satisfied by the
testimony of the taxpayer and his accountant. The Commissioner had cross
examined the taxpayer's witnesses, but had not introduced any evidence. The case
was remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings to determine if the
Commissioner met the burden of proof, even though the Tax Court opinion, in a
footnote, stated that its decision would have been the same if the Commissioner
had borne the burden of proof. Perhaps tipping its hand that it wanted the taxpayer
to win, the Court of Appeals admonished the Tax Court that "[i]f the same
conclusion is reached by the tax court without a new hearing, an explanation is
warranted as to how the existing record justifies the conclusion that the
Commissioner has met his burden of proof."
0 According to the Tax Court, the
taxpayers did "not contend that the real property taxes in question were imposed
upon them, that they owned the real property against which the taxes were
assessed, or that they owned any equitable or beneficial interest in the real property
that might entitle them to a deduction under section 164.... The only evidence
regarding the nature of [taxpayers'] business activities consists of [one taxpayer's]
summary and uncorroborated testimony. He testified, with little elaboration, that
he has been a building contractor and land developer for about 30 years, during
which time he has developed about one project a year. On cross-examination, he
testified that his construction and real-estate development businesses are not
separate businesses, but are 'all tied together. They're all - any business I have is
- if I - if they are - oftentimes I incorporate, because of the liability aspect. They
are Subchapter S if they are.' . . . [T]here is no credible evidence that the tax
payments were made with respect to such activities. To the contrary, [taxpayer's]
accountant testified that the tax payments were reported on Schedule E because
they were attributable to [his] S corporations.... [Taxpayers] failed to introduce
credible evidence to establish that [taxpayer's] failure to make the tax payments
would have caused direct and proximate adverse consequences to any businesses
conducted in [taxpayers'] individual capacities. [One taxpayer] testified that he
made the tax payments 'in order to preserve my integrity and my standing with the
bank, and my good name, my goodwill.' There is no evidence to indicate, however,
to what extent [the taxpayer's] failure to make the tax payments would have
resulted in any damage to his reputation or creditworthiness. [Taxpayers] have
introduced no credible evidence to show that petitioner made the tax payments to
protect the reputation of any business operation conducted in [their] individual
capacities. On the basis of [taxpayer's] testimony, we are unable to conclude that
the tax payments would have represented ordinary expenses to advance any
business carried on in [taxpayers'] individual capacities, as opposed to capital
outlays to establish or purchase goodwill or business standing...."
3. Burton Kanter in trouble again. Investment Research
Associates, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407 (12/15/99). In a 600-page
opinion Burton Kanter was held liable for the §6653 fraud penalty by reason of his
being "the architect who planned and executed the elaborate scheme with respect
to the kickback income payments .... In our view, what we have here, purely and
simply, is a concerted effort by an experienced tax lawyer [Kanter] and two
corporate executives [Claude Ballard and Robert Lisle] to defeat and evade the
payments of taxes and to cover up their illegal acts so that the corporations
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[employing the two corporate executives] and the Federal Government would be
unable to discover them."
a. So far, he is unable to wriggle out, the way he did 25
years ago when he was acquitted by a jury. 0 The taxpayers subsequentlymoved
to have access to the special trial judge's "reports, draft opinions, or similar
documents" prepared under Tax Court Rule 183(b). They based their motion on
conversations with two unnamed2' Tax Courtjudges that the original draft opinion
from the special trial judge was changed by Judge Dawson before he adopted it,
They were turned down because the Tax Court held that the documents were
related to its internal deliberative processes. See, Tax Court Order denyingmotion,
2001 TNT 23-31 (4/26/00) and (on reconsideration) 2001 TNT 23-30 (8/30/00).
Taxpayers sought mandamus from the Fifth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, but
were unsuccessful.
b. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and
taxpayer Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit.
Ballardv. Commissioner 321 F.3d 1037,2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,246,91 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-928 (11 th Cir. 2/13/03), affg T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that changes
allegedly made by the Tax Court Special Trial Judge were improper. Judge Fay
stated:
Even assuming Dick's [taxpayers' lawyer's] affidavit to be true
and affording Petitioners-Appellants all reasonable inferences, the
process utilized in this case does not give rise to due process
concern. While the procedures used in the Tax Court may be
unique to that court, there is nothing unusual about judges
conferring with one another about cases assigned to them. These
conferences are an essential part of the judicial process when, by
statute, more than one judge is charged with the responsibility of
deciding the case. And, as a result of such conferences, judges
sometimes change their original position or thoughts. Whether
Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared drafts of his report or
subsequently changed his opinion entirely is without import
insofar as our analysis of the alleged due process violation
pertaining to the application of [Tax Court] Rule 183 is
concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will simply not
interfere with another court's deliberative process.
The record reveals, and we accept as true, that the underlying
report adopted by the Tax Court is Special Trial Judge
Couvillion's. Petitioners-Appellants have not demonstrated that
20. Iis partner (and son-in-law) was convicted and imprisoned. See United States v.
Baskes, 649 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981).
21. Kanter's attorney revealed the names of the two judges when asked at oral
argument to the Seventh Circuit as Tax Court Judge Julian Jacobs and Chief Special
Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos. See the text at footnote 1 of Judge Cudahy's dissent in
the Seventh Circuit Kanter Estate opinion, below.
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the Order of August 30, 2000 is inaccurate or suspect in any
manner. Therefore, we conclude that the application of Rule 183
in this case did not violate Petitioners-Appellants' due process
rights. Accordingly, we deny the request for relief and save for
another day the more troubling question of what would have
occurred had Special Trial Judge Couvillion not indicated that the
report adopted by the Tax Court accurately reflected his findings
and opinion.
C. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and
taxpayer Kanter's Estate2' loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh
Circuit Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833, 92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-
5459,2003-2 U.S.T.C. 150,605 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per curiam) (2-1), affg inpart
and rev'g in part T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The court found the nondisclosure of the
special trial judge's original report to be proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's
Ballard opinion. It affirmed the findings on deficiencies, fraud and penalties, but
reversed on the issue of the deductibility of Kanter' s expenses for his involvement
in the aborted sale of a purported John Trumball painting of George Washington
because "Kanter has shown a distinct proclivity to seek income and profit through
activities similar to the failed sale of the painting."
(1) The Supremes will sing on Kanter's grave.
Certiorari was granted. 124 S.Ct. 2066 (4/26/04).
d. And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated but
taxpayer Lisle's Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue in the Fifth Circuit.
Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364,92 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5566,2003-2
U.S.T.C. 50,606 (5th Cir. 7/30/03), affg in part and rev'g in part T.C. Memo.
1999-407. The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and
Seventh Circuits on the nondisclosure of the special trial judge' s original report by
the Tax Court. It affirmed the findings of deficiencies, except for the deficiency in
a closed year because the government's proof of Lisle's fraud did not rise to the
level of "clear and convincing evidence."
4. Alleged settlement based upon Appeals Officer's mistake in
computation is unenforceable. Estate of Halder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2003-84 (3/25/03). The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) declined to enter decision on
a settlement that was reached after an appeals officer faxed the estate's accountant
a valuation that mistakenly listed the proposed value of a partnership interest as $1
million [its 1987 value], as opposed to $1,124,410 [its value as of the 1997 date of
death]. The Tax Court ruled that the appeals officer's offer was based upon a
mistake, so that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. In a
footnote, Judge Vasquez also noted:
Even if we held there was a meeting of the minds, we would
deny the estate's motion because the "settlement" was never
signed or approved by, or even submitted to, any IRS official
21. Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001.
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authorized to approve it. Gardnerv. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 475,
479 (1980).
0 The accountant advised the estate's
lawyers and beneficiary of the mistake and was advised by them not to inform the
Appeals Officer, but instead to accept the $1 million offer.
5. The regulations say I have to file this document at an IRS
office that no longer exists. Notice 2003-19,2003-14 I.R.B. 703 (3/19/03). This
notice provides guidance on the proper locations for filing elections, statements and
the like following the IRS reorganization. The notice provides that, pending
issuance of revised regulations, if a taxpayer files a document as directed in
existing regulations, the Service will forward it to its proper filing location.
6. Strong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-87 (3/25/03). In
response to an IRS reconstruction of the taxpayer's income using the bank deposit
method, the taxpayer claimed that he had held a $165,000 cash hoard at the
beginning of the period under examination, even though he had asserted in a
bankruptcy petition that he had no such cash at that time. The Commissioner
moved for summary judgment on the issue of the existence of the cash hoard on
the grounds that the taxpayer was estopped from claiming its existence, but the
court (Judge Panuthos) denied summary judgment on the grounds that there were
genuine material issues of fact regarding the reason for the omission of the cash
hoard from the bankruptcy petition that might affect the application of estoppel.
7. The TEFRA notice wasn't an unauthorized disclosure even
if some of the recipients turned out not to be partners. Abelein v. United States,
323 F.3d 1210, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1476, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,331 (9th Cir.
3/27/03). The taxpayer, an investor in a tax shelter partnership of which the IRS
was conducting a TEFRA audit, claimed the mailing of final partnership
administrative adjustment (FPAA) forms to all persons who the IRS believed
might have been partners entitled to notice improperly disclosed confidential tax
return information because some notices went to people who were not partners.
There was no doubt that return information had been disclosed, but the IRS argued
that the § 6103(h)(4) exception for disclosure in administrative proceedings
applied. The Court of Appeals (Judge Fernandez) held that the administrative
proceeding exception applied because (1) the taxpayers were parties to the
administrative proceeding, and (2) under § 6231 the IRS must notify all persons
who the IRS believes to be partners in the partnership undergoing the TEFRA
audit.
8. Sign the Form 870 and sue for a refund. Smith v. United States,
328 F.3d 760, 91 A.F.T.R.2d 2003-1919, 2003-1 U.S.T.C. 50,396 (5th Cir.
4/16/03), rev'g 2002-1 U.S.T.C 50,409 (S.D. Tex. 4/1/02), corrected by 2003-1
U.S.T.C 50,176 (S.D. Tex. 11/22/02). The taxpayer, whose deficiency was
determined in a partnership level proceeding, could seek refund of penalties after
executing Form 870 with phrase "Settlement Position" at top. Although the
taxpayer clearly waived right to file a Tax Court petition, neither Form 870, nor
accompanying "penalty report," which taxpayer also signed, clearly indicated that
the taxpayer was his waiving right to contest the penalties through a refund claim.
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9. The ACLU unsuccessfully tries to protect Irwin Schiff's right
to pander fraudulent tax-scams. United States v. Schiff, 269 F.Supp.2d 1262,92
A.F.T.R.2d 2003-5047, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,551 (D. Nev. 6/16/03). The United
States obtained an injunction against Irwin Schiff, an infamous fraudulent tax-scam
promoter. Schiff falsely stated that income earned by individuals is not subject to
federal income taxes, advised customers to file zero-income tax returns, assisted
them in submitting false W-4 forms to stop withholding taxes from wages, helped
them prepare other fraudulent tax documents, and urged customers to inundate the
IRS, federal courts and Department of Justice with frivolous lawsuits and hearings.
The First Amendment did not prevent an injunction against the promotion of the
tax scam though publication and sale of Schiff s book, THE FEDERAL MAFIA, even
though the Nevada ACLU vigorously argued that Schiff should not be censored.
The IRS identified nearly 5,000 zero-income federal income tax returns filed by
approximately 3,100 of Schiff's customers during the past three years using a two-
page attachment referenced in THE FEDERAL MAFIA.
10. You have a choice of forum for review of the Commissioner's
refusal to abate interest. Beall v. United States, 336 F.3d 419, 92 A.F.T.R.2d
2003-5001, 2003-2 U.S.T.C. 50,551 (5th Cir. 6/27/03). The Fifth Circuit (Judge
Garwood) held that a district court has jurisdiction in a refund suit to review for
abuse of discretion the Commissioner's refusal to abate interest. Judge Garwood
reasoned that the grant of jurisdiction to the Tax Court in § 6404(h) was not
exclusive.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Is there a Circular 230 issue lurking here? Veterinary Surgical
Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-48 (2/26/03). An S
corporation failed to treat its sole shareholder/president/sole employee as an
employee for employment tax purposes. The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) denied §
530 relief because the corporation had no reasonable basis for disregarding the
explicit rules of § 3112(d)(1) and Reg. §§ 31.3121(d)-1(b) and 31.3306(i)-1(e),
treating corporate officers as employees. For the same result for earlier years, see
Veterinary Surgical Consultants, P.C. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 141 (2001).
* The taxpayer was a client of Joseph M
Grey, a tax practitioner who suffered a similar fate with respect to his own S
Corporation in Joseph M. Grey Public Accountant, P.C. v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.
121 (2002).
0 On the same day the Tax Court handed
down five almost identical cases involving other clients of Joseph M Grey: Mike
Graham Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-49 (2/26/03); Superior
Proside, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-50 (2/26/03); Specialty Transport
& Deivery Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-51 (2/26/03); Nu-
Look Design, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-52 (2/26/03); Water-Pure
Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-53 (2/26/03).
2. "Nothing in the language or legislative history of section 530
leads us to the conclusion that denial of section 530 relief was meant to be an
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additional penalty for the failure to timely rile information returns .... "
Medical Emergency Care Associates, S.C. v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. No. 15
(5/19/03). The taxpayer provided hospitals with emergency room physicians and
treated those physicians as independent contractors. The taxpayer did not treat the
physicians as employees for any period, filed all tax returns treating the physicians
as independent contractors, and had a reasonable basis for not treating the
physicians as employees. For the year in question however, the taxpayer filed the
information returns after the due date (but before the audit). The Commissioner
denied § 530 relief because the taxpayer failed to timely file Forms 1096 and 1099.
Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 C.B. 518 states that the IRS will not grant § 530 relief
unless all Forms 1099 have been timely filed. Judge Nims refused to follow Rev.
Proc. 85-18 and granted relief, holding that the late filing of information returns did
not preclude the taxpayer from obtaining relief. "Nothing in the language or
legislative history of section 530 leads us to the conclusion that denial of section
530 relief was meant to be an additional penalty for the failure to timely file
information returns, particularly under the circumstances in this case." Because the
court was "unable to ascertain the thoroughness of the agency's consideration or
the validity of its reasoning' it would not "defer to its requirement of timely filing
as a prerequisite to section 530 relief ......
3. Both the taxpayer and the Commissioner argued against Tax
Court jurisdiction, but they were both wrong. Charlotte's Office Boutique v.
Commissioner, 121 T.C. 89 (8/4/03). The Commissioner asserted a deficiency for
unreported employment taxes and additions to tax for 1995 through 1998, and the
taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court under § 7436(a) for a determination of
employment status. Thereafter, the taxpayer conceded that the person whose status
was in question for 1996 through 1998 was an employee, and the parties agreed
that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction over those years because the taxpayer did not
dispute the employment status during those years. The Commissioner argued that
the Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 7436(a) extends only to cases in which a
taxpayer asserts that an individual performing services for the taxpayer is a
nonemployee and the Commissioner has determined that the individual is an
employee. The Tax Court (Judge Laro) held that the agreement of the parties as to
jurisdiction is not dispositive. Section 7436(a) confers not only jurisdiction to
determine whether an individual providing services is an employee, but also
whether an employer is entitled to relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978,
and the correct amounts of employment taxes. The court went on to find that
purported royalties were wages, that § 530 relief was not available, and that
penalties were warranted.
B. Self-employment
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during 2003.
C. Excise Taxes
There were no significant developments regarding this topic during 2003.
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XH. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003
("JGTRRA" or the "2003 Act"), Pub. L. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 was signed by
President Bush on 5/28/03.
0 The 2003 Act accelerated the effective
dates of a number of the income tax provisions enacted in the Economic Growth
and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the "2001 Act"), most significantly, the
reduction of the upper level income tax rates. The 2003 Act also decreased
corporate and other business taxes through preferential depreciation deductions,
and significantly reduced the tax rate on long-term capital gains. Finally, and most
dramatically, the 2003 Act significantly reduced the tax rate on dividends received
on corporate stock, taxing such dividends at the same preferential low rates that
apply to long-term capital gains. Many of the changes in the 2003 Act are
scheduled to sunset after three or four years, and those that are not scheduled for
an earlier sunset, will sunset on 12/31/10, like all of the changes in the 2001 Act.
2. The Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-121,
117 Stat 1335, was signed by President Bush on 11/10/03.
3. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 was signed by
President Bush on 12/8/03.
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